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Police Officers' Perspectives on the Death of George Floyd by Minneapolis Police Officers: A Descriptive Study

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Doctor of Education in Organizational Leadership

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by

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Dedication

This study is dedicated to the memory of my father, Mr. Floyd Henderson, and my mother, Ms. Adelaide L. Sims Henderson. From the time my four siblings and I were very young, both of our parents birthed within each of us a love for reading. Through their determination and by their example of self-sacrifice, they taught us to value a high quality education and encouraged us to always aim high. My parents were my first and the most important and impactful role models for success in life. I owe them a deep debt of gratitude for everything that I have achieved and for the person that I am continually evolving into.

This study is also dedicated to the African Americans that have gone before me, the formerly enslaved people, those that due to societal circumstances that were beyond their control were legally prevented from learning how to read and were not afforded the opportunity to pursue any form of higher education. I remember them, I honor them, and I stand upon their shoulders.

Acknowledgments

No one succeeds without the support of others. I am thankful for the Abilene Christian University professors that pushed me to strive to be the best by asking tough and challenging questions. Their example reinforced in me the philosophy that compromising our standards is never acceptable and should not be tolerated by ourselves or by others.

While finishing my master's degree, I was considering whether or not I should or could pursue the doctorate. One of the people with whom I consulted was the last Mr. Antonio David, the math professor whom I had known for several years and who had previously been my professor on more than one occasion, and he was a dear friend. Mr. David was the consummate professional who was highly regarded and respected by his fellow academics, administrators, and students alike. Mr. David, on more than one occasion, encouraged me to not quit on myself and on the process of completing the doctorate. Though Mr. David did not return to the university to complete his doctorate in mathematics, his goal was to ensure that I completed my doctorate. Unfortunately, Mr. David passed away before I completed the dissertation process. When I walk across the stage at the commencement ceremony, I will be walking for Mr. David and for myself. Thank you, Mr. David, for all of your support and encouragement. Whenever I eat some thin-shelled Texas pecans, I think of you.

There were many professors and friends that kept me motivated, charged, directed, focused, and encouraged, too many to mention by name but I must mention a few. My dissertation chair, Dr. José (Joe) Perez, would not let me quit. The dissertation committee members, Dr. Richard (Rick) Dool and Dr. Karmyn L. Downs, provided their extensive knowledge, expertise, and critical feedback for which I am grateful. To the dissertation committee members, thank you for being so patient with me.

Dr. Kipi Fleming exemplified and reinforced the philosophy of never compromising our standard of excellence for anyone or for any reason. Dr. Dana McMichael, thank you so much for your assistance, guidance, and technical support. I don't know how you do it, but you always get it done. You are a wonder woman.

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Abstract

On May 25, 2020, four Minneapolis police officers reported to the location where an African American man had been accused of trying to use a counterfeit $20 bill in a convenience store. After being taken outside of the store, the man, George Floyd, was eventually placed in the back of a police patrol car, after he was handcuffed. Saying he was claustrophobic and resisting arrest, Mr. Floyd was removed from the patrol car, and placed on the ground on his stomach. One of the patrol officers, the most senior officer present, and a field training officer, placed his knee on Mr. Floyd's neck for more than nine minutes, while Floyd could be heard saying that he could not breathe. Two police officers also held Mr. Floyd down while a third officer conducted traffic control. The officers did not provide any medical assistance, contrary to their training. Mr. Floyd was not later pronounced dead. This study investigated the actions of the four former Minneapolis Police Department patrol officers from an organizational leadership perspective and assessed whether police organizational systems processes, organizational culture, and the organizational leaders' leadership practices influenced the police officers' behavior and choices. The purpose of this qualitative descriptive study was to investigate police officers' perspectives of the incident that resulted in George Floyd's death. The study provided police officers an opportunity to communicate their perspectives, including how Floyd's death has or has not impacted the police officers' leadership and decision-making processes.

Keywords: police history, implicit bias, excessive force and deadly force, police socialization, blue wall of silence, police training, leadership efficacy, learning organization, and police reform

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Chapter 1: Introduction

The study examines the death of Mr. George Floyd on May 25, 2020, in Minneapolis, Minnesota, at the hands of four Minneapolis Police Department police patrol officers from the perspective of police patrol officers. The study also investigates the actions of four former Minneapolis Police Department patrol officers from an organizational leadership perspective. The study assesses whether police organizational systems processes, organizational culture, and the organizational leaders' leadership practices influenced the police officers' attitudes toward the use of excessive force or deadly force(Lee et al., 2013). Though George Floyd, an African American, died due to his interaction with patrol officers of the Minneapolis Police Department, I questioned whether the leadership practices of the four Minneapolis police officers are supported by or endorsed by other police patrol officers. The purpose of this qualitative descriptive study (Bradshaw et al., 2017; Colorafi& Evans, 2016; Leavy, 2017; Milne &Oberle, 2005; Neergaard et al., 2009; Sandelowski, 2010; Turale, 2020) was to investigate police patrol officers' perspectives of the incident that resulted in George Floyd's death and provide police officers an opportunity to communicate their perspectives, including how Floyd's death has or has not impacted the police patrol officers' leadership and decision-making processes.

An introductory statement and background information offers reasoning for the study. During the weekly Zoom meeting with my dissertation chair (J. Perez, personal communication, March 7, 2021), I commented on Derek Chauvin's lack of affect, the non-emotional, blank stare that the (former) police patrol officer of the Minneapolis Police Department displayed during the nearly nine minutes (Thorbecke, 2020) that Chauvin's knee was placed on George Floyd's neck. Chauvin's behavior resulted in Floyd's death on May 25, 2020, in Minneapolis. I wondered if Chauvin's behavior indicated a type of psychopathy and asked the professor, a former police

patrol officer, if he thought Chauvin is a sociopath or a psychopath. The question referenced a previous conversation, during which I learned that my dissertation chair and I share a common interest in psychology (J. Perez, personal communication, February 28, 2021). After hearing the question, the professor paused for a moment. He did not directly answer the question but responded by saying, “He [Chauvin] didn’t create the system; the system created him.”

I am not and do not pretend to be a licensed psychologist qualified to make such determinations about former police patrol officer Chauvin's behavior on May 25, 2020. Yet, the professor's comment ignited a firestorm within me, which resulted in a drive to better understand the organizational factors that contributed to or created the circumstances that resulted in Floyd's death. As an African American and a social scientist interested in future police agency organizational change and reform initiatives, the circumstances surrounding Floyd's death, and real-world police patrol officers’ perspectives of the circumstances and their perceptions of the leadership impact of the incident, are of particular interest.

Statement of the Problem

The problem identified is that law enforcement agency’s leadership practices and organizational culture may socialize police patrol officers to make choices that support and extend the police agency’s “blue wall of silence” (Skolnick, 2002; Westmarland& Rowe, 2018; Wieslander, 2019). The police cultural “blue wall of silence” may result in more African Americans being unnecessarily physically harmed or killed by permitting or condoning, either directly or indirectly, the use of excessive force or deadly force by police patrol officers.

George Floyd, a 46-year-old African American resident of Minneapolis, Minnesota, was confronted by Minneapolis police patrol officers outside of a convenience store after a store clerk called 9-1-1. The store clerk had accused Floyd of using a counterfeit $20.00 bill to pay for

cigarettes (ABC News, 2020; Hill et al., 2020). Initially, two officers arrived on the scene, Lane and Kueng, followed by Chauvin and Thao, who arrived separately in two different vehicles (Hill et al., 2020). After being handcuffed, police patrol officers struggled to place Floyd in the patrol vehicle's rear seat.

Officer Chauvin pulled Floyd from the police car, making Floyd lay face-down on the ground next to the patrol car. Former officers Lane and Kueng, two of the other three police patrol officers present, held Floyd down; Kueng placed his knee in Floyd's back while Lane held Floyd's legs down. Former officer Thao conducted traffic control, preventing bystanders from approaching the scene. Officer Chauvin placed his knee on the back of Floyd's neck, and then transitioned to placing his knee on the side of Floyd's neck (ABC News, 2020).

During investigations of the incident, and as reported by ABC News (2020), Officer Lane questioned Officer Chauvin if they "should roll him on his side," to which Chauvin responded, "No, staying put where we got him." Officer Lane stated he "was worried about excited delirium." Officer Chauvin replied, "That's why we have him on his stomach." Officer Chauvin kept his knee on Floyd's neck for nearly 9minutes. Officer Keung checked Floyd's wrist for a pulse but found none; still, the officers did not move from their positions. None of the officers rendered medical aid to Floyd (Forliti, 2021), which was a violation of the Minneapolis police department policy. An ambulance was called to the scene and took Floyd to Hennepin County Medical Center, where Floyd was pronounced dead (ABC News, 2020).

On April 20, 2021, former officer Chauvin was found guilty of second-degree unintentional murder, third-degree murder, and second-degree manslaughter (Higgins, 2021). On June 25th, 2021, Judge Peter Cahill sentenced former officer Chauvin to 270 months (or 22.5 years) in state prison at the Hennepin County Government Center in Minneapolis (Griffith,

2021). On December 15, 2021, former officer Chauvin pleaded guilty to federal charges of violating George Floyd's civil rights (Hutchinson, 2021).

The remaining three former police officers, Thomas Lane, J. Kueng, and Tou Thao, were charged with aiding and abetting second-degree murder and aiding and abetting second-degree manslaughter. Lane, Kueng, and Thao were charged with "depriving Floyd of his civil rights while acting under government authority" (Silva, 2022). For their failure to stop their fellow officer, Derek Chauvin, from using excessive force, Kueng and Thao faced an additional charge.

In February 2022, former officers Lane, Kueng, and Thao were tried together on the federal charges, and each defendant testified during the trial (Fischer & Sandberg, 2022; Kirkos & Vera, 2022; Ortiz, 2022). On February 24, 2022, Lane, Kueng, and Thao were found guilty of the federal charges (Silva, 2022). On May 18, 2022, former officer Lane pleaded guilty to second-degree manslaughter in the death of George Floyd. July 22, 2022, Lane was sentenced to 30 months (2.5 years) in prison for violating George Floyd's civil rights (CBS News, 2022). On October 24, 2022, Kueng pleaded guilty to manslaughter in Floyd's death (Bogel-Burroughs, 2022). Former officer Thao would not take a plea deal and faced state criminal charges, choosing to have the case adjudicated by a judge instead of a jury trial. On May 2, 2023, Thao was found guilty of aiding and abetting second-degree manslaughter. Thao was scheduled to be sentenced in August 2023 (Levenson & Parks, 2023). On August 7, 2023, former officer Thao was sentenced to 57 months in prison. The state prison sentence of 57 months will be served concurrently with the previous federal sentence of 3.5 years (Hyatt, 2023).

Chauvin was a senior police practitioner with 19years of law enforcement experience at the time of the incident and was a first-line supervisor. Police patrol officers are referred to as front-line officers because they have the most daily interaction with the local community.

Chauvin was also a field training officer (FTO). As an FTO, Chauvin was responsible for training, mentoring, coaching, and guiding less experienced police patrol officers while they earned their police officer certification (Cordner, 2020). FTOs are considered the subject matter expert for patrol officers. Less experienced and recent police academy graduates are assigned to work under an FTO in a probationary status for a specific period that is established by each police agency. Recent police academy graduates are assigned to rotating FTOs so the officer may receive training from more than one FTO.

The police agency's leadership practices and organizational culture may socialize police patrol officers to make choices that support and extend the police academy's "blue wall of silence" (Skolnick, 2002; Westmarland& Rowe, 2018; Wieslander, 2019). The police cultural "blue wall of silence" within the Minneapolis police department may have contributed to George Floyd's death by permitting or condoning the use of excessive force by some police patrol officers. The Minneapolis Police Department's senior leaders' leadership philosophy, the police agency's socialization processes, and police culture may have had detrimental impacts on police patrol officers' decision-making processes when interacting with racial minorities and African Americans in particular. How police organizational system-wide (Stroh, 2015) policies and practices impact police practitioners' decision-making practices warrants further study. There exists a dearth of research related to real-world police patrol officers' perspectives and perceptions, and the impact related to Floyd's death by the four Minneapolis police officers. The study's subject justifies additional research.

Research indicated implicit or unconscious biases, in addition to explicit prejudicial beliefs, may contribute to and result in excessive force or deadly force against African Americans, particularly males, by police officers (Adedoyin et al., 2019; Dukes & Kahn, 2017;

Hall et al., 2016; Petersen, 2019; Price & Payton, 2017; Richardson, 2015; Tolliver et al., 2016). Addressing police patrol officers' perspectives of police leadership practices related to racial bias may contribute to police practitioners' adherence to established organizational policies and possibly contribute to instituting police organizational reform (Goff, 2021; Kerrison et al., 2019; Lum, 2021).

Kaufman and Guerra-López (2013) conceptualized the organizational elements model (OEM) as providing guidance and direction for organizational performance improvement. The OEM has five levels: resources (inputs), activities (processes), micros (organizational accomplishments and contributions), macros (organizational contributions), and mega (societal contributions and contributions). The study addressed some elements of the micros and macros (i.e., organizational elements) and mega (i.e., external elements) systems that may impact the law enforcement agency's leadership practices.

Kaufman and Guerra-López's (2013) concept of OEM is congruent with Chen's (2015) systems theory approach and allows for examining the organization in smaller, more manageable parts. The system's orientation (Stroh, 2015) approach of this study utilizes three theoretical frameworks; Critical race theory (Conyers & Fields, 2020; Glover, 2019), social identity theory (Hogg, 2001; Hogg et al., 2012), and shared leadership theory (Northouse, 2019; Steinheider & Wuestewald, 2008; Wuestewald & Steinheider, 2012).

Lum (2021) conceptualized that the police organizational system is too vast for examination within one study, and that police scientists should conduct police science research on smaller organizational sub-systems. Congruent with a narrow focus and smaller scope, the micros (sub-system) organizational and cultural elements under investigation include the police agency's leadership philosophy, toxic leadership, and masculinity contest culture (MCC; Matos

et al., 2018; Rawski & Workman-Stark, 2018), power dynamics, police socialization processes, police organizational culture, the "blue line of silence," implicit bias, stereotype threat (Najdowski et al., 2015), the police union and their impact on police leaders' policies and procedures, and law enforcement's use of excessive force or deadly force (Kahn et al., 2017; Nix et al., 2017a).

The micros (sub-system) of the Minneapolis Police Department include the organization's communication system. The organization's cultural macro-subsystems include administrative policies, procedural justice (Nix et al., 2017b), White supremacy in policing (German, 2020b), White privilege (DiAngelo, 2018), and implicit bias training and its effectiveness. The agency's organizational cultural mega system includes the police agency's relationship with members of the criminal justice system (e.g., criminal prosecutors in the district attorney's office), members of city government (e.g., the city council and the city manager), and communication, interaction, and involvement with African American social and religious organizations (e.g., the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People [NAACP] and African American churches). Research on the police organizational systems elements included studies conducted by Goff (2021) and Lum (2021).

Purpose of the Study

The purpose of this qualitative descriptive study (Bradshaw et al., 2017; Colorafi& Evans, 2016; Leavy, 2017; Milne &Oberle, 2005; Neergaard et al., 2009; Sandelowski, 2010; Turale, 2020) was to describe, from police patrol officers' perspectives, the circumstances, the systems processes (Stroh, 2015), and organizational culture that resulted in George Floyd's death by Minneapolis Police Department police patrol officers on May 25, 2020, in Minneapolis, Minnesota. The study also addressed how the four Minneapolis police patrol officers' decisions

and George Floyd's death have (or have not) impacted the study participants' leadership practices. The study's intended goal was to provide police patrol officers an opportunity to express their first-hand perspectives of the circumstances surrounding the four Minneapolis police patrol officers involved in George Floyd's death from a leadership paradigm.

Research Questions

RQ 1: Does implicit bias influence police patrol officers' use of excessive force or deadly force when interacting with African American community members?

RQ 2: Does the police socialization process prioritize "fitting in and following orders" and the blue wall of silence above police patrol officers exercising proactive judgment and decision-making skills?

RQ 3: Does your police agency provide opportunities for and support police patrol officers' leadership development?

Definition of Key Terms

Acculturation. Acculturation is defined as adopting aspects of the dominant culture, such as values (Liu et al., 2019). Liu (2017, as cited in Liu et al., 2019) differentiated a definition of acculturation by arguing current acculturation theories overlook White supremacy ideology and asymmetrical power imbalances that impact people of color.

Binding. Binding is defined as boundaries that restrict what will and what will not be studied in the scope of the research project (Baxter & Jack, 2008).

Blue code of silence. Blue code of silence or the blue wall is described as a normative unwritten subculture element of policing where loyalty or brotherhood/sisterhood protects police against genuine threats. The "blue code of silence" may sustain a criminal subculture that

protects police officers that violates criminal law (Skolnick, 2002; Westmarland, 2005; Wieslander, 2019).

Blue culture. Blue culture is defined by the language, characteristics, behaviors, and perspectives that unite all officers regardless of cultural, racial, ad geographical differences (Moskos, 2008 as cited in Roscigno & Preito-Hodge, 2021), and is overwhelmingly insular and resistant to nonpolice critique (Sierra-Arévalo, 2019 as cited in Roscigno & Preito-Hodge, 2021).

Critical race theory. Critical race theory is defined as a race-conscious lens that critically examines the degree to which race impacts organizational culture (Conyers & Fields, 2020). Critical race theory focuses on injustice and difference based on race (Leavy, 2017).

Culture. Culture is defined as "the accumulated shared learning of a group as it solves its problems of external adaptation and internal integration" (Schein, 2017, p. 6). Werner (2017) defined culture as "a set of shared values, beliefs, norms, and artifacts that are used to interpret the environment and is a guide for behavior."

Discrimination. Discrimination is defined as "prejudice applied where negative social definitions are translated into action and political policy via the subordination of minorities, and depriving their social, political, and economic rights" (Kinloch, 1974, as cited in Hadden et al., 2016).

Excessive force. Excessive force is described as using more force than what is necessary to gain compliance during an incident (Adams, 1995, 1999; Worden, 1995 as cited in Phillips, 2010).

Field training officer. Field Training Officer (FTO) is a senior police patrol officer who serves as a coach or mentor and first-line trainer for junior, less experienced police patrol

officers. The FTO assists junior patrol officers in earning their police officer certification (Cordner, 2020).

Implicit bias. Implicit bias is defined as biases that operate primarily outside of conscious awareness and control (Spencer et al., 2016). Implicit bias can operate outside of conscious awareness and is not necessarily based on animus toward the stereotyped group (Fridell& Lim, 2016).

Institutional racial paralysis. Institutional racial paralysis is described as "a form of debilitating, sometimes hidden, racism that perpetuates historical systems of oppression through various guises, often leading to a pervasive cycle of oppression" (Conyers & Fields, 2020, p. 1).

Leadership. Leadership is defined as a process whereby an individual influences a group of individuals to achieve a common goal (Northouse, 2019, p. 5).

Masculinity contest culture. Masculinity contest culture (MCC) is defined as when organizations devolve into being characterized by norms, rituals, and belief systems that prioritize social dominance and work above other life areas. Masculinity contest culture involves gratuitous displays of physical strength and avoids perceptions of weakness (Matos et al., 2018), and displays dog-eat-dog competition (Rawski & Workman-Stark, 2018).

Minority threat hypothesis. Minority threat hypothesis proposes resource allocation and crime control efforts vary according to the racial/ethnic composition of locations. The dominant group (e.g., Whites) desire to protect their privilege and power from areas considered a 'problem population' (e.g., ethnic minorities; Morrow et al., 2018).

Moral compromise. Moral compromise is defined as when police officers regularly use their discretion which may be a precursor to ethically questionable behaviors. Police officers'

moral compromises may cause a decline in the officers' personal integrity (Blumberg et al., 2018).

Moral distress. Moral distress has been defined as "the psychological disequilibrium and inner conflict experienced by caregiving professionals when they are confronted with situations that prevent them from doing what is morally right" (Jameton, 1994 as cited in Blumberg et al., 2018, p. 5).

Moral injury. Moral injury is defined as "a particular type of psychological trauma characterized by intense guilt, shame, and spiritual crisis, which can develop when one violates his or her moral beliefs, is betrayed, or witnesses trusted individuals committing atrocities" (Jinkerson, 2016 as cited in Blumberg et al., 2018, p. 5).

Moral suffering. Moral suffering is defined as the two components, moral distress and moral injury, both of which may lead to police traumatization (Papazoglou & Chopko, 2017).

Noble cause. Noble cause is defined as a moral commitment by police officers to protect society and to maintain peace and order (Caldero& Crank, 2011).

Noble cause corruption. Noble cause corruption is defined as a concept used to explain police officers' unethical behavior, such as when law enforcement agencies condone police work where the ends justify the means (e.g., using deception, breaking rules to catch offenders, etc.).

NVivo Coding. NVivo Coding is defined as an analytic procedure that uses the participant's verbatim words from data as codes (Leech &Onwuegbuzie, 2011; Saldaña & Omasta, 2018).

Organizational culture. Organizational culture is defined as "the set(s) of artifacts, values, and assumptions that emerge from the interactions of organizational members" (Keyton, 2005 as cited in Driskill & Brenton, 2011). Werner (2017) defined organizational culture as "a

set of shared values, beliefs, norms, and patterns of behavior by organization members and that guide behavior."

Organizational justice. Organizational justice is defined as understanding the complexity of fair treatment in a work setting (Graso et al., 2020).

Police culture. Police culture is defined as "a lens or worldview through which police officers work based on a set of values and attitudes that assist officers in coping with the strains of police work" (Silver et al., 2017, p. 1973).

Procedural justice. Procedural justice is defined as “the fairness and evenhandedness of police procedures” (Wolfe et al., 2016, p. 254).

Racial paralysis. Racial paralysis is defined as “the tendency for people to opt out of situations that require choices seemingly made on the basis of race” (Norton et al., 2013, p. 387) and is grounded in race neutrality, where people appear impartial when race is a contributing factor in situations.

Stereotype threat. Stereotype threat is defined as "the concern one experiences when at risk of being perceived in light of a negative stereotype that applies to one's group" (Steele, 2010; Steele et al., 2002 as cited in Najdowski et al., 2015). Hadden et al. (2016) conceptualized that police violence against African American men should be studied through critical race demagogy.

Structural racism. Structural racism refers to “a network of social relations at social, political, economic, and ideological levels that shapes the life chances of the various races (Bonilla-Silva, 2010 as cited in Tormos-Aponte et al., 2021, p. 4).

Systems thinking. Systems thinking is defined as "an interconnected set of elements that is coherently organized in a way that achieves something," revealing the difference between

what an organization wants to achieve (i.e., an espoused purpose) and what the organization is producing (i.e., the current purpose; Stroh, 2015, p. 17).

Toxic leadership. Toxic leadership is defined as a leadership style that utilizes abusive behaviors to bully or control others (Schmidt, 2008 as cited in Matos et al., 2018).

Unnecessary force. Unnecessary force is described as force that precedes a citizen's resistance or continues after a citizen has stopped resisting (Adams, 1999; Worden, 1995).

Use of force. Use of force is broadly defined as the effort required by the police to ensure or compel compliance by a subject that is unwilling (Boxer et al., 2021). Terrill (2003, p. 56) defined the use of force as "acts that threaten or inflict physical harm on subjects" (as cited in Stroshine & Brandl, 2020).

Warrior mindset. Warrior mindset refers to "a deep-bone commitment to survive a bad situation no matter the odds or difficulty, to not give up even when it is mentally and physically easier to do so" (Lynch, 2018a; Stoughton, 2015).

Whistleblowing. Whistleblowing is defined as "the disclosure by organization former or current members of illegal, immoral, or illegitimate practices under the control of their employers, to persons or organizations that may be able to effect action" (Near &Miceli, 1985, p. 4).

White privilege. White privilege is defined as "White men being entitled and having unearned authority to have attitudes, beliefs, and practices in any place and time to perpetuate the status quo of White supremacy, systemic inequality, and social and racial segregation" (Liu, 2017 as cited in Liu et al., 2019). White people are protected from the consequences of their actions due to White privilege (Spanierman& Smith, 2017).

White supremacy. White supremacy is defined as "a political system that is based on the exploitation of a group of human beings for the benefit of another group of human beings" (Mills, 1998 as cited in Tolliver et al., 2016, p. 280). Howard and Sommers (2019) defined White supremacy as the "ideological belief that biological and cultural Whiteness is superior, whereas biological and cultural Blackness is inferior" (p. 1).

Summary

To summarize, Chapter 1provided an introduction and the background of the phenomenon that justified the need for the study. Chapter 1 identified the problem, explained the purpose, and provided a purpose statement. The five supportive concepts that contributed to the development of the research questions are provided and the three research questions. A "definition of key terms" section defined the key terms used throughout the study.

Chapter 2 provides a more in-depth background and the purpose of the study. The three research questions are listed, along with the conceptual framework of the study. Literature search strategies are provided, along with the rationale for the study. The literature review, based on three theoretical frameworks, is provided.

Chapter 2: Literature Review

The circumstances surrounding Floyd's death by Minneapolis police patrol officers warrant investigating the myriad contributing factors, including the police organization's leadership practices. Floyd's death occurred while four police patrol officers were present. Three of the (former) police patrol officers, Theo, Lane, and Kueng (Hill et al., 2020), may have intervened to stop another (former) officer and field training officer (FTO) Chauvin from using excessive force and deadly force but chose not to do so (ABC News, 2020). After Floyd's death, the four police patrol officers were fired from the Minneapolis Police Department and faced criminal charges.

The problem identified is that law enforcement agency's leadership practices and organizational culture may socialize police patrol officers to make choices that support and extend the police agency's "blue wall of silence" (Skolnick, 2002; Westmarland& Rowe, 2018; Wieslander, 2019). The police cultural "blue wall of silence" may result in more African Americans being unnecessarily physically harmed or killed by permitting or condoning, either directly or indirectly, the use of excessive force or deadly force by police patrol officers. This study addresses police cultural and organizational constructs, and law enforcement leadership practices that may be applicable to myriad types of American law enforcement agencies.

Law enforcement agency's socialization processes, culture, organizational priorities, and senior leaders' leadership practices may have detrimental effects on law enforcement patrol officers' decision-making processes when interacting with racial minorities and African Americans in particular. The law enforcement organizational culture (Lynch, 2018a; McLean et al., 2020; Silver et al., 2017) and socialization processes (Hogg, 2001, 2018; Hogg et al., 2012; Hohman et al., 2017) encourage and expect law enforcement patrol officers' unquestionable

loyalty. Law enforcement superiors may expect obedience to their authority and decision(s) even when their decisions and choices are incongruent with established policies, procedures, guidelines, and laws (Trivedi & Van Cleve, 2020). Protecting the "blue wall of silence" and covering up law enforcement professionals' misconduct may take precedence over protecting and serving community members, particularly African Americans.

The purpose of this qualitative descriptive study (Bradshaw et al., 2017; Colorafi& Evans, 2016; Leavy, 2017; Milne &Oberle, 2005; Neergaard et al., 2009; Sandelowski, 2010; Turale, 2020) was to describe, from police patrol officers' perspectives, the circumstances, the systems processes (Stroh, 2015), and organizational culture that resulted in George Floyd's death by Minneapolis Police Department police patrol officers on May 25, 2020, in Minneapolis, Minnesota. The study also addressed how the four Minneapolis police patrol officers' decisions and George Floyd's death have (or have not) impacted the study participants' leadership practices.

This study's overarching purpose was to ask and extrapolate the answers to the questions: If George Floyd had not been an African American, would he have been killed by the four Minneapolis police patrol officers on May 25, 2020? Could Floyd's death have been prevented? Could the other three former patrol officers (present with Chauvin) have prevented or stopped Chauvin from using excessive force and deadly force against Floyd? How has Floyd's death impacted the police patrol officers' perceptions of police organizational leadership?

The study was a qualitative descriptive study (Bradshaw et al., 2017; Colorafi& Evans, 2016; Leavy, 2017; Milne &Oberle, 2005; Neergaard et al., 2009; Sandelowski, 2010; Turale, 2020) utilizing one police agency. The research participants were police field training officers

(FTOs) and police patrol officers within one medium-sized police agency located in South Texas. The study was conducted as an external (non-employee) representative.

The study is significant and may have real-world practical implications for other law enforcement agencies, law enforcement leaders, and law enforcement patrol officers. Many elements of the law enforcement agency's organizational culture are common to myriad types of law enforcement agencies, in varying degrees, making this study generalizable and transferable to other law enforcement agencies. The study's findings may influence police and other law enforcement professionals and leaders to assess their leadership practices and examine their decision-making processes, particularly when interacting with African Americans and other minorities and ethnic groups. The terms "law enforcement patrol officers" and "law enforcement practitioners" are synonymous and are used interchangeably throughout the study.

Literature Search Methods

The literature search strategy consisted of conducting keyword searches through the online library of Abilene Christian University (ACU). The databases used included *OneSearch, EducationScience, SocINDEX with full text, JSTOR Journals, ScienceDirect, SAGE Journals, HeinOnline, Nexis Uni (formerly Lexis Nexis), EZPROXY, EBSCO Host,* and *Digital Commons*. The keywords used for conducting journal searches included *race relations in American policing, racial and implicit bias in American policing,* organizational justice in policing, *procedural justice in policing, shared leadership,* shared leadership in American policing, p*olice corporate culture, police culture, the police blue wall of silence, management diversity in police agencies, police organizational culture, police unions, social identity theory in policing,* s*ocial identity theory, race relations and American policing, police training, police violence, police*

socialization processes, *qualitative descriptive study*, and *qualitative descriptive study in policing*.

The research search strategy involved searches through the online library of ACU's Resources for Researchers. I conducted extensive searches on qualitative methodology, sampling techniques, qualitative data gathering, rigor in qualitative research, rigor in qualitative descriptive study (Milne &Oberle, 2005; Sandelowski, 2010), qualitative data analysis, the ethical use of qualitative data, and qualitative analysis software and reporting data.

Peer-reviewed articles authored by well-known subject matter experts, such as police scientists and police practitioners, were also included in the study. Another source for locating peer-reviewed studies and articles was a topic search through Google Scholar Alerts. Some studies accessed through Google Scholar alerts led this author to a different database resource, Taylor and Francis peer-reviewed journals, which became a vital resource for national and international police scientists' and police practitioners' published peer-reviewed works.

The keyword searches were filtered through peer-reviewed journal articles that were generally limited to the most recent 5–6 years. Exceptions were allowed and consisted of seminal studies that developed scientific theories and follow-up theoretical frameworks. After finding relevant peer-reviewed studies and articles, further research consisted of reviewing the references listed in those studies.

Conceptual Framework Discussion

The conceptual framework is that police agencies, due to the nature and the impact of the law enforcement culture and long-held cultural traditions within and external to police agencies, cannot and should not be evaluated or assessed based on leadership theories alone. I propose that

three different theories may contribute to explaining police officers' decision-making processes specifically as applied to this study.

To understand police officer's leadership practices, it is necessary to understand the micros (sub-systems), macros (sub-systems) and mega systems (Stroh, 2015) that are myriad and multidimensional, and which police organizations and police officers. This study is based on contributing factors from the systems thinking (Stroh, 2015) approach based on three theories; critical race theory (Bell, 1980, 1992; Christian et al., 2019; Conyers & Fields, 2020; Delgado & Stefancic, 2017; Hadden et al., 2016;Norton et al., 2013), social identity theory (Hogg, 2001, 2018; Hogg et al., 2012; Holman et al., 2017; Northouse, 2019), and shared leadership theory (Amos & Klimoski, 2014; Bergman et al., 2012; Day et al., 2004; Locke & Schweiger, 1979; O'Toole et al., 2002; Pearce et al., 2009; Northouse, 2019; Steinheider & Wuestewald, 2008; Wuestewald & Steinheider, 2012). The conceptual proposition of this study, based on research and a systemic review of contributing factors, is Floyd's death may have been a collective, at-large systemic organizational failure and may not have been the result of only a leadership failure of the police patrol officers involved in the incident.

This study examines, from an organizational leadership perspective, the "how" and the "why" questions related to the events that resulted in George Floyd's death in May 2020. The underlying variable is the organizational leaders' leadership philosophy. Secondary and contributing variables may also impact the organizational leaders' leadership practices. I queried whether organizational success can or should be assessed or evaluated solely on leadership practices, and that other equally important and influential variables should be considered.

The conceptual framework includes the organizational elements model (Kaufman and Guerra-López (2013) and systems thinking (Stroh, 2015), as well as critical race theory, social

identity theory, and shared leadership theory. Kaufman and Guerra-López (2013) conceptualized the organizational elements model (OEM) as providing guidance and direction for organizational performance improvement. The OEM has five levels: resources (inputs), activities (processes), micros (organizational accomplishments and contributions), macros (organizational contributions), and mega (societal contributions and contributions). The study will address some elements of the micros and macros (organizational elements) and mega (external elements) systems that may impact the law enforcement agency's leadership practices.

Kaufman and Guerra-López's (2013) concept of OEM is congruent with Chen's (2015) systems theory approach, and allows for examining the organization in smaller, more manageable parts. The system's orientation (Stroh, 2015) approach of this study utilizes the three theories, critical race theory (Conyers & Fields, 2020; Glover, 2019), social identity theory (Hogg, 2001; Hogg et al., 2012), and shared leadership theory (Northouse, 2019; Steinheider & Wuestewald, 2008; Wuestewald & Steinheider, 2012), as well as examining police culture.

Literature Review

The literature review’s audience consists of police patrol officers, other law enforcement leaders, law enforcement practitioners, police organizational leaders, police scientists, police researchers, and others involved in myriad scientific disciplines, including but not limited to peace studies and conflict management scientists. The literature review's organization and concepts focus on issues impacted by three theoretical frameworks: critical race theory, social identity theory, and shared leadership theory. The literature is divided into three sections based on the three research questions, each addressing a particular theoretical framework.

I. Police Leadership in Relation to Implicit Bias

RQ 1: Does implicit bias influence police patrol officers' use of excessive force or deadly force when interacting with African American community members?

The History of Policing in America. The history of policing in America dates back to the founding of the United States and was rooted in White supremacy ideology and practices and reflected European colonization of North America. The subjugation of the Native Americans, the enslavement of native Africans and their descendants, and protecting and reinforcing White social and economic power were critical to the development of American policing (German, 2020b). American police practitioners have been linked to slave patrols and night watchers during the era of slavery, especially involving African American males (Adedoyin et al., 2019).

Slave patrols were instituted as a means of maintaining racial social order, protecting the property interests of the privileged White class, and ensuring the stability of the labor force (German, 2020b), as well as controlling the behavior and movement of slaves (Adedoyin et al., 2019). The slave patrollers, who usually were White, operated with virtually no accountability. As a result, the patrollers adopted brutal tactics such as maiming, castration, and lynching. Lynching became an effective tool for policing African American communities (Fitzgerald, 2007), as well as portraying African American males as a social problem (Fitzgerald, 2007; Muhammad, 2011).

"Black laws" restricted travel and denied civil rights for free African Americans. The U.S. Congress passed the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, requiring law enforcement officials in free states to return escaped slaves to their slave owners in the South (German, 2020a). After American slavery was abolished after the Civil War, White supremacy continued through Black codes and Jim Crow laws. In the Jim Crow South, police were mandated to keep "Negroes" in a

lower caste system (Dunham & Petersen, 2017; Skolnick, 2007). According to Skolnick (2007), "It was a part of the policeman's philosophy" (p. 1).

As the United States expanded westward, government agents expressed their authority by enforcing violent policies intended to perpetuate ethnic violence against Native Americans and Mexican Americans. During the early 20th Century, Texas Rangers led lynching parties, including those that targeted Mexican Americans that resided in Texas border towns, accusing them of being bandits. White supremacy philosophy motivated the Ku Klux Klan to use terroristic violence to dissuade non-Whites and non-Protestants from exercising their civil rights (Aymer, 2016).

Law enforcement officials supported Ku Klux Klan activities by refusing to fulfill their sworn duties to protect the peace or by actively participating in the racial violence. Outside of the Deep South, many states developed "sundown towns." In "sundown towns," police officers and vigilante mobs were given official and quasi-official authority to prohibit African Americans and other non-Whites from remaining in town past sunset. It is estimated that in the 1970s, there were approximately 10,000 sundown towns across America. Law enforcement's White supremacy policies and practices had permeated across American culture and society (Hayden, 1997). Richardson (2015) correlated America's sordid racial history of White supremacy and racial subordination to police violence.

Critical Race Theory. The landmark 1954 Supreme Court case *Brown v. Board of Education* ruled that "separate but equal" racial segregation was unconstitutional. The late Derek Bell (1980) questioned why it had taken America over 100 years to initiate and take action toward race-based social changes. Bell argued the ideological shift occurred only after White policymakers identified the economic and political advantages that would benefit the United

States by abandoning segregation. Bell postulated that America practiced institutional racial paralysis until those in power benefitted from the changes (Bell, 1980 as cited in Bell, 1992; Conyers & Fields, 2020). Bell's writings eventually evolved into what is now known as critical race theory.

What is critical race theory? Delgado and Stefancic (2017) described critical race theory as a movement comprised of activists and scholars engaged in studying and transforming the relationship between race, racism, and power. Critical race theory considers many of the same tenets of the civil rights movement and ethnic studies but focuses on a broader range of subjects including emotions, the unconscious, economics, history, group and self-interest, and setting. Critical race theory questions the foundation of liberal order to include equality theory, legal reasoning, and the neutrality of constitutional law. Critical race theory focuses on injustice and difference based on race (Leavy, 2017).

Critical race theory was developed and grew during the 1970s as activists, lawyers, and legal scholars around America realized advances from the 1960s civil rights era had stalled and were being cancelled. Early writers included Derrick Bell, Alan Freeman, and Richard Delgado, who were joined by other developers from various disciplines in 1989. Critical race theory builds upon critical legal studies, radical feminism, and ethnic studies, and focuses on redressing historical wrongs, similar to the civil rights movement. The basic tenets of critical race theory are:

- Racism is ordinary and is not an aberration.
- Interest convergence or material determinism, where there is general agreement that the white-over-color ascendancy system serves material and psychic purposes for the

dominant group. Racism advances White elites and working-class Whites, resulting in large segments of society having little interest in eradicating racism.

- Race and races are products of relations and social thought (social construction theory)
- Differential racialization, when the dominant society racializes and portrays different minority groups based on the dominant group's changing needs.

Conyers and Fields (2020) defined critical race theory as a race-conscious lens that critically examines the degree to which race impacts organizational culture. Conyers and Fields postulated that critical race theory is the theoretical framework through which police agencies are inherently racist organizations. In the area of the law, critical race theory can be applied to the subject of police brutality and offers "a foundation for understanding the historical racialized experiences of Black men in America" (Aymer, 2016 as cited in Adedoyin et al., 2019, p. 117).

Critical race theory is theorized to cause and support institutional racial paralysis within organizational culture (Conyers & Fields, 2020). Racial paralysis is defined as "the tendency for people to opt out of situations that require choices seemingly made on the basis of race" (Norton et al., 2013, p. 387) and is grounded in race neutrality, where people appear impartial when race is a contributing factor in situations. Institutional racial paralysis is described as "a form of debilitating, sometimes hidden, racism that perpetuates historical systems of oppression through various guises, often leading to a pervasive vicious cycle of oppression" (Conyers & Fields, 2020, p. 1). Institutional racial paralysis is a byproduct of institutional racism (Conyers & Fields, 2020). Institutional racial paralysis promotes inaction and a lack of accountability, often occurs due to racial nervousness or White hegemony, or where there is no interest or little to no motivation for administrators to address racial inequities.

Institutional racial paralysis occurs through four identified stages: Idleness, concealment, evolving modus operandi, and pervasiveness. Idleness or organizational inaction is a lack of acknowledgement or minimization of race's role, where there is no action plan to address racial inequity, and there is no intent to create or implement laws or policies to remedy the situation. The organization remains idle. Idleness is the core component of institutional racial paralysis (Conyers & Fields, 2020).

With concealment, institutional racial paralysis remains undetected due to the organization intentionally hiding their inaction. The evolving modus operandi makes it challenging to expose the concealment. Pervasiveness results in institutional racial paralysis possibly spreading from one organization to other organizations. According to Conyers and Fields (2020), the criminal justice system is a model of how language, methods, and philosophy spread into other organizations.

Institutional racial paralysis, with critical race theory as its theoretical framework, illustrates how police violence and killings may be a persistent and inescapable reality for African-American males, and captures how race may be structurally embedded within organizational structures, such as law enforcement, and may increase the probability for disparate treatment for marginalized groups to keep them subjugated (Adedoyin et al., 2019; Aymer, 2016; Christian et al., 2019; Conyers & Fields, 2020; Hadden et al., 2016).

Implicit Bias, Explicit Bias, and Systemic Racism. Implicit bias is defined as biases that operate primarily outside of conscious awareness and control (Spencer et al., 2016). Stereotype threat is defined as "the concern one experiences when at risk of being perceived in light of a negative stereotype that applies to one's group" (Steele, 2010; Steele et al., 2002 as cited in Najdowski et al., 2015). The history of race-based and physically dangerous interactions

between police patrol officers and minorities, particularly African Americans, is well known (Hirschfield, 2015).

Swencionis and Goff (2017, p. 1) asked the question, “What is the role of racial bias in policing?” Swencionis and Goff attempted to answer the question through the framework of psychological science as a means for developing the ability to predict which police officers may practice racially discriminatory behavior. Unfortunately, there was a lack of robust scientific literature. Swencionis and Goff provided known predictors of discrimination with situational risk factors for bias is policing, which may be useful for developing and implementing policy. The identified risk factors for police discriminatory behavior included having a crime focus, having minimum experience, discretion, cognitive demand, and identity threat. Each risk factor has an associated psychological risk. For example, the psychological route to discrimination based on ‘“shooter” bias and Black-crime associations’ were impacted by four of the five situational risk factors; discretion, novice status, crime focus, and cognitive demand (Swencionis & Goff, 2017, p. 399).

First-line or patrol officers have and use a great deal of discretion when carrying out myriad types of services and activities during their daily routine, which may create situational ambiguity. Situational ambiguity leads to an increased likelihood of discriminatory behavior demand (Swencionis & Goff, 2017). Social dominance orientation, a form of explicit prejudice, measures individuals’ support for hierarchies that discriminate against others that a member is of a lower social class (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). Individuals with higher levels of social dominance are more likely to engage in discriminatory behavior. Smiley and Fakunle (2016) examined how unarmed African American males who were killed by the police have been referred to as a

"thug," a micro-insult intended to posthumously demonize and criminalize the men, intended as a justification for killing unarmed citizens.

A less-experienced law enforcement officer may be confronted with situations with which they have less experience and for which they have not been trained. Research indicated the longer an officer remains on the force, their social dominance orientation increases (Teahan, 1975). Having a focus on crime control increases the likelihood, due to pervasive stereotypes, that officers may associate African American citizens and African American males specifically, with crime (Swencionis & Goff, 2017). Kahn and Martin (2020) addressed racially biased policing from a social psychology domain.

Research indicated that when interacting with racial/ethnic minority suspects, law enforcement practitioners may employ implicit bias (Fridell& Lim, 2016) and utilize excessive or deadly force (Kahn et al., 2017; Nix et al., 2017b) without justification due to stereotype threat (Najdowski et al., 2015; Trinkner et al., 2019). There is insufficient data available with which to answer the question posed by Price and Payton (2017), whether implicit racial bias and the police use of force is justifiable homicide or potential discrimination. The Violent Crime Control and Enforcement Act of 1994 required the U.S. Department of Justice to collect national data on the police use of lethal force but participation by law enforcement agencies is voluntary. Law enforcement agencies are not required to report police shootings, the use of unnecessary force, the use of excessive force, or the use of deadly force.

On January 1, 2015, the *Washington Post* created a database to track police-involved deaths in America by obtaining data from news reports, social media, law enforcement websites, and independent databases. Rogue police officers that have been fired from one location and then moved to another location, gypsy officers, can be tracked. The study indicated that Amnesty

International, an independent, non-governmental organization that focuses on preventing human rights violations, reviewed 50 U.S. states and Washington, D.C. laws on police officer use of lethal force, providing the results. The Bureau of Justice Statistics, *The Guardian*, and other projects have tracked people shot and killed by the police since 2015 (Lim, 2017).

Implicit bias operates primarily outside of conscious awareness and control (Spencer et al., 2016). Rivers et al. (2017) asked, "Where did the bias come from?" Biased crowds may transfer their intergroup preferences into norms, regulations, and lawmaking which become parameters for future engagements. Yet, individuals must have learned intergroup bias without having been taught. Intergroup preferences are developed through learning processes, intergroup competition, and evolutionary accounts. Also, social learning is a mechanism that propagates biases across cultures.

Repeatedly, research indicated that discrimination is pervasive, specifically in policing (Glaser, 2006). Glaser considered how implicit biases affect policing, determining that stereotypes that link African Americans with crimes, implicit bias, do not directly cause biased policing but rather influence police officers' judgments through several processes: general trait and behavioral stereotypes, specific race-crime stereotypes, and race-weapon association. African Americans have been stereotyped as being more aggressive than Whites, which is an important element when law enforcement decide if they perceive someone poses a threat, which is a determining factor in whether a police officer uses force. Depicting African Americans as apes is an implicit dehumanization that condones and increases violence against African American targets (Goff et al., 2008).

African Americans being stereotyped as aggressive and subhuman results in bidirectional associations. Law enforcement practitioners may be more likely to focus on African Americans

when they think of crime, and when thinking of crime, may be more likely to associate crime with African Americans, which leads to officers' disparate treatment toward African Americans. African Americans are stereotypically associated with carrying weapons. The race-weapon association creates a racial disparity that often results in the police shooting unarmed civilians. Police officers' implicit race-weapons associations often predict shooter bias (Goff et al., 2008).

Within policing, increased diversity and sensitivity training have not shown any lasting effects (Paluck & Green, 2009). Goff et al.'s (2008) alternative interventions included intergroup contact, counter-stereotypic exemplars (exposure to out-group persons that counter group-based stereotypes), stereotype negation training with affirmation of counter-stereotypes, multifaceted interventions (participating in more than one is necessary, and intervention effectiveness. Additional testing within law enforcement was identified as a need (Goff et al., 2008).

David et al. (2019) addressed some of the consequences of internalized racism. Systemic racism is described as when society's political, economic, social, cultural, and psychological rewards are partially allocated along racial lines (Bonilla-Silva, 2021). Bonilla-Silva expounded on systemic racism.

Race-Based Police Violence. Menifield et al. (2019) posed and addressed the question: Do White law enforcement officers target minority suspects? Based on a data set of all confirmed (reported) cases of lethal force between 2014 and 2015 in the United States, findings indicated that: (a) nationwide, African Americans are disproportionately killed by police officers; (b) at the time of the fatal encounter, the majority of those killed are armed with some type of weapon; (c) micro-level racism was not the overriding cause of the disproportionate killings of African Americans; and (d) macro-level policy changes and meso-level organizational practices are needed for addressing the root causes of the racial disparity of police killings. Moving

beyond the “bad apple” attribution (Haider-Markel & Joslyn, 2017), Menifield et al. (2019) proposed that the root cause of the disproportionate number of police officers killing racial minorities is systemic or institutional in nature.

Menifield et al. (2019) presented past studies of police use of force. The level of force used in police-citizen interactions did not reflect a significant relationship between the officer’s race and the citizen’s race (Lee et al., 2014). The rate of police use of force was not impacted by the number of female or minority police officers but was associated with the city’s population of African Americans (Smith, 2003). The prevailing racial attitude and implicit bias of the community influences police officers’ choice to use lethal force (Hehman et al., 2017; Holmes et al., 2019), and reflected White people’s perception of protecting their “White space” (Christian et al., 2019; Embrick & Moore, 2020).

There were varying findings related to place-based police killings. Klinger et al. (2016) proposed that a neighborhood’s racial and economic composition and violent crime were unrelated to the frequency of police shootings. Conversely, Menifield et al. (2019) discovered that while African Americans are disproportionately killed by police, African Americans are killed at higher rates by non-White officers than White officers, likely due to minority officers being assigned to minority neighborhoods. Who policies what communities may influence the pattern of police killings. Holmes et al. (2019) determined cities with high levels of African American segregation, which is tied closely to social disadvantage, experience a higher rate of police-caused homicide compared with less segregated cities. Police officers associated disadvantaged African American neighborhoods with danger, criminality, and challenges to authority.

Despite evidence of implicit bias after taking the Implicit Association Test (IAT), via a decision-making simulator, officers were slower to shoot armed African Americans compared to armed White suspects (James et al., 2016). Do White law enforcement officers target minority suspects? “Existing scientific studies lack the high degree of external validity to draw conclusions on this question” (Menifield et al., 2019, p. 59). Christian et al. (2019), Dukes and Kahn (2017), and Hadden et al. (2016) conceptualized that police violence against Black or African American men should be studied through a critical race demagogy which included shooter bias, negative race-based portrayals of racial and ethnic minorities, and the exercise, misuse and abuse of power (Lynch, 2018a, 2018b).

Jones (2017) addressed police racial violence against persons of color from a scientific-historical perspective. Jones’ (2017) preferred explanations for police violence were based on several constructs. Racially biased policing may be often based on a statistical likelihood, such as the hoodie effect (Scott et al., 2017). The hoodie effect may be a race-based warning that something might activate an emotionally traumatic memory or event (Mane, 2015) and trigger police officers to shoot people. Kahn and Davies (2017) revealed that when African Americans are in neighborhoods where they are not expected, they arouse suspicion and racial bias is more likely to occur.

Black and brown police officers are more likely to be shot or killed when they are not wearing their police uniform, based on other police officers saying, ‘I did not recognize you without your uniform’ (Charbonneau et al., 2017). Black Cops Against Brutality (B-CAP), an African American police officer support organization, was founded in 1991 by De Lacy Davis, a retired police officer who started the organization in response to the maltreatment he experienced

inside and outside of his police agency in New Jersey. The mission of the B-CAP is to improve community-police relationships and enhance the quality of life for African people (Davis, 2021).

Jones (2017) posed the question, “Is the dead person a victim or did they ‘cause’ their death?” (p. 876). Attitudes, beliefs, and perceptions may have been contributing factors in police violence against minorities (e.g., justifications for police killings) included the media, racism, and assessing blame. Media reports may be complicit in creating the context that results in people of color being killed since the media reinforces racist beliefs, judgments, and behaviors (Dukes & Gaither, 2017). Hall et al. (2016) identified media reports as a psychological antecedent that contributes to citizens choosing to become law enforcement.

The Gorilla Effect, in which African Americans have been dehumanized by portraying them as descendants of apes (Goff et al., 2008), exacerbates the unconscious bias framework. Knowledge may affect motivation. Nelson et al. (2013) introduced the “Marley Hypothesis” where the differences between African Americans’ and Whites’ perceptions of racial discrimination were based on their knowledge of historical bias against African Americans, as well as the differences in knowledge about police brutality and Black/White protests (Reinka& Leach, 2017). Jones’ (2017) study revealed police violence against persons of color is complex and multidimensional. Also, see Hirschfield (2015).

Richardson (2015) correlated police violence with America’s racial history of White supremacy and racial subordination. Richardson explained how police officers’ insecurities may manifest through stereotype threat and masculinity threat. When combined, these psychological processes expressed why racial violence may be inevitable based on current policing practices and culture.

Hall et al. (2016) revealed police work may attract people that value conformity and power, restraint of actions, and control or dominance over other people. Lynch (2018a, 2018b) revealed police recruits are psychologically indoctrinated into a culture of violence through the formal survival curriculum embedded with the police academy training, and the orthodoxy is reinforced through the police agency's continual socialization process. Obasogie (2020) extrapolated how law enforcement's use of force doctrine and violence are perpetuated by individual state's penal code and the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.

White Supremacy and White Privilege. In February 2015, then-Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation James (Jim) Comey gave a presentation at Georgetown University where his subject was titled, "Hard Truths: Law Enforcement and Race." Comey offered several hard truths, including the relational disconnect between police agencies and citizens, particularly, communities of color, expressing how American history is riddled with examples of law enforcement being unfair to disfavored groups. Another second truth was that research indicated law enforcement officers have widespread unconscious bias which impacts law enforcement's decision-making processes. A third truth was that over time, something happens to police officers; they may become cynical and develop mental shortcuts whereby law enforcement practitioners believe most young Black males are liars and guilty (Comey, 2015). Comey (2015) stated that though his affection toward law enforcement professionals runs deep, he was willing to confront harsh realities, indicating law enforcement needs to "redouble our efforts to resist bias and prejudice" (p. 6). Comey (2015) reiterated the need for collecting accurate demographic use of force data and the value of data analytics.

Michael German of the Brennan Center for Justice authored a report titled "Racism, White Supremacy, and Far-Right Militancy in Law Enforcement" (2020a). German postulated

racial disparities have been pervasive through each step of the criminal justice process, concluding that the criminal justice system reflects long-standing economic, racial, and social inequities. Despite well-intended reforms, law enforcement agencies are riddled with explicit racism (German, 2020a). There is no federal database that tracks law enforcement practitioner's misconduct or membership in white supremacist or far-right militant groups.

Law enforcement explicit racism includes affiliation or membership with violent white supremacist or far-right militant groups, making racist remarks and sharing them on social media, and participating in discriminatory behavior toward citizens or fellow law enforcement professionals, while federal, state, and local governments have done little to identify the racist practitioners. German (2020a) preferred explicit racism in law enforcement will endure in the criminal justice system if systemic and implicit biases remain.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation, in 2017 (as cited in German, 2020b) reported White supremacists posed a "persistent threat of lethal violence" (p. 4). White supremacist and anti-government militia groups have "active links" to law enforcement personnel, yet the Justice Department does not have a national strategy to identify white supremacist police officers or to protect the civil rights or safety of the communities they serve. Disciplinary action or termination for law enforcement personnel occurs if the racist behavior triggers a public scandal. The response to law enforcement's participation with white supremacist and militant groups has been inadequate (German, 2020b). German (2020b) provided a detailed listing of law enforcement officials that have been known to affiliate with or are members of a White supremacist or militant group.

German (2020b) described how "few law enforcement agencies have policies that specifically prohibit affiliating with White supremacist groups" (p. 4). Some identified white

supremacy or far-right militant groups include the confederate Officers Patriot Squad (COPS), a Klan sub-group in Kentucky (1980s); the Lynwood Vikings, labeled by a judge in California as "a neo-Nazi, White supremacist gang" (1990s); the League of the South, a White supremacist secessionist group in Alabama (2009); the Proud Boys, a far-right "Western chauvinist fight club that was founded in 2016 but supports White supremacist groups" (2018); and the Rise Above Movement, a white supremacist group (2017).

The Federal Bureau of Investigation's Counterterrorism Policy Directive and Policy Guide, 89 (2015 as cited in German, 2020b) warned that law enforcement officers have been linked to militia extremists, White extremists, and sovereign citizen extremists. German (2020b) explained how "the Department of Homeland Security and the Federal Bureau of Investigation identified white supremacists as the most lethal domestic terrorist threat to the United States" (p. 7). The Federal Bureau of Investigation was tasked by the U.S. Congress with protecting the civil rights of communities targeted by discriminatory stops, searches, arrests, and brutality by police officers (German, 2020b).

Caitlyn Lynch, a former police officer with 4 years real-world police experience, resigned from policing to pursue higher education. Lynch offers a unique perspective as a former police officer, researcher, and as an academic, having earned a doctorate in Criminology and Criminal Justice from Old Dominion University (2017; Eastern Illinois University, 2022). Lynch (2018b) discussed "the police academy's police survivability discourse, describing it as instrumental in mobilizing the police through fear" (p. 34). Police cadets are trained to constantly focus on their mortality which legitimizes the need for self-preservation through a "good" vs. "evil" paradigm, which leads to guardianship, police aggressive behavior, and entitled violence. Within the police subculture, officers that utilize "justifiable" deadly force are rewarded the 'highest badge' and

are regarded as protectors of their peers and the public for cleansing one more threat to moral order from the world (Lynch, 2018b).

Police survivability discourse is highly racialized with the police subculture, as evidenced by the disproportionate killings of unarmed African American males by the police, as well as the creation of the Blue Lives Matter Movement (Lynch, 2018b). The Blue Lives Matter Movement began with a focus on police survivability and to communicate that blue lives matter but to also indicate that police lives matter more, particularly in comparison to Black lives. The Blue Lives Matter movement rose in direct opposition to Black Lives Matter and the perception that having Black Lives Matter was a threat to police officers' lives (Lynch, 2018b).

Liu et al. (2019) purported that White supremacy and acculturation offered an explanation for how police academy training and the police subculture internalize stereotypes and offers demeaning ideological systems via acculturation, where dominant cultural aspects are adopted and enforced. Acculturation is not independent of racial and structural implications, and in many cases, reflects White supremacist ideologies. Internalized racism, a contemporary psychological construct that is rooted in the negative history and demeaning perceptions of people of color, was meant to keep people of color subjugated and to justify the White cultural rationale for continued inequality.

II. Individual, Group and Organizational Socialization

RQ 2: Does the police socialization process prioritize "fitting in and following orders" and the blue wall of silence above police patrol officers exercising proactive judgment and decision-making skills?

Social Identity Theory. Social identity theory is defined as when leaders emerge within a group become most like the group's prototype (Haider-Markel & Joslyn, 2017; Hogg, 2001;

Hogg et al., 2012; Northouse, 2019). Social identity theory (Hogg, 2001, 2018; Hohman et al., 2017) research postulated that leaders might emerge based on their in-group placement (e.g., self-categorization) and self-assimilate to maintain social and normative balance within the group. The degree to which a person fits with the identity of the group determines or influences leadership emergence.

A group prototype develops as the group develops over time. Group leaders emerge from those that are most like the group prototype (Northouse, 2019). Individuals emerge as a leader through others in the organization that accept and support the individual's behavior through the process of communication. Positive communication behaviors include being informed, initiating new ideas, being verbally involved, and being firm but not rigid (Ellis & Fisher, 1994 as cited in Northouse, 2019). Leadership also involves power, as power is utilized to influence others' attitudes, beliefs, and courses of action (Northouse, 2019).

Social identity theory "examines the cognitive processes that influence social identification, social categorization, and social comparison associated with discrimination and prejudice associated with perceived group membership" (Hadden et al., 2016, p. 338). Hogg et al. (2012) stipulated that leadership is a position of influence, and followers know and accept their place and function as a social-cultural norm, even when the social norm is incongruent with organizational policies or procedures. Police officers are socialized to support the "blue code of silence" whereby officers ignore police officer corruption and never speak up against a fellow officer (Skolnick, 2002). Wieslander (2019) suggested officers are less likely to report wrongdoing than civilians due to the police socialization process.

Police Organizational Culture. "The police value orthodoxy, loyalty, obedience, and salience… The entering recruit's expectations of service and good deeds founders on the cold

shoals of the secretive internal culture, the cynicism and the unspoken assignment pushed by the overclass," a quote by Chief Anthony V. Bouza (retired), *The Police Mystique,* 1990 (as cited in Skolnick & Fyfe, 1993, p. 89).

Schein (2017) defined the culture of a group as "the accumulated shared learning of that group as it solves its problems of external adaptation and internal integration" (p. 6). Werner (2017) defined culture as "a set of shared values, beliefs, norms, and artifacts that are used to interpret the environment and is a guide for behavior" (p. 23). Silver et al. (2017) defined police culture as "a lens or worldview through which police officers work based on a set of values and attitudes that assist officers in coping with the strains of police work" (p. 1273).

Central to the police sub-culture is that the police describe themselves as distinct and different from the general population, a perception that may breed suspicion of the public and mistrust. The perception manifests in the police tendency to protect each other and cover up officer's misdeeds. Police officer's social order, or socialization, is considered suspicious, masculine, insular, and focused on risk (Myers, 2021). Differentiation within the police world is described in two ways that represent two distinct approaches, management cop and street cop. The management cop is focused on an allegiance to rigid lines of authority and formal bureaucratic structures. The street cop is characterized by their latitude to improvise in responses to events based on their unique characteristics (Herbert, 1998).

Herbert (1998) described various types of normative orders within the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD). Two contracting labels define aspects of police behavior, the "hard charger" and the "station queen." The hard charger describes an aggressive officer that will rush into dangerous situations and seeks the adrenaline rush. They seek out dangerous suspects and enjoy vehicle pursuits for the rush. Hard chargers are police warriors that exemplify masculine

characteristics of strength and courage. In contrast, station queens avoid danger and hazards of the street, and cannot “pass muster” compared to the adventurer. Another normative order of safety shapes how officers define and respond to situations based on their perception of “pro-police” and “anti-police” areas. Pro-police areas are supportive of the police and pose no threat, whereas anti-police areas resist police authority, sometimes with violence (Herbert, 1998).

Masculinity contest culture (MCC; Matos et al., 2018) is defined as when organizations devolve into being characterized by norms, rituals, and belief systems that prioritize social dominance and work above other life areas. The masculinity contest culture involves gratuitous manifestations of physical strength, avoids perceptions of weakness (Matos et al., 2018), and displays dog-eat-dog competition (Rawski & Workman-Stark, 2018). Based on the “blue code of silence,” the masculinity contest culture (Matos et al., 2018; Rawski & Workman-Stark, 2018) is a form of toxic leadership that exemplify the police organizational culture through an "us vs. them" mentality (Brooms & Perry, 2016; Doherty, 2016), which portrays ethnic minorities as the "out-group" and enemies of the police (Haider-Markel & Joslyn, 2017).

Police culture, or the “blue culture,” is defined by behaviors, language, characteristics, and perspectives that unite all officers despite racial, cultural, and geographical differences between police officers. Blue culture is insular and resistant to other (nonpolice) critique and is known for its traditional code of silence. Traditionally, police blue culture is racist, sexist, and homophobic (Roscigno & Preito-Hodge, 2021). Long held and practiced elements of the “blue culture” includes what is referred to as law enforcement’s “warrior versus guardian” problem. Officers’ attitudes toward how they perform their job (e.g., role orientation) determine officers’ psychological orientation toward the citizens they serve, officers’ orientation toward supervisors, the scope of the role of police officers and how the role should be enacted, and police officers’

satisfaction with policing (McLean et al., 2020). Officers' socialization into the "blue culture" extends to and includes participating in and covering up fellow officers' misconduct (Cruwys et al., 2020; Donner et al., 2016).

The police organizational culture is comprised of several overlapping, interdependent, and competing elements that warrant review from a systems perspective (Stroh, 2015). Contributing sub-cultural elements include the senior police leader's leadership philosophy and practices (i.e., traditional authoritarian or participative; Bandura, 1977, 1986; Park & Hassan, 2018; Phillips, 2015b), White privilege (DiAngelo, 2018), racism, White supremacy (Christian et al., 2019), far-right militancy that have infiltrated law enforcement agencies (German, 2020a, 2020b), and the working personality theory (Skolnick, 2010), describing how police academies train recruits to promote police brutality, which was supported by Lynch (2018a, 2018b) and police in-service training (Lynch, 2018a, 2018b; McLean et al., 2020).

McLean et al. (2020) proposed a warrior/guardian framework that studied police officers' psychological orientation toward policing. The warrior approach emphasized crime-fighting and officer safety, whereas the guardian approach prioritized service over crime-fighting. The police agency's leader's warrior/guardian framework and leadership orientation affect the organizational and environmental factors that may contribute to police misconduct (Eitle et al., 2014; Silver et al., 2017). The warrior mindset is exacerbated by the militarization of American police agencies (Doherty, 2016). Doherty (2016) expounded on how blurred the line between domestic law enforcement and federal military forces has become. Mastrofski et al. (2016) offered a more textured perspective of police culture that extends beyond the perception of the warrior.

The police agency's organizational structure (Lee et al., 2013), including field training officer (FTO) accountability, may be hampered by the overreach of police unions (Bies, 2017;

McCormick, 2016; Walker, 2008) and impedes police reform initiatives (Doherty, 2018). The police organization's external relationship with the district attorney's office (Morton, 2018; Skolnick, 2002; Trivedi & Van Cleve, 2020) may impede procedural justice and organizational justice initiatives and reforms (Herrington & Roberts, 2013; Murphy & Tyler, 2017; Wolfe et al., 2016). Whistleblowing and retaliation (Johnson, 2006; Lim & Sloan, 2016; Near et al., 2004; Near & Miceli, 1985; O'Malley, 1997; Rothwell & Baldwin, 2007) within law enforcement organizations may reinforce police misconduct (Ashforth & Anand, 2003; Crank et al., 2007; Eitle et al., 2014).

Warrior Mindset v. Guardian Mindset. The warrior approach emphasizes officer safety and prioritizes crime fighting. Officers seeing themselves as warriors is ingrained during police training, police textbooks, and police manuals, ensuring a warrior mindset becomes a police organizational cultural norm (McLean et al., 2020). The warrior mindset manifests through a hyper vigilance on officer safety and paramilitary "self-image of officers as soldiers on the front line of a never-ending battle to preserve order and protect civilization against chaos and criminality" (Stoughton, 2016, p. 612). Warrior police self-identify as crime fighting soldiers and reflect "real" police work.

The guardian approach offers an alternative to the warrior orientation. Guardian officers perceive themselves as protectors of society and prioritize service over crime fighting. Guardian officers emphasize developing relationships with the community through positive, non-enforcement contacts, and are the bedrock of community policing initiatives (Stoughton, 2015). The police forming working relationships with the community involve making police activities subject to the approval of the people that they serve. A priority for guardian officers is protecting civilians from unnecessary harm and indignity (McLean et al., 2020).

Law enforcement training and tactics reflect and reinforce the warrior mindset that, as Stoughton (2015) postulated, if not addressed and changed may result in undermining and preventing efforts to "improve public perceptions of police legitimacy" (p. 2). The warrior mindset often mutates into a warrior mentality where police officers are taught that civilians are considered the enemy and police begin gunning for them. Officers may become hyper-attentive, vigilant, alert, cautious, and observant of others. Officers learn to treat individuals with whom they interact as an armed threat with the possibility of a deadly force encounter (Stoughton, 2015).

Lynch (2018b) identified state and municipal police academies' priority in providing cadets with foundational skills for law enforcement practitioners. The instructional hours include an excessive amount of training hours devoted to hyperaggressive strategies and survival curriculum that prepare prospective officers to wage war against the communities in which the officers will soon serve. The curricula include arrest and control tactics, weaponless defense strategies, firearms and chemical agents training, and less lethal weapons training. The cadet training normalizes implementing violent tactics and violence to resolve conflict. Police academy curricula minimize training in interpersonal communication skills and de-escalation tactics, and limited instruction on responding to service calls involving persons with mental health issues.

The warrior mindset has created problems for law enforcement, and the warrior mentality makes policing less safe for officers and civilians. McLean et al. (2020) preferred that police officers may not be singularly focused on one mindset but may perform with a combined warrior and guardian mindset. Suggestions for shifting from a warrior mid-set to a guardian mindset have included making cultural shifts with a different focus on training, in addition to changing officers' priorities. Stoughton (2015) offered two suggestions for promoting guardian policing;

encourage officers to connect with community members by requiring prospective officers to initiate non-enforcement contacts with community members and to emphasize tactical restraint through training and use-of-force after-action reviews. Stoughton's (2015) suggestions for promoting a guardian mindset, as opposed to a warrior mindset, reflect the climate of the organizational culture, and are not the premises of individual officers, as the organizational culture is taught and reinforced during the continual socialization process.

The Police Use of Force, Necessary Force, Unnecessary Force, Excessive Force, and Deadly Force

> How can police, who can be exemplary heroes, beat people and then even be prepared to lie about it? We shall explain this paradox with the proposition that two principal features of the police role – danger and authority – combine to produce in them a distinctive world view that affects the values and understanding of cops on and off the job, sometimes leading to admirable valor, sometimes to brutality and excessive force, and sometimes to a banding together, a cover-up, a conspiracy of silence. (Skolnick & Fyfe, 1993, p. 90)

Broadly defined, the use of force is defined as the effort required by the police to ensure or compel compliance by a subject that is unwilling (Boxer et al., 2021). Terrill et al. (2003) defined the use of force as "acts that threaten or inflict physical harm on subjects" (as cited in Stroshine & Brandl, 2020).Necessary force is "the amount of force required to control a situation to preserve life and maintain the safety of police officers or vulnerable civilians at the scene" (Miller, 2015, p. 98.). Unnecessary force is described as force that precedes a citizen's resistance or continues after a citizen has stopped resisting (Adams, 1999; Worden, 1995). Excessive force

is described as using more force than what is necessary to gain compliance during an incident (Adams, 1995, 1999; Worden, 1995 as cited in Phillips, 2010).

Police department use of force policies are designed to assist officers in applying the appropriate amount of force for the situation in response to the citizen's degree of resistance (Paoline & Terrill, 2011). Paoline and Terrill (2011) examined officers' views of the use of force when responding to varying types of citizens' resistance including compliance, verbal, passive, nonassaultive physical, and assaultive physical. When assessing the appropriate level of use of force, applying the use of force continuum, a critical component is the level of citizen resistance encountered.

There is no universally agreed upon use of force policy within American police agencies; use of force policies differ dramatically between police agencies (Paoline & Terrill, 2011; Phillips, 2010). Because there is no clear definition of excessive force, identifying excessive or unnecessary force is difficult. Often, situations evaluated as excessive force or unnecessary force are subjective, based on complaints against the police or citizens' perceptions.

There is no generally accepted ranking of force by police practitioners or researchers, and no use of force policy has empirically been shown to be better than another policy (Phillips, 2010). Police agencies, via their use of force policy, give their officers autonomy in using force. Weisburd et al. (2000 as cited in Paoline& Terrill, 2011) revealed three-quarters of the officers surveyed (N = 925) disagreed on the acceptability on the level of use of force necessary to control someone but explained that following the rules is sometimes incompatible with job accomplishment.

The use of force is constrained by a force factor, the use of force continuum, the amount of force relative to a citizen's actions (Phillips, 2010). The use of force continuum that officers

use includes verbal direction without threats, verbal commands and threats, pain compliance techniques, soft empty-hand techniques, hard empty-hand techniques, chemical-irritant sprays, electronic devices, baton, and projectile launchers (Paoline & Terrill, 2011). Most police agencies use the use of force continuum but struggle with where different levels of force fall within the continuum (Phillips, 2010).

Most patrol officers do not push the limits of their coercive power, while other officers may be problem employees due to their attitudes toward and dealings with citizens (Paoline & Terrill, 2011). Phillips' (2010) study expanded the use of force literature by examining the use of force by other police officers based on two variables: the use of unnecessary force and officers' willingness to report the use of unnecessary force. Worden (1995) found police officers do not use force in most cases but when force is used "a sizeable proportion seems to be excessive or unnecessary force" (p. 198.).

Examining the factors that led to officers' use of force resulted in three broad components. First, officers were more likely to use force against suspects that are young, African American, male, lower class, or intoxicated. These features do not influence officers' use of force as consistently as suspect resistance or antagonism toward the police. Second, officer characteristics, though officer race and gender were not significant factors (Phillips, 2010). Terrill and Mastrofski (2002) found a negative relationship between an officer's years of service and the use of force whereas Garner et al. (1996) and Worden (1995) found no link between those two components. Third, situational factors contribute to the use of force, such as legal and extra-legal aspects of the event (Phillips, 2010).

The use of force has been linked to a suspect's behavior; a violent offense, possessing a weapon, and when officers are involved in a foot or vehicle pursuit. Increased levels of violence

are more likely when an officer initiates the encounter (Terrill et al., 2003). Other situational variables that may influence officers' use of force include bystander presence or the suspect possessing a weapon.

Law enforcement practitioners disapprove of excessive force, but excessive or unnecessary force can be acceptable under certain circumstances, primarily when challenging the authority of a police officer (Carter, 1985). A suspect fleeing from an officer is considered a challenge to the officer's authority and justifies, from the officer's perspective, dispensing a level of street justice, hence, the use of unnecessary or excessive force (Phillips, 2015a). Nearly two-thirds of officers believed excessive force is acceptable when used for retaliation, and not only for self-defense. A substantial amount of police officers believe officers should be permitted to use more force than the law allows (Carter, 1985).

The code of silence restricts communication from street-level officers and their managers and provides protection for officers engaged in unnecessary force or excessive force. Where officers do not believe in excessive force, they will not turn in other officers engaged in the behavior, suggesting there is a gap between attitudes toward excessive force and behavior (Phillips, 2010; Weisburd et al., 2000). Gender and education level are characteristics that may influence officers reporting other officers' unnecessary use of force. More empirical study is needed in the subject of unnecessary or excessive force (Phillips, 2010).

Within one regional police academy, Phillips (2015a) examined police recruits' attitudes toward the unnecessary use of force during the recruits' first week of training, providing a different vantage point of a police recruit's socialization process during their time in the police academy. The police recruits were not yet affected by the police agency socialization process, compared to an experienced police patrol officer with real-world "street" exposure.

Findings indicated that prior to formal training or introduction to police socialization, police recruits view the use of unnecessary force unacceptable but is acceptable under certain conditions. The use of unnecessary force was negatively correlated with auto thieves, Hispanic suspects, swearing at a suspect, and a fleeing suspect. Police recruits were indoctrinated into and susceptible to the code of silence during their police academy training (Phillips, 2015). Phillips (2015) postulated the police training academy socializes police recruits into police culture, whereas Lynch (2018b) proffered a more exhaustive review of police academy training. Lynch (2018b) stated the learned hyperaggressive strategies normalizes violence as a means for resolving conflict based on extensive hours of training, that included firearms and chemical weapons training, weaponless defense strategies, arrest and control tactics, and less lethal weapons training.

The police academy emphasizes de-escalation tactics and interpersonal communication skills, and a limited number of training hours are devoted to fair and impartial policing, cultural understanding, and procedural law. The emphasis on tactics is intended to cause harm to the served citizenry. The result is newly graduated police cadets are forced into an environment that forces them to use skills and knowledge that were not developed during cadet training (Lynch, 2018b). Officer safety is a central theme of the police academy culture (Lynch, 2018a, 2018b). The overemphasis on survival tactics, coupled with the false construct that police are targeted for attack because they are police officers, encourages and normalizes police violence in their day-to-day interactions with the public. The normal nonthreatening interactions may result in police officers overreacting to nonviolent encounters, which may result in unnecessary force or excessive force (Lynch, 2018b).

Stroshine and Brandl (2020) focused on weaponless physical force by police officers. Research suggested physical force has a high likelihood of injuring citizens, with the potential to be deadly. Officers may have more discretion regarding physical force since physical force is at the lower end of the use of force continuum. Physical force may have a higher potential for abuse since physical force is less visible. Physical force includes control holds and strikes, using hands and arms, and grabbing and holding subjects. Injuries from physical force are often minor, whereas severe injuries are uncommon. Resistance is an important injury predictor for the subject and the police officer. The police officer's level of force is relative to the level of resistance by the subject (Stroshine & Brandl, 2020).

Organizational characteristics may affect the police use of force. The police union or the benevolent association may impact the police agency's functioning and operations. Police unions intend to guard their members' interests, including instances of unnecessary force, excessive force, and deadly force, which may increase officers' sense of security and insulation from disciplinary or punitive action (Alpert & MacDonald, 2001).Willits and Nowacki (2014) and Wooley and Smith (2022) delineated the differences between small-town and large city police agencies, and the organizational characteristics of police department, including organizational contexts, levels of professionalism, organizational complexity, and organizational control.

Morrow et al. (2018) ameliorated the minority threat hypothesis by examining the use of force in connection with ecological factors, such as a suspect's race or ethnicity and the ethnic composition of a precinct (of the New York Police Department) to influence the police use of force. The minority threat hypothesis proposed resource allocation and crime control efforts vary according to the racial/ethnic composition of locations. The dominant group (e.g., Whites) desire

to protect their privilege and power from areas considered a ‘problem population’ (e.g., ethnic minorities; Morrow et al., 2018).

Conceptualizing the police use of force on the minority threat hypothesis, Morrow et al. (2018) proposed the criminal justice system may be one mechanism that controls culturally dissimilar minority groups. Employing the minority threat hypothesis framework, in addition to the use of force being applied as a means for ensuring compliance with the law, use of force also preserves social order or the status quo for the political or social elite. The theoretical framing of the minority threat hypothesis as it relates to police use of force warrants further research to increase transferability and dependability (Morrow et al., 2018).

Police Misconduct and Corruption

Sherman (1980 as cited in Ashforth & Anand, 2003) defined a corrupt act “as the misuse of authority for personal, sub-unit, and/or organizational gain” (p. 2). In their seminal study, Ashforth and Anand (2003) developed a model that explained how corruption becomes normalized in organizations, and specifically, collective corruption which requires cooperation between two or more persons. Ashforth and Anand (2003) proposed that the normalization of corruption in organizations involves three pillars:

- Institutionalization, when corrupt practices have become routine.
- Rationalization, where individuals use socially constructed accounts to legitimize their behavior in their eyes.
- Socialization, when newcomers are trained to accept and perform corrupt practices.

Organizational leaders are the most impactful element in the institutionalization process, where rewarding, ignoring, condoning, or facilitating corruption sends loud and clear messages to employees. As role models, leaders may intentionally or unintentionally authorize corruption.

With institutionalized corruption, corruption becomes a normalized concept of the collective, and is an accepted and expected co-dependent routine fiber within the organization's culture. The organization's culture becomes deviant through the process of routinizing. Routinization locks employees into an interdependent process where the system of corruption is accepted and normative. Employees adapt, become desensitized, are mindless to corruption, and rationalize their behavior. Corrupt individuals tend to not view themselves as corrupt. Eventually, the system of corruption becomes consumed with protecting itself (Ashforth & Anand, 2003).

Law enforcement officer integrity and misconduct have been subjects of research and study for several years. Eitle et al. (2014) addressed and explained broader factors that contribute to police malfeasance. Police organizational characteristics, policies, and practices are limited in controlling police discretion, including the two domains of professionalizing the police and attempts at increasing bureaucratic control over police activity. Increased professionalism is designed to increase the capital of the individual police officer. Bureaucratic policies that may reduce police misconduct include hiring highly educated officers, increased screening of applicants, providing proper training, and paying a more competitive salary but there is mixed evidence that these initiatives increase the quality of appropriate police decisions (Eitle et al.,2014).

Crank et al. (2007) offered the noble cause as an explanation for corrupt police behavior. Noble cause corruption is defined as a concept used to explain police officers' unethical behavior, such as when law enforcement agencies condone police work where the ends justify the means (e.g., using deception, breaking rules to catch offenders, etc.; Harrison, 1999). Caldero and Crank (2004, p. 29) defined noble cause as "a moral commitment to make the world a better place. Put simply, it is getting the bad guys off the street." Noble cause corruption occurs when

procedural justice, department policy or the due process of law is violated for utilitarianism or the greater good (Crank et al., 2007).

Noble cause corruption involves ethical dynamics which are pivotal to police discretion and decision-making (Crank et al., 2007). Sunahara (2004 as cited in Crank et al., 2007) described noble cause in a broader sense of unethical and unprofessional police behavior, contending that noble cause corruption is learned, and organizational procedures can be utilized to unlearn it. The hostile environment of policing has been blamed for noble cause corruption, but Sunahara (2004) postulated that police illegal behavior is not legitimized. Noble cause philosophy should be addressed in the context of the circumstances within which it is applied (Crank et al., 2007).

Police and other law enforcement cadets learn the unwritten rule of loyalty to fellow officers while attending the police academy and the training is reinforced throughout an officer's career. Loyalty is a key construct within policing, whether criminality is involved. The blue code of silence and loyalty are connected to and may exacerbate corruption within law enforcement organizations. Law enforcement officers' refusal to report or deny knowledge of corruption is common, as well as providing false information to cover up misdeeds. Manifestations of the code include officers refusing to provide embarrassing information on fellow officers. Conversely, officers expect fellow officers to cover up their misconduct, lying, and brutality through the fear of retribution (Skolnick, 2002). The blue wall of silence is described in further detail in the section titled "The Blue Wall of Silence."

Police corruption extends to and is also dependent on elements that are external to the police organization; the symbiotic relationship between police officers, police organizational

leaders, and prosecutors in the district attorney's office (Trivedi & Van Cleve, 2020). This topic is covered in-depth in the section titled "External Law Enforcement and the District Attorney."

Whistleblowing in Law Enforcement Agencies. In a paper published by Rutgers University Journal of Law and Urban Policy, Johnson (2006) surmised police agencies make whistleblowing very difficult and less probable. The lack of whistleblowing is engrained into new law enforcement recruits as part of the peer group socialization process of becoming an experienced patrol officer. Patrol officers often work alone, without senior officer or management supervision, which creates a heightened sense of autonomy that requires independent situational decision-making. The law enforcement cultural values that are taught and communicated in day-to-day interactions are given a higher priority than formal written policies. Socialization over time into law enforcement culture contributes to silence codes (Johnson, 2021; Rothwell & Baldwin, 2007).

Law enforcement officers' bond over the mutually shared emotional tentacles of shared dangers and unique elements of their "police universe" which only they understand. Loyalty to the team with fellow law enforcement officers is expected and demanded; to do otherwise is to be considered a "snitch" or a traitor, hence, the "blue wall of silence." The lack of whistleblowing may allow law enforcement officers' abhorrent behavior to continue, which includes unequal treatment, bribery, using public office for private gain, excessive force, deadly force, and differential treatment of ethnic minorities (Johnson, 2006).

Law enforcement practitioners are reluctant to report on one another and are willing to commit perjury to protect each other (Rothwell & Baldwin, 2007). Law enforcement cultures that condone and exercise a code of silence place "loyalty over integrity" (O'Malley, 1997, p. 21 as cited in Rothwell & Baldwin, 2007). Organization size and situational variables impact

officers' tendencies to participate in whistleblowing. Larger organizations are more likely to have written policies regarding whistleblowing. Supervisory status impacts whistleblowing as law enforcement supervisors are held accountable for their subordinates' behavior.

Tenure may be a variable in whistleblowing since more senior offers may be closer to retirement (Rothwell & Baldwin, 2007). Variables affect officers' choice in whistleblowing, including the type of wrongdoing which may range from lying to supervisors, sexual assault, accepting bribes, the use of excessive force, sexual harassment, and committing intentional homicide. Written organizational policy, circumstances surrounding the questionable activity, and whether the reporter can remain anonymous may impact whistleblowing behavior (Near et al., 2004; Near & Miceli, 1985).

Retaliation for whistleblowing within police agencies can be harsh. Officers that expose other officers are called rats, and are scorned, excluded, shunned, may not be backed up when responding to service calls, condemned, and cast out. Some whistleblowing officers' lives are threatened; they may be forced to change police agencies several times, and may eventually quit their job (Johnson, 2021). Other forms of retaliation include verbal harassment or intimidation, pressure from co-workers to stop the complaint, being denied an award or a promotion, poor performance appraisals, denied training opportunities, reassignment to a different geographic location, reassignment to a job with less desirable duties, job suspensions, grade level demotions, and firing (Near et al., 2004).

Near and Miceli (1985) described whistleblowing as a type of organizational dissidence. Law enforcement officers are taught that they must trust implicitly each other with their life while also being indoctrinated that when witnessing bad behavior by a fellow officer they must remain silent, behavior that inherently destroys organizational trust. The whistleblower may hold

important information that may be valuable in improving organizational effectiveness or efficiency but may be restrained from discussing the information due to organizational-social or cultural socialization and expectations.

Law enforcement officers that fail to report fellow officers' bad behavior support, condone, and assist the "bad apples" in continuing practicing bad behavior. Whistleblowing within law enforcement agencies may be enhanced by creating written policies that enhance the perception of and support procedural justice that reflect one's self-interest and fairness. Mandatory reporting requirements, using polygraph examinations, and the existence of an internal affairs unit or an internal accountability unit may support the practice of police whistleblowing and individual accountability (Rothwell & Baldwin, 2007).

USA TODAY conducted a year-long investigation involving more than 300 cases of police officers over the past decade that spoke out against alleged misconduct in their police departments. USA TODAY's final report of their "Behind the Blue Wall of Silence" series was released in December 2021 (Barton et al., 2021). The investigation revealed a culture of retaliation against police whistleblowers, revealing the depth of law enforcement's blue wall of silence and the extent to which individual officers are affected by the blue wall of silence.

Lim and Sloan (2016) extended previous studies on police integrity by examining police supervisors and command-level officers and the organizational factors that enhance or impede police integrity and accountability. Lim and Sloan (2016) identified three categories of people; "rotten apples," "rotten barrels," and "rotten orchards." "Rotten apples" are individual-level factors that influence integrity. Individuals may successfully thwart safeguards that prevent them from earning promotions or prevent the police department from identifying them as candidates for illegal or unethical behavior, and thus spoiling the barrel. According to Fyfe and Kane (2005

as cited in Lim & Sloan, 2016), officers with high levels of education were less likely to the fired for misconduct, while Harris (2010 as cited in Lim & Sloan, 2016) stipulated officers with longer service records are less likely to be terminated for misconduct. Organizational size also influences individuals' integrity decisions.

"Rotten barrels" are organizational influences on integrity, which includes the high rate of stress, which was described as "the fertile soil from which police deviant behavior springs" (Griffin & Ruiz, 1999, p. 28). Police deviance may manifest through a "rotten barrel" that includes a subculture, departmental rules, and practices that negatively impact individual officers' decision-making. A "rotten barrel" spoils the "apples" (Lim & Sloan, 2016, p. 286).

"Rotten orchards" consist of environmental influences on integrity, which includes the values and norms of the policed communities. "Rotten orchards" include specific neighborhood cultures or the demographic make-up of a particular neighborhood. Terrill and Reisig (2003 as cited in Lim & Sloan, 2016) indicated officers used increased levels of force when police-civilian encounters occurred in disadvantaged neighborhoods or in areas with a high homicide rate. Lim and Sloan's (2016) study contained several limitations, including a sample size within small agencies in a single state, which may inhibit study generalizability of the integrity of supervisors and their agencies in other locations.

The Blue Wall of Silence. Skolnick's (2002) seminal report provided extensive data on the police code of silence. The "blue code of silence" or the "blue wall of silence" is described as a normative unwritten subculture element of policing where loyalty or brotherhood/sisterhood protects law enforcement against genuine threats. The "blue code of silence" may sustain a criminal subculture that protects police officers that violate criminal law (Skolnick, 2002; Westmarland, 2005; Wieslander, 2019). Law enforcement leaders' leadership practices and the

organizational culture may socialize law enforcement officers to make choices that support and extend the police academy's "blue wall of silence" (Skolnick, 2002; Westmarland & Rowe, 2018; Wieslander, 2019).

The blue wall of silence may be the breeding ground for police corruption. The etiology of the blue wall of silence emanates from the nature of law enforcement work where officers are trained to use force to overcome resistance in exercising their authority. Loyalty to fellow officers is a key element of policing, even when criminal behavior is involved. The code of silence is reinforced through the fear of retribution. The "bad cop, good cop dilemma" involves choosing between the blue wall of silence and law enforcement department policy that compels officers to report officer misconduct immediately. If the officer reports the violation immediately, the officer is labeled a "rat." When an officer delay reporting the incident, they may have trouble in explaining the reporting delay. With these pressures, officers' default to the blue wall of silence. External to the law enforcement organization, the blue wall of silence related to officer misconduct may be perpetuated by the criminal justice system. Traditionally, the nearly all-White local juries refuse to prosecute law enforcement officers that have an unblemished record. Crooked law enforcement officers face a higher rate of prosecution for criminal charges when charged and tried under federal charges (Skolnick, 2002).

The code of silence inhibits police investigations of corrupt officers. After law enforcement officers have subdued a criminal suspect who is safe in police custody, officers are not allowed to use retribution against a suspect. Accusing the suspect of resisting arrest has become the classic defense for using and justifying excessive force. Law enforcement has been known to enact "street justice" or "tune up" civilians when the civilian is involved in criminal activity but where the civilian cannot be legally apprehended. Physically assaulting the civilian

may occur. The officer may not suffer criminal charges or a conviction since local judges are reticent to convict police officers for assaults against perceived “low life’s” (Skolnick, 2002).

Skolnick (2002) asserted police brutality and corruption may be positively affected by police leadership, and that “police corruption does not take place in a vacuum” (p. 16). Police corruption, in reference to the blue wall of silence, is reinforced or undermined by police managers and supervisors that will not tolerate corruption. Changing the senior leader, the police chief, may be a necessary yet insufficient step in reducing or eliminating police department corruption.

Grunwald and Rappaport (2019) provided insight on another aspect of the blue wall of silence, the wandering officer. Wandering officers are law enforcement professionals that were fired or resigned under threat of termination by one law enforcement agency that then are hired by another agency, though the officer may have committed serious misconduct. Systemic data are lacking, making it difficult to know the quantity or the negative impact of wandering officers. Another term for the wandering officer is the “gypsy cop.” The wandering cop phenomenon is prevalent within policing because some police leaders choose to not officially document an officer’s bad or criminal behavior in the officer’s personnel file.

Depending on individual state law or police fraternal associations, police leaders may be forbidden from formally documenting an officer’s bad behavior in the personnel file unless or until the officer is found guilty of said charges. During the investigation process, the officer guilty of corrupt behavior may resign, leaving no paper trail for their corrupt behavior. Insufficient background checks also explain hiring a wandering officer or the officer may not fully reveal their questionable background.

When considering prospective new law enforcement hires, agency leaders may be made aware of official or unofficial complaints of an officer's corrupt behavior but due to extreme manning shortages and the insufficient number of applicants for law enforcement jobs, the leader may be forced to hire a wandering officer. The police leader may justify their choice to hire the wandering officer by explaining the officer is a warm body that has already been trained and has current police certifications and credentials.

Law enforcement leaders may be willing to give the wayward officer another chance, thinking wayward officers may have redeemed themselves and may be more conscientious with the new position. Hiring wandering officers is risky; wandering officers are more likely to be fired from future jobs. Hiring the wandering officer may be a better option than hiring a less qualified officer. The "cowboy" veteran officer may offer some perceived benefit by accepting more difficult or challenging assignments. Law enforcement organizations may discount the risks and costs of hiring wandering officers (Grunwald & Rappaport, 2019).

Organizational Justice. Organizational justice is defined as understanding the complexity of fair treatment in a work setting (Graso et al., 2020), particularly addressing the behavior of managers and leaders toward their subordinates (Herrington & Roberts, 2013).Graso et al.'s (2020) research reflected organizational justice enactment is a shared responsibility of targets (employees) and agents (managers). Instead of applying external controls to reduce police misconduct, Fridell et al. (2020) surmised organizational internal controls may be more effective in addressing law enforcement workplace misconduct.

President Obama's Task Force on Twenty-First Century Policing (2015) suggested the principles of procedural justice may be applied within police agencies to promote police legitimacy. When employees perceive a greater degree of organizational justice, those controls

are enacted which promote more desirable behavior, resulting in employees deferring to organizational policies. While Fridell et al. (2020) focused on attitudinal measures and not actual conduct, literature "demonstrates the link between evaluation of the misconduct of others (attitude) and the respondent's propensity to engage in misconduct (behavior)" (p. 3).

Findings indicated the more a subject perceived organizational justice, less support is expressed for misconduct. Officer's support for misconduct is less likely to be expressed when they perceive outcomes are distributed fairly, they have a say in their agency's decision-making processes, internal processes are just, and they are treated with respect. Fridell et al. (2020) indicated that command-and-control leadership practices enhance the impact of organizational justice based on the belief that officer misbehavior will be detected.

Police officers that viewed their senior officers' managerial practices as just and fair were less likely to support behaviors that support other officers' bad behavior or believe that corruption in support of noble causes was justified (Wolfe & Piquero, 2011). Wolfe and Piquero (2011) also found a lower level of misconduct was associated with officers' perceptions of organizational justice. Wolfe and Piquero's (2011) earlier study was confirmed by Wolfe et al.'s (2018) findings that officers that feel they were treated fairly by managers were more likely to support police agency goals and less likely to engage in misconduct.

Procedural Justice. Procedural justice was defined by Wolfe et al. (2016) as "the fairness and evenhandedness of police procedures" (p. 254), how the police engage with the public (Herrington & Roberts, 2013), and that police treat citizens fairly (Murphy & Tyler, 2017). Murphy and Tyler (2017) consistently found that when evaluating the police, citizens place more emphasis on procedural justice than on police performance. Adopting a procedural

justice approach and an organizational justice approach to policing may enhance police legitimacy (Roberts & Herrington, 2013; Wolfe et al., 2016).

Procedural justice involves four key tenets when police interact with others: respect, neutrality, trustworthiness, and voice. While treating others with dignity and respect, police officers need to demonstrate they can make neutral decisions based on legal rules, principles, and facts, and not on opinion. Trustworthiness is displayed by listening to others' accounts and their actions show sensitivity to people's concerns and needs. People appreciate being given an opportunity to have their voices heard before police officers decide (Herrington & Roberts, 2013).

The potential benefits of adopting a procedural justice approach to policing include: improved deterrence to the police during interactions; improved cooperation with police to prevent and manage crime, enhanced confidence and trust in the police, the public's increased compliance with the law, and improved support for police departments (Herrington & Roberts, 2013). The U.S. President's Task Force on 21st Century Policing (2015) recommended police legitimacy could be endorsed as a pillar for change in American policing, yet the methodologies used to study procedural justice have been limited to self-report surveys or interviews (Murphy & Tyler, 2017). Additional research is needed to determine whether procedural justice works in policing (Tyler, 2017 as cited in Murphy & Tyler, 2017). Maguire (2018) offered recent resources of procedural justice studies.

Nagin and Telep (2017) questioned the correlation and causation between procedural justice and police legitimacy as postulated by Wolfe et al. (2016), proposed perceptions of procedurally just treatment and legitimacy "are reflective of an accumulation of a lifetime of cultural, community, and familial influences…" (p. 6). Police departments are adopting

programs aimed at improving procedurally just behavior, but no training program has demonstrated effectiveness in altering citizens' perceptions of police behaviors (Nagin & Telep, 2017).

In a follow-up study, Nagin and Telep (2020) reported encouraging evidence that procedural justice training improved police officers' attitudes and community policing initiatives improved citizens' perceptions of the police, though crime rates were not reduced. Body-worn cameras research provided indirect support that respectful police-citizen interactions have a positive impact (Nagin & Telep, 2020).

Nix et al. (2017b) conducted two randomized experiments that considered citizens' demeanor, race, and police perceptions on procedural justice. Factors, or variables, may affect the value police officers place on procedural justice, such as being involved with suspicions persons, the threat of violence, and racial stereotypes among officers. Police-citizen interactions vary widely during different encounters, based on two potentially key factors, citizen disrespect and race. Citizen noncompliance and disrespect toward police increases the likelihood that citizens will be treated disrespectfully by the police.

Police Unions. Walker's (2008) seminal research article highlighted the lack, or neglect, of researchers in addressing the impact of police unions in American policing, particularly regarding issues such as police-community relations, police management, police accountability, and innovation and reform, a sentiment later reinforced by McCormick (2016). The issues addressed included whether the police union and collective bargaining agreements prevent senior law enforcement leaders from implementing innovations. Community civil rights activists purport police unions prevent thorough and fair investigations of officer misconduct, thwart the

discipline of officers involved in improper activity, and magnify racial tensions (McCormick, 2016; Walker, 2008).

Changes in state law regarding collective bargaining rights were the result of President John F. Kennedy's 1962 Executive Order 10988, which facilitated the conversion of police officer associations, lodges, and orders into police unions (DiSalvo, 2020). In states where collective bargaining is illegal, police associations such as the Fraternal Order of Police or the National Association of Police Organizations were established to represent police employees (McCormick, 2016). DiSalvo (2020) determined the Fraternal Order of Police is the largest police organization with 354,000 members, while the National Association of Police Organizations boasts of having 236,000 members. The National Sheriff's Association represents thousands of sheriffs, deputies, and other law enforcement public safety professionals and concerned citizens (NSA, 2021).

Prior to police unionization in America, which gained political prominence (McCormick, 2016) and power in the last 1960s, police officers were subject to arbitrary and punitive discipline. Police unionization contributed to securing adequate salaries and benefits. Police unions are prevalent within American policing, though their prevalence varies by region and agency size (Walker, 2008). Unions play a large role in shaping the police organizational culture. Unions assist with developing and implementing solutions that affect police cultural reforms and change officer behavior (McCormick, 2016).

Police unions have a significant impact on law enforcement agencies as represented through shared governance, where employees through their union have a voice in some areas of management, including personnel standards, officer assignments, impact on innovation, and unit determination. Unions have gained the right to negotiate some personnel issues, including

mandatory drug testing for current employees and physical fitness standards. Collective bargaining affects law enforcement managers' power to assign and deploy patrol officers and sergeants, which is based on the officers' seniority (Walker, 2008).

Some union contracts restrict the police chief from deploying one-person patrols, as opposed to two-person patrols. Union contract restrictions may also affect innovation and change within police agencies. Police unions fight to keep secret information related to police officer discipline. Police chiefs are aware of the possibility that the union may challenge proposed change initiatives (Walker, 2008).

Police unions negotiating the salary and fringe benefits for police officers improved law enforcement attractiveness as a career. Additional research is needed to determine whether police union contracts provide excessively generous benefits and pensions, which may impact some local property tax rates (Walker, 2008). Fegley (2020) stipulated that whereas improved compensation increased job security, union protections increase the costs of holding officers accountable for disciplinary problems.

Police unions impact officer discipline and accountability by reinforcing police subcultural norms (e.g., the code of silence and the warrior mindset; McCormick, 2016; Walker, 2008). Specific provisions in collective bargaining agreements inhibit investigations, representing due process protections for employees. Further research is warranted in assessing how police unions sustain the code of silence by contract negations that inhibit misconduct investigations, provide support for accused officers through experienced legal representatives, and provide group solidarity and moral support for accused officers.

Some states are governed by a Police Officers Bill of Rights (POBR), which is like the content within police union contracts (Walker, 2008). Law enforcement discipline and

accountability have a substantial impact on police-community relations and citizen oversight of the officers (Walker, 2008). Unions have fought citizen oversight agencies, whereas large city police chiefs willing to maintain positive relations with the African-American community cannot afford to be perceived as opposing citizen oversight (Walker, 2008).

Police unions fight publicly releasing officer disciplinary records, which is contrary to the construct of transparency. White-dominated police unions have led in filing reverse discrimination lawsuits opposing affirmative action hiring (Walker, 2008). Davis (2021) expounded upon the generally accepted view that hiring more African-American police officers as a means of increasing organizational diversity would reduce the number of excessive use of force complaints against the police "is simplistic and naïve" (p. 2) and ineffective in creating police organizational cultural change. Police unions are an organized interest group with financial resources and political clout that endorse political candidates for office and impact city or county budget issues. Political candidates are reluctant to appear to be soft on crime and are traditionally conservative (Walker, 2008).

After Walker's (2008) research, scientific study of police unions has expanded. Fegley (2020) expanded Walker's (2008) research by addressing the privileges officers have through police unions, explaining why politicians compensate police officers with protections, provided evidence that unionized departments have been more successful than nonunion departments in protecting their officers, and explained how union protections effect officer discipline.

Stoughton (2014) elucidated that state laws governing public sector employee collective bargaining are not intended to effect police practices, including rank-and-file officers, that embrace a more legalistic approach to policing and collective bargaining grievance procedures that "both discourage and frustrate attempts to discipline individual officers" (p. 2211). Rushin

(2017) compiled union contracts for 178 cities and found 156 of the contracts contained a minimum of one provision that made it more challenging to discipline officer misconduct.

Some unions protect their members from criminal prosecution, insulating law enforcement personnel from discipline based on clauses in the union's collective bargaining agreement. The clauses include how soon an officer may be interrogated after an incident, how the investigation takes place, who and how many perform the interrogation, any incentives the interrogators may offer, and requiring that other witnesses are questioned first. When the subject of an investigation is a police officer, certain interrogation tactics used on civilians are prohibited. Many of the larger police departments with a union contract contain restrictions that limit police interrogations. When an outside agency, such as the U.S. Department of Justice, conducts investigations of officer misconduct, these provisions would not apply (Fegley, 2020). Police officer misconduct may result in civil lawsuits which may be included in police union collective bargaining agreements with provisions that cities pay for the costs of civil judgments, legal fees, and paid leave while officers are being investigated (Fegley, 2020).

Civilian oversight initiatives began in 1948 but progressively increased in power during the 1960's civil rights movement as a means of pushback against police misconduct. Yet, police unions fought against and were able to restrict the creation of civilian oversight committees. Civilian oversight committees are usually formed after a well-publicized incident of police violence, usually against a minority. As recent as 2010, the police union may lack the political power to inhibit the creation of a civilian oversight committee (Wilson & Buckler, 2010 as cited in Fegley, 2020).

Police union contracts may hamper police manager's ability to execute internal discipline against rank-and-file officers. Officers may benefit from the mandatory purging of complaints

and misconduct against the officer from the officer's record, including charges that have been substantiated. Identified problem officers may be eligible for additional training or may have justified grounds for being terminated through arbitration via an independent arbitrator, neither of which may occur after the officer's record is purged. Arbitrators do not have access to an officer's adverse disciplinary history once the information is eliminated from the officer's record, and the collective bargaining agreement may prohibit considering prior discipline. The civilian oversight board may only make recommendations to police management (Fegley, 2020; Rushin, 2017). Rushin (2017) detailed specific categories of problematic provisions that have been implemented by police union contracts that limit police accountability within the largest police agencies in America.

Some police agencies are required to provide certain information to the officer being investigated, which precludes undercover stings and integrity tests, and prevents management from employing tactics for rooting out corruption. The Corpus Christi, Texas police department requires that an officer receives the name of their complainant before the officer is interrogated for misbehavior (Fegley, 2020). Complaints against police misbehavior are disqualified if the complaint is not submitted within a certain timeframe (Check the Police, 2016). Police officers' disciplinary action may be appealed through arbitration based on the police union's contractual protections. An officer's positive work history may persuade an arbitrator to overturn an officer's discharge, including charges of repeated on-duty sexual harassment of citizens (Adams, 2016).

Police Training and Education. In 2018, Huey intended to conduct a social scientific systematic literature review to determine "what works" in the field of in-service police training covering the period 2000–2015. Unfortunately, the literature review was abandoned due to an insufficient number of scientific evaluations or quantitative research elucidating police in-service

training efficacy. Part of the reasoning for this, explained Huey, from the police practitioner's perspective, was the historical divide between police practitioners and police scientists or researchers; police management philosophy perceives police "real world" experience as a critical component to decision-making and viewed scientific research as unnecessary. The costs associated with conducting training evaluations and the disruption to police officer's normal duties were further justifications for the lack of systematic training evaluations (Huey, 2018).

Courses related to American policing are minimally covered at regional and state-run police academies. Police in-service training is then provided to recent police academy graduates for the next 3 to 6 months as a prerequisite for earning their police credential or certification (Buehler, 2021). Training on new innovations or periodic refresher training on a host of varied subjects is provided by the police agency. Unfortunately, as Huey (2018) elucidated, in-service training often lacks rigorous scientific assessments, needs assessments, and evaluation research to test the training's effectiveness or efficiency (Chen, 2015; Cordner, 2020; Kaufman & Guerra-López, 2013; Stroh, 2015).

In research conducted in conjunction with the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP; 2023) and funded by Arnold Ventures, Engel et al. (2020a) expounded on the lack of scientific evaluations and literature review for de-escalation training across all professions but specifically noted the lack of de-escalation training evaluation research in the discipline of policing. Engel et al. (2020b) made a direct call to police practitioners, academics, and funders across policing to prioritize the evaluation and testing of de-escalation, use of force policies, and other police training.

Former-President Obama Commissioned the President's Task Force on 21st Century Policing (2015) as a means for building trust and legitimacy between law enforcement and

community members by improving the police organizational culture. The Task Force proposed changes to police culture via six pillars, the fifth pillar being training and education. The fifth pillar identified the military-style approach which endorses a "warrior mentality" and recommended changing to a "guardian-style approach." Changing to a guardian-style approach of policing included offering more nontraditional courses during preservice training (e.g., at the police academy), as well as in-service training. In a critique of The President's Task Force on 21st Century Policing (2015), Cook (2016) exclaimed that without incentives for the police to pursue these goals and sufficient motivation to maintain successes, the recommended changes would be ineffective.

Sloan and Paoline (2021) analyzed the basic law enforcement training at over 500 police academies, reviewing subject content and the number of training hours dedicated to traditional policing subjects and nontraditional policing subjects. Although the core curricula for preservice training were similar, the allocation of hours assigned to the training varied greatly. Preservice training ranged from 653 hours or 16 weeks to 949 hours or 24 weeks. Most of the preservice training consisted of traditional subjects, such as patrol tactics and procedures, use of force, and criminal investigations. The total number of hours for nontraditional topics such as cultural diversity, ethics and professionalism, communication, and stress management is just over 50 hours. Community-policing training consisted of six percent of the total training hours. Sloan and Paoline (2021) proposed adjusting how the existing hours of training are allocated to prioritize guardian-style policing.

The growth of multiculturalism has resulted in police officers experiencing more challenges in their communities, including making de-escalation more difficult. The focus of police training is the tactical side of use of force, addressing how officers may protect themselves

from a real or perceived threat. Additional training in soft skills may provide a social context to address how interactions between the officer and community members may affect the community. Soft skills competencies that are needed in policing include decision-making skills, problem-solving approaches, and interpersonal communications (Sereni-Massinger & Wood, 2016).

Moon et al. (2018) uncovered that there were no nationally centralized training or assessment standards for police officer training, nor was there a cultural competency assessment tool. Extensive research to determine if and how police departments are measuring and accounting cultural competency training is lacking. Moon et al. (2018) recommended utilizing the Intercultural Development Inventory (IDI) to training police officers. Research indicated a lack of periodic review, assessment, needs assessment, and evaluation (Cordner, 2020; Huey, 2018; Spencer et al., 2016; Swencionis & Goff, 2017) of race relations training. Assessing police officers' perceptions of the efficacy of race relations training content and soliciting recommendations for possible future racial awareness training content justifies additional research.

External Law Enforcement/District Attorney. Trivedi and Van Cleve (2020) examined the codependent relationship between police officers and the local district attorney's office, which exacerbates police misconduct by condoning long held, but in some cases, not well known and unwritten policies and norms of not holding accountable wayward or possibly criminal police officers. The district attorney is a local community elected public figure that may politically market themselves with a "get tough on crime" philosophy. The exception to the political standard is when the accused is a police officer, creating political and structural benefits for both entities.

Prosecutors need a high conviction rate to earn their promotions and are dependent on law enforcement officer support and testimony for the district attorney's job security. In turn, some district attorneys will "turn the other way" when they are aware that a testifying law enforcement officer is not telling the truth or the whole truth or is shading the truth on the witness stand if the "story" results in a conviction of a civilian but, again, the rules are different for wayward police officers. For example, police officers have been known to testify that a smaller amount of drugs were confiscated from a suspect when the actual amount may have been much larger. The officer is shading the truth and the prosecutor knows it but allows the officer to perjure themselves on the witness stand so the prosecutor will win a conviction, with perjured testimony. The co-dependent relationship may condone police misbehavior (Trivedi &Van Cleve, 2020).

According to Trivedi and Van Cleve (2020), traditionally, wayward police officers that exercised excessive force or deadly force, particularly against African Americans, have not been criminally charged because the district attorney failed to prosecute the officer. Examples include Michael Brown, Philando Castile, Stephen Clark, Eric Garner, Tamir Rice, Alton Sterling, and others. Police officers that are criminally charged are those where there is overwhelming factual evidence, the officer's behavior is recorded, or a special prosecutor is appointed to oversee the criminal case and possible trial, such as was the case with former officer Derek Chauvin's criminal trial (Trivedi &Van Cleve, 2020).

The police's bad apple philosophy is not a stand-alone paradigm but rather one that is supported externally to the police organization through the district attorney's office. The district attorneys are often socialized and intimidated in supporting and extending the destructive aspects of the police culture. Prosecutors put blinders on and do not see or say anything about what they

hear or are told and are expected to show officers ‘good faith.’ Prosecutors have been known to meet with police officers prior to the officer’s grand jury or criminal court testimony to ‘get their stories straight’ (Trivedi &Van Cleve, 2020).

Prosecutors may practice cultural infrastructure, a culture of silence about police violence, ensuring the prosecutor’s continued career promotion. Police may threaten the prosecutor by threatening to expose the prosecutor’s previous compliant behavior. Prosecutors are expected to enable police misconduct, and those that do not “follow the rules” will pay a price, including alienation from police leaders and police officers, and the possibility of the loss of their reelection bid (Trivedi &Van Cleve, 2020).

Prosecutors are some of the most powerful participants in the U.S. criminal justice system, especially when considering a prosecutor may influence a defense attorney to motivate their client(s) to plead to a lesser charge, which is a conviction. When evidence is tainted by police officer misbehavior or misconduct and the accused accepts a plea bargain, or where charge manipulation exists, there are no grounds for a review or an appeal. The police misconduct that resulted in the accused’s conviction remains covered up and the case is closed. Morton (2018) offered strategies for improving law enforcement transparency and accountability within African American communities.

III. Police Leadership

RQ 3: Does your police agency provide opportunities for and support police patrol officers’ leadership development?

Police Leadership Philosophy. Phillips (2015b) studied the attitudes and goals of police supervisors. Police leadership philosophy has been conceptualized into two frameworks: traditional and community policing. Traditional policing and police leadership involved using

aggressive street tactics mixed with applied criminal law intended to gain compliance from citizens. Traditional policing, also known as the ‘reform era’ of policing, covered the period roughly from 1920 to 1960. Traditional policing’s quasi-military style involves aggressive law enforcement related to drugs, seizing guns, and making arrests. Community policing began in the 1970s when aggressive crime control efforts were questioned. With a community policing framework, the police would engage with the public to develop solutions to the causes of crime, which reflected a philosophical and program shift in policing. Community policing shifted the role of the police from crime control to a broad service function (Phillips, 2015a).

Changes in the policing model mandated a shift in organizational goals and measurement objectives. The traditional policing model is measured quantitatively (e.g., the number of arrests or citations or calls for service). Community policing focuses on improving citizens’ quality of life and is measured qualitatively, such as community contacts and fear reduction. Police supervisors were ambivalent toward community policing due to street-level officers having increased freedom and discretion. Keeping police officers out of trouble was a primary goal of police supervisors, followed by treating citizens fairly and reducing serious crime. Findings indicated smaller police agencies generally utilize community policing (Phillips, 2015a).

Police supervisors favor aggressive enforcement tactics, such as focusing on hot spots, within a community policing framework. Police supervisors’ behavior and values may influence officers’ attitudes (Phillips, 2015a). Park and Hassan (2018) elucidated that, through social cognitive theory (Bandura, 1977, 1986), public managers are more likely to use empowering leadership practices when their direct supervisors use such practices. Managers need to feel empowered to empower others. The extent to which public managers feel empowered is based

on their supervisor's empowering leadership. For empowering initiatives to be successful, senior managers must have faith in the initiative and lead by example (Park & Hassan, 2018).

Policy Failure and the Policy Implementation Gap. Tormos-Aponte et al.'s (2021) study, a targeted and focused expansion on Hudson et al.'s (2019) research, addressed policy failure and implementation failure regarding racism and systemic change failures within policing. Reducing racism through a systemic change lens may be more effective when studied and practiced via policy implementation. Research indicated implementing policy changes that would inhibit police mistreatment of African Americans and increase police reforms related to racism have failed (Tormos-Aponte et al., 2021).

Structural racism is allowed to continue due to policy design failures, which includes permitting a high degree of discretion with policy implementation, selectively using body worn cameras, and allowing racial biases to influence policy outcomes. According to Tormos-Aponte et al. (2021), police reforms have failed partly through a pattern of not observing or overlooking racism as a contributing factor in implementation failures. Prenzler et al. (2013) researched case studies that assessed the impact of interventions used to reduce police use of force and harms associated with force.

Policy implementation has failed to meet the intended goals for several reasons, including poor design, overly optimistic expectations, implementation in dispersed governance, inadequate collaborative policy making, and the transitional vagaries of political cycles. Implementation in dispersed governance occurs when a national policy is formulated but faces implementation difficulties at sub-national levels. Overly optimistic expectations are hampered by the need for a long-term focus which is complicated by costs and benefits exigencies; there is an implementation-positive outcome lag; policies are challenged intellectually and are politically

challenging to deliver; and the causes and effects involve government bureaucracies (Hudson et al., 2019; Tormos-Aponte et al., 2021).

Implementing policy changes between dispersed levels of governance with a degree of consistency across different levels of political authority has been fraught with difficulties. Policy implementation must be an integrated process over policy legitimacy between different levels of organizational missions and priorities. Changes in the political cycle and politicians' priorities affect policy initiative outcomes. The current politician is attracted to short-term results, which negates long-term progress and reforms (Hudson et al., 2019; Tormos-Aponte et al., 2021).

In February 2018, the U.S. Committee on Proactive Policing, appointed by the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, published a report on their review of the effectiveness of proactive policing strategies (Weisburd & Majmundar, 2018). Willis and Toronjo (2019) provided implications from the National Academies' report. The report is particularly relevant to police chiefs that establish and implement policy. Integrating scientific research into policy extends beyond documenting policing strategy outcomes, offering training programs, and conducting high quality program evaluations. Willis and Toronjo surmised that translating research into a policy requires addressing a broader research agenda that should consider and consider: (a) the lack of cost-efficiency analyses on proactive policing strategies, (b) the challenges of managing competing values, and (c) the police's mistrust of science and researchers. Willis and Toronjo proffered considerations for police leaders on taking further action(s).

On December 18, 2014, then-President Obama signed an executive order establishing The President's Task Force on 21st Century Policing. The task force's purpose and intent, and the theme of the report recommended change initiatives that could reform the police culture. The

task force met seven times in January and February of 2015, and brought 11 task force members together with 100 individuals from a diverse group consisting of law enforcement executives and officers, civic leaders, community members, advocates, academics, researchers, and others.

The Final Report of the President's Task Force on 21st Century Policing was issued May 2015 (U.S. Department of Justice). The task force offered recommendations and suggestions but failed to develop or create police policy and failed to implement any reforms or policy initiatives. The task force did not mention and failed to address racism, race relations between the police and minority communities, police race-based misbehavior, microaggressions, or systemic or structural racism.

Cook's (2016) critique of The President's Task Force's Final Report (2016) declared the recommended changes in the task force's report would face substantial hurdles in changing the police culture via reform initiatives due to the lack of incentives for the police to pursue the recommended goals and retaining achieved successes. The recommended reform initiatives were posed as recommendations and were dependent on the initiative of law enforcement agencies and police leaders. Giving the law enforcement agencies policy enforcement discretion resulted in the proposed recommendations not being enforced via policy implementation (Cook, 2016).

Terrill and Paoline (2017) addressed and examined the relationship between the police organization's less lethal use of force policy and the outcome of the policy. More restrictive lethal force policies were associated with fewer citizens being shot by police officers, and crime levels, arrest behavior, and officer safety were not compromised (Gellar & Scott, 1992 as cited in Terrill &Paoline, 2017). With passage of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act (1994), the Department of Justice has been required to ensure nation-wide statistics on police use

of force are collected and published. The Department of Justice has failed to establish a nationwide policy that mandates nationwide statistics for police use of force.

Police Executive Police Forum (PERF) is an independent research organization that focuses on critical issues in policing (PERF, 2021). In January 2016, PERF held a summit in Washington, D.C., which was attended by 185 current and retired police practitioners, police training academy instructors, civilian government executives, government research organization executives, law firm representatives, police union representatives, various senior Department of Justice organizational leaders, senior university academics, the Superintendent of Police Scotland, and Police Scotland personnel (PERF, 2016).

The topic discussed was police reform initiatives, with a focus on police use of force. In March 2016, PERF issued "PERF's 30 Guiding Principles on Use of Force." The Guiding Principles on Use of Force offered recommendations, when implemented, would "challenge conventional thinking on police use of force" (Wexler, p. 5), with particular attention given to incidents that involve persons with mental illness that do not possess a firearm and non-gun incidents. Recommended reform initiatives included Crisis Intervention Team training and de-escalation, and PERF's critical decision-making model.

Leadership Practices and Power Dynamics. Democratic leadership (Steinheider & Wuestewald, 2008) represented broad-based, structurally supported workplace decision-making. Power distance refers "to the degree to which members of a group expect and agree that power should be shared unequally" (Northouse, 2019, p. 438). Wuestewald and Steinheider (2012) conceptualized that participative or democratic leadership offers advantages under certain conditions, including increased job satisfaction, more substantial organizational commitment, and better corporate performance. Police unions have resisted police organizational cultural

change through democratic leadership, focusing instead on maintaining the union's power dynamics or power management and power distance supported by the traditional police organizational structure (Lee et al., 2013).

Shared Leadership Theory. Amos and Klimoski (2014) defined the act of leadership "as attempts to influence stakeholders to adopt a course of action to achieve organizationally relevant goals" (p. 111). Amos and Klimoski proposed that a team member acting as a team leader is a judgment call, and often requires a measure of courage, and personal and professional risks. Some designated team leaders may not be willing to exert situational courage even when there is a clear and valid need for leadership. Some teams operate without a formally designated leader but instead the team adapts to the decisions made between the team members based on discretionary choice (Marion & Uhl-Bien, 2007). Amos and Klimoski's study involved the virtue of courage from three qualities: character, confidence, and credibility.

Team members without formal leadership authority that speak up will exercise subjective risks and face the possibility that others may not follow their presumptive lead. An organization's culture may dictate the measure of subjective risk that team members choose to employ, even when choosing not to speak up may have dire consequences. Team members may exhibit moral action and challenge the status quo to achieve organizational goals, which demands courage (Amos &Klimoski, 2014). Peterson and Seligman (2004) described courage as the willingness to accomplish a goal despite opposition or risk. Displaying courage demands the individual characteristic of confidence, which impacts leadership self-efficacy, as well as character (Amos & Klimoski, 2014). Character involves the moral elements of "integrity, honesty, sacrificing self-interest for the greater good, and treating people with respect" (Hollenbeck, 2009).

Emerging leadership orthodoxy stipulates that all team members participate in the leadership process (e.g., shared or distributed leadership) that increases the capacity for adaptability and versatility (Day et al., 2004). Day et al. addressed facets of team development, including the nature of teamwork and interventions to facilitate its development, team learning as differentiated from individual learning, and advances in understanding shared and distributed leadership. Shared leadership theory (or distributed leadership) is defined as when team members assume leadership positions to maximize team effectiveness through leadership behaviors (Amos & Klimoski, 2014; Northouse, 2019; Steinheider &Wuestewald, 2008; Wuestewald & Steinheider, 2012). A key element of shared leadership is emergent leadership, where someone without a formal, assigned leadership role or position assumes leadership authority based on the situation's needs. Shared leadership decentralizes power and influence from a single person and shifts power and influence on a set of individuals (Pearce et al., 2009). Distributed leadership involves team members sharing leadership influence (Northouse, 2019; Solansky, 2008). Bergman et al. (2012) described shared leadership as a dynamic, multidirectional, and ongoing influential process where two or more members engage in team leadership to maximize team effectiveness.

O'Toole et al. (2002) contrasted organizational management styles that focused on single-person leadership versus joint or shared leadership, indicating single-person leadership is not necessarily better or worse than shared leadership orthodoxy. Two leaders that share authority are better than one leader "when the challenges a corporation faces are so complex that they require a set of skills too broad to be possessed by anyone individual" (O'Toole et al., 2002, p. 68). Shared leadership is more likely to succeed when the leadership partners fulfill different

and complementary roles and functions. In traditional business settings, when implementing complex organizational change initiatives, shared leadership may be a necessity.

In shared leadership, tasks must be divided, and co-leaders work together and must decide how to handle the division of credit. Alignment and coordination begin with communication. The key determining factors whether shared leadership may be effective include joint leader selection, emotional orientations, complimentary skills, and coordination mechanisms (O'Toole et al., 2002). Shared leadership, an element of leadership emergence, has been studied as a means of democratizing police power "from the bottom up," compared to traditional hierarchal police management, which is a hindrance to line officer empowerment. Emergent leadership is not assigned but instead develops through communication and when others in the team, group, or organization accept the individual's behavior (Northouse, 2019; Wuestewald & Steinheider, 2012). In most police agencies, employee input or involvement initiatives have been limited to informal or anonymous suggestion systems or basic job-level input (Wuestewald & Steinheider, 2012).

Wuestewald and Steinheider (2012) stipulated there has been limited experimentation with alternative police management schemes, with two exceptions that had mixed results due to a lack of continued funding and the lack of the new senior leader's buy-in after joining the police department. Pearce et al. (2009) stipulated shared leadership is not a replacement for top-down leadership and should be considered situationally where the personnel involved share a certain degree of interdependence.

Organizational democracy in police agencies was presumed to face resistance from middle management due to a fear of loss of power, influence or control while feeling the pressure of job accomplishment. Middle management may receive mixed messages from senior

management or may feel ill-prepared to institute democratic changes. In Wuestewald and Steinheider's (2012) study conducted within a police organization in Oklahoma, police managers compared autocratic (traditional and vertical) and democratic (horizontal) management. Wuestewald and Steinheider's findings indicated most of the presumed resistance was not valid, and "police managers felt both vertical and horizontal leadership were equally important and had a function in [the] police organization" (p. 53).

Steinheider and Wuestewald (2008) addressed participative management, defined as a power-sharing arrangement where workplace influence is shared by those that are hierarchal unequal (Locke & Schweiger, 1979), and usually involved collaborative decision-making between employees and supervisors. Though earlier experiments showed positive results, reactionary police activism resulted in the innovative approaches being unsustainable (Steinheider & Wuestewald, 2008). Steinheider and Wuestewald examined the potential effects of shared leadership on community-oriented policing. The study's authors highlighted the option of police organizations collaborating with universities through consulting services, training and ongoing evaluation processes, external assets which are often overlooked.

Martin (2017) studied the application on shared leadership within a law enforcement setting, specifically at the United States Coast Guard Academy. Marques-Quinteiro et al. (2022) addressed the adaptive process through which a team(s) transitions to shared leadership because of a mismatch of the team's needs and current leadership arrangements. Bruccoleri et al. (2019) is an international study that addressed individuals' satisfaction with the group's decision and their active participation in the decision-making process.

Fransen et al. (2020) addressed teams' perceptions of their coaches as being better leaders based on a shared leadership paradigm. In the discipline of the arts, Reynolds et al. (2017)

addressed the perception that dual leadership relationships will inevitably result in negative conflict. When leaders share a common passion and a shared background in the arts, the result may be collaborative leadership. Broughton (2021) illuminated shared leadership theory from a Christian perspective, positing “that good leaders abandon themselves to the strengths of others” (p. 79) and other-person centeredness which is based on Christ-like humility.

Police Officer Ethics and Integrity. Royce (1908) identified the philosophy of loyalty as the focal point of normative thinking within police agencies. Foust (2018) expounded on Josiah Royce’s philosophy of loyalty as a theoretical framework for diagnosing the strained relationship between police and African American citizens. Foust examined Royce’s notion of loyalty through police discretion, specifically as ethics impacts racial profiling and the use of force. The International Association of Police Chiefs endorses an “oath of honor” that stipulated the police officer’s service is also rendered to the police agency. Through the lens of police discretion, when loyalty is the primary motivating factor for police behavior, other values may be compromised to uphold loyalty (Foust, 2018).

Police ethics examine how the nature of police work creates opportunities for police corruption. Police officers are exposed to a high level of temptation and perform with considerable power, including the power to deny citizens their civil rights. The perception that police officers are above the law is introduced in the police academy and in reinforced within police organizations. The pressure to solve cases, ambiguous rules, and the use or abuse of discretion sends the message to officers that they can do as they please with impunity (Johnson & Cox, 2004).

In clarifying the role of policing in America, police chiefs formed the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP, 2023). Ethics interventions began in 1893, resulting in a

code of ethics and mission-driven policing. Ethics training is usually limited to a two-to-four-hour block of training time in most police academies (Johnson & Cox, 2004). Wyatt-Nichol and Franks' (2009) research on ethics training for police chiefs revealed police officers receive even less ethics training during in-service instruction. In-service ethics instruction is often restricted to executive development. Supervisors and organizational leaders are often overlooked, and many do not receive ethics instruction. Wyatt-Nichol and Franks identified several challenges in implementing ethics training in police organizations. Cohen (2021) provided an analysis of ethics training content and the length of ethics training for each of the 50 states.

The police culture and subculture support police unethical behavior and may provide opportunities for officers to become corrupt. The police bureaucratic structure is an impediment to organizational change by resisting anything that contradicts reforms that deviate from the standard mode of operations. The problem, according to Johnson and Cox (2004), is the "police organizational culture that molds new officers into thinking and doing as the organization wishes" (p. 74).

Johnson and Cox (2004) discovered some police officers believe ethics is irrelevant to police practice. Ethics must be embraced as a critical tool for effective decision-making in law enforcement agencies based on two factors: first, the police culture encourages officer lawlessness and, second, leadership is paramount for implementing cultural change. Ethical practice, including quick thinking and good judgment, must be reinforced in the workplace. When leaders recognize the right behavior and enforce rules against corrupt behavior, the organizational culture of police being above the law will end (Johnson & Cox, 2004).

Summary

In summary, the study is an in-depth review of law enforcement senior leaders' organizational leadership practices, and a systematic review of law enforcement organizational culture and cultural practices that contributed to and resulted in the death of George Floyd by four (former) police patrol officers of the Minneapolis Police Department in May of 2020. The qualitative descriptive study (Bradshaw et al., 2017; Colorafi & Evans, 2016; Leavy, 2017; Milne & Oberle, 2005; Neergaard et al., 2009; Sandelowski, 2010; Turale, 2020) will investigate, from police patrol officers' perspectives, the leadership practices and the systems processes (Stroh, 2015) that are contributing factors in police agency organizational culture. Though George Floyd was killed by Minneapolis police patrol officers, I propose that many cultural elements of police agencies are transferable and generalizable to myriad types of law enforcement agencies. Chapter 3 will discuss the research method and methodology.

Chapter 3: Methodology

The study examined the death of Mr. George Floyd on May 25, 2020, in Minneapolis, Minnesota, at the hands of four Minneapolis Police Department police patrol officers from the perspective of police patrol officers. The problem identified is that law enforcement agency's leadership practices and organizational culture may socialize police patrol officers to make choices that support and extend the police agency's "blue wall of silence" (Skolnick, 2002; Westmarland& Rowe, 2018; Wieslander, 2019). The purpose of this qualitative descriptive study (Bradshaw et al., 2017; Colorafi & Evans, 2016; Leavy, 2017; Milne & Oberle, 2005; Neergaard et al., 2009; Sandelowski, 2010; Turale, 2020) is to investigate police patrol officers' perspectives of the incident, including how Floyd's death has or has not impacted the police officers' leadership and decision-making processes.

The research questions for the study were:

RQ 1: Does implicit bias influence police patrol officers' use of excessive force or deadly force when interacting with African American community members?

RQ 2: Does the police socialization process prioritize "fitting in and following orders" and the blue wall of silence above police patrol officers exercising proactive judgment and decision-making skills?

RQ 3: Does your police agency provide opportunities for and support police patrol officers' leadership development?

Chapter 3 lists the philosophical statement, methodology, and design elements, including research design and method, population, study sample, materials/instruments, data collection and analysis procedures, the qualitative descriptive study rigor, qualitative descriptive study rigor, ethical considerations, assumptions, limitations, delimitations, and summary.

Research Design and Method

The research design was a descriptive study. The methodology was qualitative. The qualitative descriptive study methodology was chosen because the study examined leadership practices within law enforcement, specifically, within a police department, from the perspective of police patrol officers. A qualitative descriptive study intends to generate insight from the eyes and ears, offering a real-world reality, from the participants that have first-hand knowledge of and familiarity with the phenomena being studied (Bradshaw et al., 2017; Colorafi & Evans, 2016; Leavy, 2017; Milne & Oberle, 2005; Neergaard et al., 2009; Sandelowski, 2010; Turale, 2020). The qualitative descriptive study offered police patrol officers and field training officers an opportunity to express their views of the phenomena from their perspective as fellow police patrol officers and field training officers.

Population

The phenomena studied involved one FTO and three police patrol officers. The population for the study was police patrol officers, including police patrol officers serving in the position of an FTO. The FTO is a senior police patrol officer, based on time-in-service, experience, and qualifications. FTOs have received specialized training and certifications to serve in the FTO position. The FTO was specifically included as a participant for the study due to their positional authority and the level of trust, influence, and power that the FTO yields and exercises over less experienced police patrol officers. The FTO performs duties as the primary field trainer, mentor, guide, and someone responsible for real-world police training and professional development for recent law enforcement academy graduates and less experienced police patrol officers. The field training is considered as the primary carrier and extender of law enforcement's organizational culture.

Study Sample

Nonrandom purposive sampling (Leavy, 2017; Saldaña & Omasta, 2018; Terrell, 2016) was utilized. Nonrandom purposive sampling is defined as a sample chosen "on purpose" or intentionally because the sample chosen meets a specific criterion (Terrell, 2016). The targeted sample (Saldaña & Omasta, 2018) for the study participants was based on the study's three research questions and the identified research problem. The sample was comprised of police patrol officers and field training officers. The nonrandom purposive sampling criterion was limited to those officers serving as police patrol officers and field training officers because they comprise the category of law enforcement personnel that were actively involved in the phenomenon being examined.

The intended minimum total sample size for the study was 12 participants (N=12), based on one medium-sized police agency. The goal was to have eight study participants from one police agency (n=8). A minimum of eight participants were selected due to the smaller size of the police agencies in the South Texas area (Wooley & Smith, 2022). The descriptive study will be conducted within one medium-sized police agency located in South Texas. If it was not possible to complete the study within one medium-sized police agency by garnering the participation of the intended minimum number of participants, eight, another study would be needed within a second police agency. The number of study participants was also limited due to the study's scope and focus restrictions.

Kerrison et al.'s (2019) article on creating ethical, productive, and durable research partnerships with law enforcement officers and their departments postulated that law enforcement leaders and stakeholders are hesitant and somewhat resistant to research practitioners, "outsiders," researching within their organizations. The study was conducted with

law enforcement leaders' and stakeholders' support instead of executing the task at the law enforcement leaders and practitioners.

Recruiting participants for the study involved developing a positive working relationship with the police agency's senior leader, the police chief, and requesting their assistance in supporting the study. The police chief had to provide written permission for the study to be conducted within their organization. After I received approval to move forward with the study from Abilene Christian University's Institutional Review Board (Appendix E), the police chief was asked to distribute an email to the police patrol officers, asking those specific personnel to participate in the study. A recruitment flier (Appendix A) explaining the research was forwarded from the police chief via the police chief's email account. I created the recruitment flier that was included as an attachment to the police chief's email.

The recruitment flier contained information related to the study's purpose, goals, focus, and intent, and identified the intended study participants; police/patrol officers and field training officers. The flier included information related to confidentiality and anonymity. The participants were informed of the 16-question questionnaire. My contact email and cell phone number were provided for prospective participants in case they had any additional questions about the study.

Materials/Instruments

Kerrison et al.'s (2019) research provided guidelines on creating ethical, productive, and durable research partnerships with police officers and their departments. Kerrison et al. indicated law enforcement personnel may not trust "outsiders" or researchers and may be hesitant to participate in scientific research. For this reason, I chose to not conduct interviews and to not make video recordings of the participating police officers. Interactions with the police patrol officers were not audio recorded for the same reasons, which was an additional precautionary

step toward protecting the police officers' anonymity and confidentiality. Copious amounts of written notes were taken, and the notes' privacy was protected.

The data gathering material was a survey, and the instrument was a 16-question, open-ended questionnaire. The questionnaire's questions were based on concepts in the conceptual framework, the three theories, and the three research questions. The questionnaire was chosen as the data collection method due to the study's sensitive nature and the unique framework of police organizations and the law enforcement culture. The questionnaire was a written questionnaire that was individually distributed to each volunteer participant after they completed a permission form and a confidentiality form. I created the questionnaire.

The questionnaire consisted of an introduction and two parts: Part 1 contains the demographic data, and Part 2 contained the 16 open-ended questions. The study's credibility and dependability were checked by obtaining feedback from police patrol officers and field training officers that were not participating in the study and were external to the police agency involved with the study. The questionnaire is named "The Death of George Floyd Descriptive Study Questionnaire" (Appendix C).

Data Collection and Analysis Procedures

The written questionnaire was made available to volunteers privately (face-to-face) after the prospective participant expressed an interest in participating in the study. Information about the study and the need for volunteers to participate in the study was communicated by the police agency's senior leader via email correspondence to organization personnel. The email stipulated that volunteers must be police patrol officers and field training officers (FTOs). Information about the study was also disseminated during work shift turnover and debriefs. Data analysis was conducted by developing codes or themes that reflected the participants' own words. Coding was

achieved through using the most recent version of NVivo coding software (Leech & Onwuegbuzie, 2011; Saldaña & Omasta, 2018) at the time data analysis is conducted.

Ethical Considerations

The ethical considerations include the ethical mandates for a study involving human research participants, based on the Belmont Report's (1979) three principles of beneficence, respect for people, and justice. Protecting the study participants' confidentiality was critical, and no personal identifying data were collected. The informed consent form explained that no personal identifying information was collected, respondents were anonymous, and no attempts were made to identify participants (Appendix B). Collecting general demographic data was necessary to identify the research participant's unique functions (e.g., police patrol officer or the field training officer) for descriptive statistical purposes only.

For descriptive purposes only, demographic data were requested, consisting of (a) police patrol officer, (b) field training officer, (c) race, (d) ethnic background, (e) gender, (f) number of years of education, and (g) years of service as a law enforcement practitioner. For anonymity purposes, the years of service were classified into four categories: Less than 5 years, 6–10 years, 11–20 years, 21–30 years, and more than 30 years.

The study datasheet was available to agency personnel, explaining the study's purpose, goals, and intent. The intended participants and the needed number of participants for the study was presented and why. The informed consent form repeated some of the information contained in the datasheet. The informed consent was the first page of the survey. The informed consent listed the number of questions included in the survey, which were 16.

Informed consent was explained as an integral part of ethical research practices. I defined the study's purpose and goals and explained the risks and benefits of participating in the study.

The study's requirements for confidentiality and privacy were described in everyday language so the participants could understand. The informed consent included the number of questions in the survey and provided a sample question.

The informed consent page explained that participants had the right to not answer any question(s) that the participants were uncomfortable answering. Participants could stop participating in the survey at any time without suffering any consequences. There were no gratuities for participating in the study. The data collection processes, storage, and privacy provisions were explained in the informed consent document.

The study participants did not fall under any protected class categories (e.g., pregnant women, fetuses, biomedical specimens, prisoners, children (minors), or those with diminished decision-making (i.e., autonomy) faculties. According to the definition provided in the Abilene Christian University (ACU) Institutional Review Board (IRB) Handbook (2008), the proposed study falls within the stipulations of an IRB review because the study involves human research participants.

Assumptions

An assumption was police leaders support, and that police patrol officers and field training officers want to participate in a study that addresses an incident that involved police patrol officers' leadership, and actions toward an African American man that resulted in the man’s death. Another assumption was police patrol officers may view their participation in the study as a form of self-questioning and self-reflection, and possibly a resource for professional development for individual and organizational change. A belief was that police patrol officers and field training officers may utilize the study questionnaire to critically self-evaluate and

assess their leadership skills, leadership practices, leadership development, and decision-making processes.

An assumption was that the senior leader in the police agency, the chief of police, would wholeheartedly support the study and enthusiastically request volunteers to participate in the study. Another assumption was there were no less than eight participant responses from the organization and all participants would complete the questionnaire.

The risks to the study participants would be minimal. A risk was that some law enforcement practitioners may not want to address the circumstances involving Floyd's death. Introspection, self-reflection, and self-evaluation may be considered unnecessary or not helpful for some police practitioners. Some police patrol officers and/or field training officers may be uncomfortable discussing their views honestly about the study's subject with me due to my race, which is African American (Savage, 2016). I believed that police patrol officers being given the opportunity to share their perceptions, views, and perspectives on the subject would override any misgivings, fears, or hesitations the officers may have about discussing the study's subject.

The benefits to the study participants included the police patrol officers and field training officers would have an opportunity to anonymously express their feelings, perceptions, and ideas openly and honestly without fear of repercussions or organizational backlash. Another benefit was law enforcement practitioners may have an opportunity to assess their leadership, influence, and decision-making skills before advancing into a higher level or senior leadership position.

Limitations

Study participation was voluntary. Neither the police agency's senior leader, the chief of police, nor I controlled how many participants would volunteer for the study. The minimum threshold for the number of study participants was eight, which may increase the likelihood of

the findings being more generalizable within small-to-medium-sized police agencies. Insufficient study participants, less than eight, may adversely affect the study's validity, reliability, and transferability. To off-set the possible limitation of a too-low participation rate, if the questionnaire generated less than eight participants, it may be necessary to initiate a second study with another police agency. In case the senior leader of the law enforcement agency that had committed to participate in the study changes their mind, another police agency would be contacted and asked to participate with the study. Another limitation may be that the police patrol officers may be uncomfortable discussing the subject honestly with me due to my race, which is African American (Savage, 2016).

Delimitations

Delimitations of the study involved not including all elements and sub-elements of the police organizational structure and culture. The study assessed specific sub-elements of the law enforcement agency and the law enforcement corporate culture through a systems paradigm. Some sub-elements of the law enforcement system were intentionally not addressed due to the scope of the study, including body-worn cameras and police officer mental health.

Summary

To summarize, a law enforcement agency's systems processes, at-large culture, sub-cultural elements, and socialization processes generally are the same or similar. The circumstances that contributed to George Floyd's death at the hands of four Minneapolis police patrol officers may possibly have happened or may happen within other law enforcement agencies around the country. The study examined the organizational culture, systems elements, and leadership practices that caused, contributed to, supported, or intentionally or inadvertently led to the confluence of events that resulted in Floyd's death. The intent of the study was to give

police patrol officers and field training officers the opportunity to express their perspectives of the events they thought contributed to or resulted in George Floyd's death from a police patrol officers' leadership perspective. An additional intent of the study was to increase police patrol officers' leadership discourse with the goal of preventing similar law enforcement decision-making and actions that may prevent someone's, particularly African Americans' death, in the future.

The study was an opportunity for real-world police patrol officers and field training officers to express their views, opinions, and perceptions about the events that resulted in George Floyd's death without the police patrol officers possibly violating the police cultural "blue wall of silence." As valuable as the study's potential impact on law enforcement leaders' leadership policies, procedures, and practices, and police patrol officers' leadership and decision-making processes, the ethical standards of research with human research participants are just as important. The study offers police patrol officers an opportunity to privately express their views of the phenomena being studied while also being protected from possible organizational repercussions or backlash. Chapter 4 will provide the findings from the data analysis from the descriptive study.

Chapter 4: Results

The study examined the death of Mr. George Floyd on May 25, 2020, in Minneapolis, Minnesota, at the hands of four Minneapolis Police Department police patrol officers from the perspective of police patrol officers. The purpose of this qualitative descriptive study (Bradshaw et al., 2017; Colorafi& Evans, 2016; Leavy, 2017; Milne &Oberle, 2005; Neergaard et al., 2009; Sandelowski, 2010; Turale, 2020) was to investigate police patrol officers' perspectives of the death of Mr. George Floyd on May 25, 2020, in Minneapolis, Minnesota, at the hands of four Minneapolis Police Department police patrol officers, including how Floyd's death has or has not impacted the police patrol officers' leadership and decision-making processes. This chapter will provide a summary of the data collected from the 13 police officers that participated in the study. The themes that emerged from the data will be discussed. Descriptive phrases used by the study participants will be included to enhance the analysis of the data.

Design

The research design was a qualitative descriptive study. The study examines leadership practices within a police department from the perspective of first-line police officers. A qualitative descriptive study intends to provide a real-world perspective of policing from the participants that have first-hand knowledge of and familiarity with the phenomena being studied (Bradshaw et al., 2017; Colorafi& Evans, 2016; Leavy, 2017; Milne &Oberle, 2005; Neergaard et al., 2009; Sandelowski, 2010; Turale, 2020). The uniqueness of this qualitative descriptive study is that organizational lower level first-line police officers and field training officers are afforded an opportunity to express their views and perspectives, which is rarely the case.

Participants and Setting

The law enforcement agency that participated in the study was medium-sized police agency located in South Texas. The police agency has a manning capacity of 34 officers, with 20 (*N*=20) authorized police patrol officer positions. At the time the study was conducted, 18 full-time police officer positions were filled: one officer was completing military duty and one position was vacant. Thirteen (*n*=13) police officers participated in the study.

The sample size (*n*=13) of respondents may appear to be small when compared to larger police agencies in a larger city but the percentage of study respondents within the participating police agency was 38%. A limitation of the study's sample size (*n*=13) reflected the medium-sized city and the population of the city where the study was conducted. The location and population level of the city impacts, reflects, and determines the limited or smaller number of police officers that are available for hire and to serve as police officers.

Recruitment

The Institutional Review Board (IRB) for the protection of human participants at Abilene Christian University (ACU) granted approval for the research study December 29, 2022 (See Appendix A). The recruiting process began immediately after receiving the ACU IRB's approval. I attempted to gain support for the study by mailing a letter to the senior law enforcement organizational leader, with a copy of the proposed study questionnaire included. The recruitment letter was mailed to law enforcement agencies within a 60-mile radius of my location. Twelve law enforcement agencies were invited to participate in the study: nine police agencies and three sheriff departments. I met and discussed the study with four law enforcement agency leaders: three police chiefs and one sheriff.

Gaining senior law enforcement leaders' support for the study was challenging, except for two law enforcement agencies. One police chief and one sheriff agreed to participate in the study. Due to the differences in operational requirements, function, and a critical manning shortage, it was decided that the study would not be conducted within the sheriff's department. By default, the study was limited to one police agency.

The police chief that chose to participate in the study strongly supports academic research and police science. Before starting the data gathering process, the senior organizational leader and I held three planning and communication meetings. The study was conducted with the full support and assistance of the police chief. The recruitment flier, Appendix B, was developed with the guidance of the senior leader who has expert first-hand knowledge of their police agency's culture.

The police chief and I developed a strong, positive working relationship that resulted in the police chief expressing his commitment to and support of the organization's participation in the study. During a planning meeting, the police chief recommended the study participants should include certified peace officers that are normally not assigned to patrol division since those officers are qualified to serve as patrol officers when necessary. The chief explained that due to the size of the department, officers that are normally assigned to administrative functions may be temporarily assigned to patrol division to undergird manning shortages, such as was the case during the COVID-19 outbreak.

Prospective participants were invited to participate in the study via a 4-minute introductory video that was created by me (Henderson, 2023) and a recruitment flyer (Appendix B). The video and the recruitment flyer were forwarded to the department personnel by the police chief via the police chief's email. Participants were given 15 workdays, or 3 weeks, to

complete the study. With no responses from the officers after the first week, I "went hunting" for a parked patrol vehicle and found one. During the 30-minute conversation, I was ensured the patrol officers had received the video and the recruitment email. Additionally, the officer encouraged me to keep the faith and to continue to pursue the study.

Recruiting police officers to participate in the research study required tenacity and flexibility, mixed with continual communication and feedback, and the support of the senior organizational leader. The police chief authorized me to attend a watch section turnover, and then remain at the police station to speak with any interested officer(s). The police chief also authorized me to participate in a ride along during police patrols. The police chief scheduled a meeting with several staff personnel that afforded me an opportunity to present information about the study while giving prospective participants an opportunity to ask questions.

Study participants were assured that their responses to the questionnaire questions would not be judged, commented on, rebuked in any way, and would remain confidential. During the staff meeting, I addressed the sensitive nature of the study's subject matter (e.g., race relations, police excessive force and deadly force, and police leadership). I explained that the study did not involve nor condoned national politics or any form of social activism. I stated that research's intent is to give lower-level police officers the opportunity to express their views as openly and as honestly as they wanted to with a nonlaw enforcement researcher, an outsider that wanted to hear what they had to say about the phenomenon being researched. My intent during the study was to be an objective nonparticipant and an active, nonjudgmental listener (Milne & Oberle, 2005).

Nonrandom purposive sampling (Leavy, 2017; Merriam &Tisdell, 2016; Miles et al., 2020; Saldaña & Omasta, 2018; Terrell, 2016) was utilized to select the sample for the study.

The nonrandom purposive sampling criterion is limited to those officers serving as police patrol officers and field training officers because they comprise the category of law enforcement personnel that were actively involved in the phenomenon being examined. The study participants included those officers currently assigned as a patrol officer, and as well as officers that are assigned to other full-time duties, such as training, administration, criminal investigation division (CID), and others. The non-full-time police patrol officers were included in the study because those officers are still required to maintain their peace officer certification and may be called upon to fulfill the duties of a patrol officer during manning shortages and/or emergency situations. Several of the police/patrol officers have prior training, certification, and experience of serving as a field training officer.

Each study participant signed a consent form (Appendix C). Participants' involvement in the survey was voluntary. Thirteen police officers, including field training officers, consented to participate in the study. One police officer participated in the study because of snowballing. While the study was being conducted, two officers were attending training out-of-state. The police chief thought one or both officers may be interested in participating in the study. Upon their return to the area, the police chief asked the two officers if they were interested. One of the officers agreed to participate and subsequently completed the study questionnaire.

Data Collection Process

The 13 study participants completed a questionnaire that was comprised of two parts: Part 1 contained the prescreening demographic data and Part 2 contained the questionnaire questions (Appendix D). The participants' prescreening demographic data are provided in Table 1. The questionnaire contained 16 open-ended questions. To increase and protect anonymity and reduce the probability of discovery through electronic means, a typed, hardcopy of the

questionnaire was presented to each participant. Some participants hand-wrote their questionnaire responses, whereas other officers chose to type their responses on a computer to save time.

The completed questionnaires were coded with a letter-number pseudonym to protect the participants' anonymity (e.g., AB1, CD2, EF3, etc.). The participants' data were coded utilizing the latest version of coding software and identified by codes and general themes. The participants' verbatim responses were transcribed from their questionnaire responses and recorded (Appendix E).

Table 1

Demographic Data

Pseudonym	Position type	Race/ethnicity	Gender	Highest level of ed.	# of yrs. of law enforcement service
MN7	FTO	Hispanic	Male	Some College	7
OP8	FTO	White	Male	High School	22
ST10	FTO	White	Female	Current College Student	6
UV11	FTO	Data not provided	Male	High School	6
WX12	FTO	White	Male	GED	7
AB1	PPO	Hispanic	Male	Some College	16
CD2	PPO	White	Male	Associate Degree	8
EF3	PPO	White	Male	High School	32
GH4	PPO	White	Male	Master's Degree Student	17
IJ5	PPO	White	Male	Associate Degree	14
KL6	PPO	Hispanic	Female	Bachelor's Degree	6
QR9	PPO	Hispanic	Male	Some College	29
YZ13	PPO	White	Male	Some College	4.5

Research Questions

RQ1: Does implicit bias influence police patrol officers' use of excessive force or deadly force when interacting with African American community members?

RQ 2: Does the police socialization process prioritize "fitting in and following orders" and the blue wall of silence above police patrol officers exercising proactive judgment and decision-making skills?

RQ 3: Does your police agency provide opportunities for and support police patrol officers' leadership development?

Questionnaire Questions and the Identified Codes and Themes

Identified Codes and Themes

The 16 questionnaire questions and the codes and themes resulted from the participants' responses were identified through the latest version of the NVivo coding software (QSR International, 2022). The list of codes and themes from the study questionnaire are provided in Table 2. The specific numerical breakdown of each theme is addressed within the listing of the discussion questions.

Table 2

List of NVivo Codes and Themes

Question #	Codes	Themes
1	Implicit bias, law enforcement, racial profiling legislation, response, stereotypes	Implicit bias, law enforcement, racial profiling legislation, response, stereotypes
2	Excessive force, group, stops	Excessive force, group (ethnic group, minority group), stops (making traffic stops, investigative stops)
3	Force, policies, department, deadly force, excessive force, standards	Force (deadly force, excessive force, using force), policies (established policies, departmental policies), department (police department standards, departmental policies), deadly force, excessive force, police department standards, reasonableness
4	Officer, senior officer, excessive force, law enforcement	Officer (senior officer, line officer, intervening officer, law enforcement officer, fellow officer), senior officer, excessive force, law enforcement (law enforcement officer, law enforcement field)
5	Officer	Officer (officers pre-plan, equal officer)
6	Cop, blue wall, officers, black eye	Cop (good cop, bad cop), blue wall, officers (fellow officers, bad officers), black eye
7	Policy, order, force	Policy (criminal violation, written policy, violated policy, order (unlawful order, lawful order), force (excessive force, unnecessary force)
8	Right thing	Right thing
9	Force, policy, police, officers, hour, right thing	Force (excessive force, deadly force), policy (serious policy infraction, possible policy violation), police (police misconduct, young police officers), officers (patrol officers, young police officers), hour (excessive hours, hour shift), right thing
10	Force, issue	Force (excessive force, deadly force, similar force, force continuum de-escalates), issue (clearly issues, apart issues)
11	Officer, position, medical intervention	Officer (getting officers, primary officer, police patrol officer), position (side position, seated position), medical intervention
12	Leadership, training, failure, officer, level, issue, organizational leadership	Leadership (organizational leadership, leadership ladder failure, leadership issue, progressive leadership, leadership role), training (training issue, field training officer, specialized training), failure (leadership ladder failure, future failures, team failure), officer (sadly officers, field training officers), level (appropriate level, supervisory level, individual level), issue

Question #	Codes	Themes
		(training issue, leadership issue), organizational leadership
13	None identified	None identified
14	Leadership, training, patrol, officers, leadership training, leadership development courses, opportunities, police, classes, supervisor, level, amount	Leadership (leadership training, leadership development courses, leadership classes, leadership opportunities), training (leadership training, training opportunities, leadership coordinator), patrol (patrol officers, patrol sergeant), officers (patrol officers, peace officer license level, officers classes), leadership training, leadership development courses, opportunities (training opportunities, leadership opportunities), police (police organization, police academy, police explorer), classes (leadership classes, officers classes), supervisor (temporary, first-line supervisor), level (front-line level, peace officer license level), amount (substantial amount, vast amount)
15	Training, leadership, class, officers, leadership class, conversations	Training (state-mandated field training, several training classes, continuing training, trained officers, several leadership trainings, adult training model, training course, complete training, additional training), leadership (leadership class, involving leadership, several leadership trainings), class (leadership class, several training classes, detailed class), officers (trained officers, molding officers, patrol officer, good quality officers), leadership class, conversations (crucial conversations, effective conversation)
16	None identified	None identified

Questionnaire Questions

Question 1: How often or do you periodically question your racial stereotypes and implicit bias?

Codes: Implicit bias, law enforcement, racial profiling legislation, response, stereotypes

Themes: Implicit bias – 4; law enforcement – 2; racial profiling legislation – 1; response – 2; stereotypes – 4

Question 2: Have you used or would you use excessive force or deadly force against someone based on the person's race or ethnic group?

Codes: Excessive force, group, stops

Themes: Excessive force – 7; group – 6 (ethnic group – 4, minority group – 2); stops – 4 (making traffic stops – 2, investigative stops – 2)

Question 3: As the Field Training Officer (FTO) that is responsible for upholding and abiding by police department standards, would you intentionally violate established policies, procedures, and guidelines for using excessive force or deadly force against anyone?

Codes: Force, policies, department, deadly force, excessive force, standards

Themes: Force – 26 (deadly force – 12, excessive force – 9, using force – 5); policies – 12 (established policies – 7, departmental policies – 5); department – 12 (police department standards – 7, departmental policies – 5); deadly force – 12; excessive force – 9; police department standards – 7; reasonableness – 1

Question 4: Would you speak up and intervene to prevent a fellow patrol officer from using unnecessary force, excessive force, or deadly force against someone, even if the person using the unnecessary force, excessive force or deadly force is senior to you in rank or position, such as an FTO or a senior officer?

Codes: Officer, senior officer, excessive force, law enforcement

Themes: Officer – 20 (senior officer – 11, line officer – 3, intervening officer – 3, law enforcement officer – 2, fellow officer – 1); senior officer – 11; excessive force – 4; law enforcement – 3 (law enforcement officer – 2, law enforcement field – 1)

Question 5: Have you received formal training in techniques on *how to intervene* during an incident of unnecessary force, excessive force, or deadly force, such as bystander intervention training?

Codes: Officer

Themes: Officer – 4 (officers pre-plan – 2, equal officer – 2)

Question 6: How does the law enforcement "blue wall of silence" influence your decision-making processes?

Codes: Cop, blue wall, officers, black eye

Themes: Cop – 4 (good cop – 2, bad cop – 2); blue wall – 3; officers – 2 (fellow officers – 1, bad officers – 1); black eye – 1

Question 7: What would you do in a situation that involves using excessive force where your FTO or supervisor directed you to do something that you knew violated organizational written policy or procedure?

Codes: Policy, order, force

Themes: Policy – 7 (criminal violation – 3, written policy – 2, violated policy – 2); order – 6 (unlawful order – 4, lawful order – 2); force – 5 (excessive force – 3, unnecessary force – 2)

Question 8: If a patrol officer (Officer A) spoke up, took a stand, intervened to prevent other officers from violating a policy, and encouraged others to do the right thing, would you lose respect for and trust in the officer (Officer A)?

Codes: Right thing

Themes: Right thing – 3

Question 9: Does the fear of retaliation or backlash from other patrol officers or leaders result in you not speaking up when you know you should intervene to prevent or to report a serious policy infraction(s) (e.g., police misconduct, the use of excessive force or deadly force, or other violation[s])?

Codes: Force, policy, police, officers, hour, right thing

Themes: Force – 10 (excessive force – 5, deadly force – 5); policy – 7 (serious policy infraction – 5, possible policy violation – 2); police – 7 (police misconduct – 5, young police officers – 2); officers – 7 (patrol officers – 5, young police officers – 2); hour – 3 (excessive hours – 2, hour shift – 1); right thing – 2

Question 10: Do you feel the George Floyd incident would have been handled differently if George Floyd had been White (e.g., patrol officer(s) employing intervention to prevent other officers' excessive force or deadly force, or providing medical assistance)?

Codes: Force, issue

Themes: Force – 6 (excessive force – 2, deadly force – 2, similar force – 1, force continuum de-escalates – 1); issue – 2 (clearly issues – 1, apart issues – 1)

Question 11: If you had been involved in the incident, as a police patrol officer, what would you have done differently to prevent George Floyd's death?

Codes: Officer, position, medical intervention

Themes: Officer – 4 (getting officers – 2, primary officer – 1, police patrol officer – 1); position – 3 (side position – 2, seated position – 1); medical intervention – 2

Question 12: Do you think George Floyd's death at the hands of the four Minneapolis police patrol officers was a failure of leadership? Why or why not? If yes, at which level was the leadership failure; individual, teams, organizational, a combination of more than one or all parameters? (Please explain)

Codes: Leadership, training, failure, officer, level, issue, organizational leadership

Themes: Leadership – 11 (organizational leadership – 4, leadership ladder failure – 3, leadership issue – 2, progressive leadership – 1, leadership role – 1),training – 7 (training issue – 4, field training officer – 2, specialized training – 1); failure – 7 (leadership ladder failure – 3, future

failures – 3, team failure 1); officer – 6 (sadly officers – 4, field training officers – 2); level – 6 (appropriate level – 4, supervisory level – 1, individual level – 1); issue – 6 (training issue – 4, leadership issue – 2); organizational leadership – 4

Question 13: Do you consider yourself to be a leader? Why or why not?

Codes: None identified

Themes: None identified

Question 14: Does your police organization offer opportunities for your leadership development?

*Code*s: Leadership, training, patrol, officers, leadership training, leadership development courses, opportunities, police, classes, supervisor, level, amount

Themes: Leadership – 23 (leadership training – 8, leadership development courses – 8, leadership classes – 4, leadership opportunities – 3); training – 15 (leadership training – 8, training opportunities – 4, leadership coordinator – 2); patrol – 11 (patrol officers – 7, patrol sergeant – 4); officers – 11 (patrol officers – 7, peace officer license level – 2, officers classes – 2); leadership training – 8; leadership development courses – 8; opportunities – 7 (training opportunities – 4, leadership opportunities – 3; police – 6 (police organization – 3, police academy – 2, police explorer – 1); classes – 6 (leadership classes – 4, officers classes – 2); supervisor – 5 (temporary – 4, first-line supervisor – 1); level – 5 (front-line level – 3, peace officer license level – 2); amount – 4 (substantial amount – 3, vast amount – 1)

Question 15: Have you received any leadership training as a police patrol officer or FTO? How would leadership training benefit you as a police patrol officer or FTO?

Codes: Training, leadership, class, officers, leadership class, conversations

Themes: Training – 25 (state-mandated field training – 4, several training classes – 4, continuing training – 4, trained officers – 3, several leadership trainings – 2, adult training model – 2, training course – 2, complete training – 2, additional training – 2); leadership – 13 (leadership class – 7, involving leadership – 4, several leadership trainings – 2); class – 12 (leadership class – 7, several training classes – 4, detailed class – 1); officers – 10 (trained officers – 3, molding officers – 3, patrol officer – 2, good quality officers – 2); leadership class – 7; conversations – 3 (crucial conversations – 2, effective conversation – 1)

Question 16: Additional comments (optional):

Codes: None identified

Themes: None identified

Data Analysis

Data analysis was based on the study participants' questionnaire verbatim responses (See Appendix E). The results of the analyzed data, based on the NVivo coding software, identified "…similar phrases, patterns, categories, themes, differences between subgroups, and common sequences" (Miles et al., 2020), interspersed with participants' verbatim comments. Ethical considerations included ensuring data analysis was based on participant-driven data, where participants shared their views and perspectives and told their stories from their vantage points. Some participants completed and returned the 16-question questionnaire without any questions, comments, or discussion. Other participants completed the questionnaire while asking follow-up questions and adding additional comments, particularly for some participants that typed their responses.

While completing the study questionnaire, a level of friendship, vulnerability, and openness developed, resulting in several study participants sharing their viewpoints for up to

three hours. Participants, of their free will, provided additional information as they answered the questionnaire questions. I asked follow-up questions for clarification or depth of understanding. I took notes on those comments since they provided input for possible future research. The participant's additional notes were attached to and will be stored with the completed questionnaires. Data analysis was limited to and was based solely on the written responses provided to the study's questionnaire responses.

Findings

Question 1: How often or do you periodically question your racial stereotypes and implicit bias?

Of the 13 study participants, 10 stated they rarely question their racial stereotypes and bias. "I do not feel I have internal dialogue when it comes to these two topics." "I rarely question my racial stereotypes and implicit bias because I try and treat everyone equally. A guy wearing a suit can kill someone just like a person wearing baggy pants and a hoody." "For myself, I do not consider racial stereotypes or implicit bias. I treat everyone the same regardless of race, creed, color, or religion." "Rarely, due to living in a small town. You get to know the community and know who is involved in the good and bad." "Not at all." "Not often. I am not particularly introspective." "Very, very seldom. After 32 years, I know character far outreaches race. I simply don't care what race anyone is." "Almost never." "I do not question my racial stereotypes or implicit bias because I know that any stereotypes that I may see are based on the totality of the circumstances, and not based on race or bias."

Three participants stated they periodically question themselves and their beliefs. "Usually on a daily basis depending on what types of calls we get and how best to handle them." "I check-in with myself semi-frequently so I can ensure I am treating everyone fairly."

> I question myself periodically about my stereotypes and implicit bias because I do worry that I will start veering in that direction without recognizing it. By periodically, I can't say a specific time frame, but I would venture to say at least every few months.

During interactions, an officer's response toward a suspect is based more on the suspect's behavior than the suspect's race. The emphasis on a suspect's race has reduced over time after enacting federal racial profiling legislation and changes in law enforcement policies and procedures.

> I find that it [racial stereotypes and racial bias] has become an issue more now than it was when I began my law enforcement career in 1993. I had the issue of Rodney King when I started my police academy and it seemed to center on racial profiling as it was carried out by law enforcement and introduced the inception of racial profiling legislature and training for newer officers. Now, with the George Floyd incident, it seems that basing a stop or almost any encounter on racial stereotypes can be assumed by a lot in the public.

Question 2: Have you used or would you use excessive force or deadly force against someone based on the person's race or ethnic group?

Of the 13 respondents, 13 officers stated they have never or would never use excessive force or deadly force based on someone's race, religious beliefs, ethnic group, or minority group.

> I would not nor have I ever used excessive force or deadly force against someone based on their race or ethnicity in my career. I came from a poor family and was part of a minority group as well so I often saw and felt law enforcement could be biased against someone just due to their skin color or where they were raised. 'Never' and 'no.' No, I would not because one's race or ethnic background should not define them as a criminal. Criminals come in all races. Absolutely not, primarily because if goes against my morals

> as a human being and a Christian. Never. The use of force, especially deadly force, is clearly outlined in Chapter 9 of the Penal Code. Neither race, ethnicity, gender, religion, or sexual preference should ever be considered in the use of force. Absolutely not. The use of force is based on the actions of the suspect and that alone. I have never used any type of force on anyone based on race. Use of force is not my decision. It is the actor's decision and choices that cause me to have to use force to protect myself, them, or someone else. Absolutely not.

Officers expressed their decisions based on the information provided by communications based on reasonable suspicion, though the encounter may change quickly, escalating the situation but the action(s) taken are not based on race.

Question 3: As the FTO that is responsible for upholding and abiding by police department standards, would you intentionally violate established policies, procedures, and guidelines for using excessive force or deadly force against anyone?

Field training officers indicated they have not and would not violate established department standards, policies, and procedures for using excessive force or deadly force. Reasonableness is the standard for using the continuum of force.

> I would not intentionally violate policies/procedures. They are specifically put in place to help us do our job. Our Chief has a "golden rule" that we follow, which allows us to make our own decisions as long as we can defend them to our peers, the community, and ourselves. There are set guidelines, but we have the ability to ultimately make our own choices as well. I have been an FTO in this department and in other agencies and would not violate any of the departmental policies, procedures, and guidelines for using force or deadly force when it came to having to deal with anyone, no matter that person's skin

color or ethnicity. I believe and have taught those under my watch that we should treat those we encounter in the way we would want our parents or relatives treated if ever encountered by law enforcement. No. As an FTO or Instructor, it is my job to train and equip officers with the highest level of education and mold them to be good stewards to the community. Furthermore, in a role as an Instructor and FTO, I hold myself to an even higher standard to be a good role model to our younger officers. No. I am a very firm believer in body-worn cameras and their ability to keep both patrol officers and the citizens we interact with safe. With that being said, if an accusation of excessive force is presented, then the complaint is taken and it is reviewed by several individuals above the officer that is being complained on. If there is an issue with the amount of force used, then it is documented and handled according to our policy guidelines. Policies are a guideline when it comes to certain areas and many of them are subject to the reasonableness standard.

Question 4: Would you speak up and intervene to prevent a fellow patrol officer from using unnecessary force, excessive force, or deadly force against someone, even if the person using the unnecessary force, excessive force or deadly force is senior to you in rank or position, such as an FTO or a senior officer?

Four FTOs completed the questionnaire. The FTOs indicated they would intervene to prevent a senior officer, a line officer, or a peer from using unnecessary force, excessive force, or deadly force when necessary. The offending officer's position, title, or rank "would not matter" and would not influence the correct choice(s) that the FTOs would make. Several officers stated that, in the past, they have intervened to deescalate the situation and prevented a senior officer from using excessive force. As those primarily responsible for training the new police recruits,

FTOs hold themselves to a high standard of individual, team, and collective excellence based on their morals and ethics.

> I would step in and intervene to stop a fellow officer that I believed was about to or was using that type of force that was unnecessary even if he was senior or my supervisor. I have intervened in calls while employed here and in other departments where I believed an officer was becoming too heated or was taking the situation too personal. Yes, of course. Our department supports each other, and sometimes that means stepping in when tensions or adrenaline run high. Absolutely. I have done so in the past with a senior officer who used excessive force. That officer is no longer employed as a law enforcement officer. I would. My moral compass and ethics dictate that I do so. Yes. I have intervened in the past and would do so again. Yes. I would prevent the unlawful use of any force regardless of rank or my position.

Question 5: Have you received formal training in techniques on how to intervene during an incident of unnecessary force, excessive force, or deadly force, such as bystander intervention training?

In January 2023, the police agency provided two classes on "The Duty to Intervene," which provided skills and knowledge about officers' responsibility to intercede if excessive force is being used. The course reviewed case law and the use of force policies. Of the 13 study participants, 12 officers attended the "Duty to Intervene" training.

> Yes, we get a class on the Duty to Intervene. It is a good class and helps the officers pre-plan for a situation where they may have to intervene with a senior or equal officer. Yes, we have had training on how to intervene and when it is necessary to do so. I have not personally attended Duty to Intervene courses. They have been offered through our

agency. Yes. The Duty to Intervene class is an approved TCOLE [Texas Commission on Law Enforcement] class that details this exactly.

The police agency provides several defensive tactics classes each year. In January 2023, the agency hosted South Texas Combative, a course that covered Police Response to Resistance and Aggression, which supplemented previous defensive tactics training.

Question 6: How does the law enforcement "blue wall of silence" influence your decision-making processes?

Study participants indicated the "blue wall of silence" is not a factor within the police agency and does not influence the officers' decision-making processes. The overriding element in officers' decisions is their personal ethics, which restricts the use and impact of the "blue wall of silence." Depending on the officer's age and their number of years' experience in law enforcement, nine study participants had heard of and/or had prior direct or indirect experience with the "blue wall of silence." Four study participants stated they

> Had never heard that phrase before and asked the researcher to explain what the phrase meant. Of the four participants unfamiliar with the "blue wall of silence," this agency is their first assignment as a police officer. Officers that cover up fellow officers' bad behavior give policing a "black eye." In the past, officers were described as a "bad cop" or a "good cop" based on whether they "protected" fellow officers' bad behavior. Officers still "help" fellow officers "but the severity of it is not what it used to be." The culture of policing has changed through a push in training and hiring practices.
>
> It does not. My integrity guides me. When I started law enforcement 17 years ago there was a culture of the blue wall of silence, to a certain point. Over the last decade I really have not experienced anything like that. We all realize that one black eye for law

> enforcement anywhere is a black eye for law enforcement everywhere. I think I can speak for almost all the officers I know in saying that nobody hates a bad cop, like a good cop. Admittedly, it does give one pause. There is the fear of being blacklisted for speaking out. Even if the agency involved doesn't put the word out, other local agencies will know and speaking out MAY cost you your career. I have never heard of the blue wall of silence, I suspect mostly because such a thing is highly unethical. We strive for a high ethical standard within my agency, where it is also encouraged to speak up if you see an officer policing in an unethical manner. If I said there was not a culture of helping fellow officers then I would be lying, but the severity is not what it used to be. There has been a push in training and hiring practices in order to change the culture and it is working.

Question 7: What would you do in a situation that involves using excessive force where your FTO or supervisor directed you to do something that you knew violated organizational written policy or procedure?

Of the 13 responses, 12 officers indicated they would not violate the organization's policy for using unnecessary force, or any other policy, regardless of the person's title or position, such as an FTO or a supervisor, that gave the order (i.e., one respondent did not address the question). If a supervisor orders a fellow officer to violate a policy, the order is considered unlawful, illegal, or unethical and would not be obeyed. Officers are not expected to obey an unlawful order. "If I was told to violate policy it would have to be in order to save or preserve life. I do not have a duty to follow an unlawful order." "I would weigh all aspects of the situation and make my own choices." Officers have been trained that they "are responsible for their own actions" yet a less experienced officer "may go against their gut" and obey the senior officer.

Each officer has been trained in and knows the consequences of violating police policy and procedures, including possibly facing criminal charges.

> I would respectfully disobey the order and explain why the order would be illegal or unethical. At the end of the day, I'm not a robot and very capable of making my own sound and ethical decisions. I wouldn't complete the task directed if I knew it violated policy. I know without a shadow of doubt that I would be supported in my decision not to violate policy by my superiors.

One participant stated, "The organizations should have a policy that involves this scenario, but personally the situation would be handled the same way as any other potentially violent action, with the de-escalation tactics," indicting the organization does not have a written policy that addresses this specific scenario.

Question 8: If a patrol officer (Officer A) spoke up, took a stand, intervened to prevent other officers from violating a policy, and encouraged others to do the right thing, would you lose respect for and trust in the officer (Officer A)?

Thirteen respondents specified they would not lose respect for a fellow officer that intervened to prevent officers from violating an organizational policy or encouraging other officers to do the right thing. Trust and respect for a fellow officer would increase because it takes a "big person" to "stand up to others." The right thing

> Is always the right thing to do since doing the right thing is an example of looking out for fellow officers and their livelihood. No because I expect officers to do the right thing when no one is looking. Nobody is above the law. I would not lose anything for the officer if he did the right thing and I would expect any officer to do that in any situation. I believe I would have greater trust and respect for that officer for having the courage to do

> what is right. I would have a much greater respect for the officer because it takes a great deal of intestinal fortitude to do so. And I would do everything in my power, including becoming a whistleblower, to ensure that officer is not retaliated against.

Question 9: Does the fear of retaliation or backlash from other patrol officers or leaders result in you not speaking up when you know you should intervene to prevent or to report a serious policy infraction(s) (e.g., police misconduct, the use of excessive force or deadly force, or other violation[s])?

Of the 13 study participants, two officers expressed there is no retaliation within the department, while 10 officers stated they have no fear of retaliation or backlash from fellow officers for doing the right thing. Officers indicated they would not allow the possible fear of retaliation or backlash to affect their choice to speak up and prevent the use of excessive force or deadly force, or other violation(s) as their morals and ethics overwhelmingly influences their behavior. The officer's overwhelming view is

> there is always the fear of retaliation, but that would not stop me or anyone I train to step up to do the right thing. This department encourages officers to be individual thinkers and will place blame where it belongs, on the wrongdoer.

Doing the right thing "shows great honesty and integrity," especially since there are many young officers in the department. Three officers expressed that "they have no filter" and will speak up regardless of the possible backlash.

> I am a Sergeant in a department that has a lot of young police officers. I do not fear the backlash or retaliation for doing the right thing as I believe this only shows great honesty and integrity. No. As previously stated, my morals and ethics outweigh me caring what others think. Also, there is no retaliation in my opinion at my department. No. It takes a

> lot to scare me. I know I would have a great deal of community support if I was ever retaliated against. Nothing prevents me from speaking up.

Question 10: Do you feel the George Floyd incident would have been handled differently if George Floyd had been White (e.g., patrol officer[s]employing intervention to prevent other officers' excessive force or deadly force, or providing medical assistance)?

Officers ameliorated that question 10 was difficult to answer, and the answers to question 10 contained the highest number of divergent views, with one exception: Of the 13 study participants, 13 articulated they do not believe George Floyd would have been treated any differently and the outcome would not have been any different if he were White (or non-African American). Officers stated they believe George Floyd's death was not race-based and was not racially motivated. Four of the 13 officers expressed that the four officers involved in George Floyd's death reflected poor training, a failure to train, "a lack of training and inexperience mixed with [a] lack of proper supervision," and "a problem with training, skills, and culture." The officers' lack of action may have been… career apathy and a lack of respect for the suspect." Officers' individual perspectives included: An officer indicated the officers did

> what they felt necessary and were trained to do at that specific moment in time. We have had several incidents where similar force and/or 'holds' have been used to gain compliance from the individuals. As soon as compliance is gained, then your use of force continuum de-escalates. If there is any complaint of pain from the individual, then Emergency Medical Services are immediately contacted and requested to respond.

Another officer stated,

> I would want to think the officers were acting that way due to [Floyd's] erratic behavior. If Floyd had complied with officers the situation could have been avoided. Other officers

> failed him. There are many things going on in the George Floyd case. Officers conducted themselves poorly, but in reality, it was bad optics. There may have been 'contact fatigue' with Floyd, which can happen with ANY repeat offender. The incident would not have received the media attention had he [George Floyd] been a different race. I do not believe the outcome would have been different but the after effects would have been.

Question 11: If you had been involved in the incident, as a police patrol officer, what would you have done differently to prevent George Floyd's death?

Of the 13 study participants, one officer stated there was not anything he could have done differently in the situation [to prevent Floyd's death] since he believed Floyd died due to ingesting illegal substances. The same officer said he also would move Floyd to a "comfortable position and call EMS." A different officer shared,

> I did not agree with the handling, however, I do not feel that officers caused his death. Current training would not have allowed him to be in this position for so long, would have allowed medical intervention, and steps could have been taken to secure him in the vehicle.

Other officers preferred various suggestions, including utilizing "different defensive tactics or less than lethal weapons, such as a Taser or pepper spray." Floyd would have "been placed in a 'recovery' position, seated with his head up" after being properly restrained. Medical would have been brought to the scene as soon as possible to check him [Floyd] out. Three officers indicated they would have taken action to ensure Floyd's airway was not obstructed and would have initiated steps to relieve Floyd's obvious respiratory distress. Other restraint mechanisms would have been used to keep the suspect in a seated position if the suspect continued to fight.

An officer shared he "would start getting officers off of him" after ensuring [Floyd] was properly handcuffed and moving Floyd to a seated or side position to make it easier for him to breathe. An officer wrote he realized Floyd was experiencing a mental health crisis or excited delirium. There would have been an attempt to deescalate the situation and have EMS standing by. Officers' ethics and training would determine their actions, where the goal is to gain compliance until a suspect is no longer a threat to the public or the officer.

> I would have told the officer to move his knee placement & if he did not agree I would pull him off and sit George Floyd upright. The officers with Gorge Floyd took it personal. They never transitioned into seeing George Floyd as a human being. They could not separate the human being from the offense.

"Floyd had ingested both methamphetamine, which increases heart rate and [a] fatal amount of fentanyl, which suppresses lung function. The only thing that may have saved him was medical intervention by EMS, which had been called to the scene." Other officers indicated they "would have reminded officers of the proper recovery techniques." "People in handcuffs should be removed from their stomachs quickly. I would have provided CPR."

Question 12: Do you think George Floyd's death at the hands of the four Minneapolis police patrol officers was a failure of leadership? Why or why not? If yes, at which level was the leadership failure; individual, teams, organizational, a combination of more than one or all parameters? (Please explain)

Primarily, George Floyd's death reflected leadership failures across myriad levels, including organizationally, structurally, leadership roles, progressive leadership at the senior level, the team level, and the individual level.

> The biggest failure… is that the four officers had no idea what to do next [after Floyd was immobile], which is a training issue and a leadership issue. The officers were not trained how to handle themselves. People were put in bad situations by not having good supervision and a lack of progressive leadership.

Baseline supervisors should have taken control of the situation and known better than to keep a hand-cuffed subject in positional asphyxiation positions. The policies have failed apparently multiple times and were never reviewed for changes to prevent future failures, so the policy maker is where the leadership ladder failure begins.

"There is definitely a toxic culture there [Minneapolis Police Department]."

Two officers stated Floyd's death was not caused explicitly by those [four] officers but "things could have been differently to counteract death as a result of the chemicals in [Floyd's] system."

> Yes. Baseline supervisors should have taken control of the situation and known better than to keep a hand-cuffed subject in positional asphyxiation positions. The policies have failed apparently multiple times and were never reviewed for changes to prevent future failures so the policy maker is where the leadership ladder failure begins.
>
> I do think his death is a failure of leadership within the individual, but more so amongst the team, and somewhat on the organizational leadership. The individual [Chauvin] should have been able to use self-restraint and recognized what he was doing. The team should have been able to stand up and stop him and find alternative solutions, and the organizational leadership should have set a standard that would never have tolerated that.

Secondarily, Floyd's death demonstrated training failures, specifically for the field training officer, and specialized training such as de-escalation training. Junior officers needed more training on the use of force and de-escalation techniques and could have stepped in to stop Derek Chauvin. The team should have "stood up to him" and stopped Chauvin, and "offered alternative solutions."

> The failure…was at the first-line supervisory level, the senior officer or sergeant on scene. What happened was an individual (Chauvin) failure as a senior officer and field training officer. This is a training issue and sadly officers in many departments do not get the appropriate level of training that they need.
>
> It seems to me that it was due in part to the failure of leadership of the senior officers on the scene and the failure to train the new officers on how to deal with these types of situations. It also could be a failure to train in part by the department that has a responsibility to educate their officers on their duty to intervene. I believe we all have a duty to teach those below us on how to properly perform our jobs as well as the combination of how to deal with unruly prisoners and their duty to act.
>
> Yes. From the Chief down, I believe people were put in bad situations by not having good supervision and [a] lack of progressive leadership. This is hard to say without being privy to the work environment. This WAS a failure of Derek Chauvin (individual), as a senior officer and a field training officer. [H]e should have realized what his junior officers were attempting to bring to his attention.

Question 13: Do you consider yourself to be a leader? Why or why not?

Though the NVivo software did not identify any codes or themes, a synopsis of the participants' responses is provided. Of the 13 respondents, 13 officers perceive themselves as a

leader with the police agency based on several variables: Supporting officers' on-the-job and personal needs; ensuring new hires are receiving the right messages (from the FTO Coordinator); leading by example and teaching others they have the responsibility to do the right thing regardless of who may be affected; making the best possible decisions and influencing others to do likewise; reevaluating agency tactics and influencing change within policing at the local level; communication skills with subordinates and superiors; making tough decisions that are in line with department policy; pursuing continuous training for knowledge expansion; seeking alternative ways of resolving difficult situations; the willingness to stand up to people alone, if necessary, to support [my] beliefs; the willingness to make and stand by a decision, even if the decision is unpopular; and the desire to move the department and fellow officers forward. One officer did not consider himself to be a leader though the officer expressed fellow officers "look to him to make decisions," which is an element of leadership.

Question 14: Does your police organization offer opportunities for your leadership development?

All respondents agreed the police agency "has embraced the value of training" and prioritizes continual leadership growth and development via leadership training courses and classes. The substantial part of the agency's budget and time are dedicated to leadership training courses. Leadership development begins immediately after a new police recruit arrives in the department. Officers have attended the police supervisor's course to prepare them to fill the position. Officers are rewarded with training opportunities based on their "dedication to the field they want to take." The police agency has four certified police trainers that perform as contract training providers to other police agencies. Everyone is encouraged "to live up to their best potential. Everyone is a leader, just at different levels."

Officers are provided leadership development courses and leadership training through the Law Enforcement Management Institute of Texas (LEMIT). A patrol officer was sent to command staff level training in Huntsville (Texas), an expensive training course which is usually reserved for a captain or above. An officer was sent to the State Texas Instructor Course in Law Enforcement to quality to teach other officers, as well as attending a supervisor's course for learning first-line supervisory skills and a Sergeant in the department. The agency supports officers' higher education goals and provides a tuition repayment program. Periodically, the opportunity will arise for a patrol officer to be assigned as a temporary shift supervisor and perform the duties normally as to a patrol sergeant, which is utilized to gauge the officer's leadership and performance during those stressful situations.

The agency's goal is to provide training to anyone that wants it. Officers expressed the police agency provides many opportunities for leadership development via their extensive training program. The agency provides internal training classes and sends officers to external training classes, providing officers the knowledge and skills to become the subject matter expert that can then pass their knowledge and skills on to other officers. An example is the officer that attended critical incident training who then developed the CIT Team within the department. Officers reported the agency is "very training focused" and officers attend classes that build and develop officers in general. "These classes are not required by TCOLE (Texas Commission on Law Enforcement), but our department is very training-heavy and makes them available." The police chief repeats police chief school every 2 years.

The senior leader's leadership ability and their leadership skills extends beyond the police officers' job performance and includes and impacts the officers' work-life balance, which develops and enhances individual personal accountability, protects officer morale, and is pivotal

toward creating and maintaining a safe and healthy organizational culture. “We need to be our own ambassadors to each other.” “Dispatchers can bring their pets to work. The ‘fur babies’ are part of the family.” The organization’s leader “take[s] care of the staff first,” as well as holding morale events for the staff member’s spouses and family members.

Question 15: Have you received any leadership training as a police patrol officer or FTO? How would leadership training benefit you as a police patrol officer or FTO?

Of the five field training officers (FTOs) that participated in the study, the five FTOs have attended a field training officer training course, “which is a leadership class in itself.” The FTO course teaches officers “how to conduct yourself as a leader and how to lead by example.” The FTOs have attended state-mandated FTO courses, several training classes, leadership training courses, and participate in continuing training. The department offers an FTO Academy. The FTO training “opened an officer’s eyes to dealing with personnel issued and molding officers into well-rounded trained officers.” The police chief and agency “are strong in accountability” and the FTO has the most influence on new officers. “Screw ups” are dealt with appropriately and, conversely, officers are quickly recognized for good performance. Training for FTOs is essential for having good quality officers within any police agency. One officer stated they have attended two different FTO schools which benefitted the officers and others in the department.

An officer attended the state mandated FTO course and the New Supervisor Course after being promoted to Sergeant. The New Supervisor Course “teaches how to have an effective conversation with your staff.” The agency has a unique “test” for promoting officers to Patrol Sergeant. If selected, there is a set amount of time to write an essay after reading the book, *Crucial conversations: Tools for talking when stakes are high* (3rd ed.; Grenny et al., 2021). The

new Sergeants are asked to think of a real or fictional conversation and “add notes from the book on how the conversation could have ended on a more positive note.”

Question 16: Additional comments (optional):

No codes or themes were identified via NVivo. The verbatim responses from study participants include the following:

> People need to know “that law enforcement officers do have compassion and we feel for those who we serve even if they do not see it every day.” Law enforcement needs to take a hard look in the mirror and embrace the communities they serve to influence change.
>
> We need progressive leaders in the field and legislative mandates that are developed with research and not put together haphazardly or one-sided. I am glad that you are researching this topic. There was a concerted effort by media and some organizations to maximize this tragedy for political gain or influence. Facts should matter: I would say that I would continue pursuing officers in other departments to get a more accurate assessment.

Summary

In summary, the questionnaire questions addressed in the study were based on the conceptual framework, the three theories, which are critical race theory, social identity theory, and shared leadership theory, and the three research questions. Codes and sub-code data analysis were based on the respondents’ verbatim responses. A discussion of the study findings, as well as conclusions and recommendations from the study will be addressed in Chapter 5.

Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations

The study's problem statement addressed whether the police agency's leadership practices and organizational culture socialize police patrol officers to make choices that support and extend the police academy's "blue wall of silence" (Skolnick, 2002; Westmarland& Rowe, 2018; Wieslander, 2019). The police cultural "blue wall of silence" within the Minneapolis police department may have contributed to George Floyd's death by permitting or condoning the use of unnecessary excessive force or deadly force by some police patrol officers. The Minneapolis Police Department's senior leaders' leadership philosophy, the police agency's socialization processes, and police culture may have had detrimental impacts on police patrol officers' decision-making processes when interacting with racial minorities, and African Americans in particular.

The purpose of the study was to describe the circumstances, the systems processes (Stroh, 2015), and organizational culture that resulted in George Floyd's death by Minneapolis Police Department police patrol officers on May 25, 2020, in Minneapolis, Minnesota. The study also addressed how the four Minneapolis police patrol officers' decisions and George Floyd's death have (or have not) impacted the study participants' leadership practices. The study's intended goal was to provide police officers an opportunity to express their first-hand perspectives, from a leadership paradigm, the circumstances surrounding the four Minneapolis police patrol officers involved in George Floyd's death.

The study was conducted within a medium-sized police agency located in South Texas. The research design was a qualitative descriptive study, which examined the leadership practices within a police department from the perspective of real-world, first-line police officers. The

qualitative descriptive study provided perspectives from police officers that have first-hand knowledge of and familiarity with the phenomena being studied (Bradshaw et al., 2017; Colorafi & Evans, 2016; Leavy, 2017; Milne & Oberle, 2005; Neergaard et al., 2009; Sandelowski, 2010; Turale, 2020). Nonrandom purposive sampling (Leavy, 2017; Merriam & Tisdell, 2016; Miles et al., 2020; Saldaña & Omasta, 2018; Terrell, 2016) was utilized to select the sample for the study. The sampling criterion was limited to police officers and field training officers because they comprise the category of law enforcement personnel that were involved in the phenomenon being examined.

The study's participating agency's total manning is 34 (N=34) personnel, with 20 permanently assigned police patrol officers, plus six field training officers (FTOs). Due to the work requirements of small-to-medium sized police agencies, police officers that are permanently assigned to nonpatrol duties, such as Criminal Investigations Division (CID), the K-9-unit, Training, Administration, and others are also available and periodically may be temporarily assigned to the Patrol Division. For this reason, nonpatrol assigned police officers were invited to participate in the study. Thirteen (n=13) study participants, including four field training officers, completed the questionnaire which contained 16 open-ended questions. To increase and protect anonymity and reduce the probability of discovery through electronic means, a typed, hard copy of the questionnaire was presented to each participant. Chapter 4 contained the results of the qualitative descriptive study. The main findings from the study, as identified by the themes and sub-themes resulting from the 16-question questionnaire, were as follows:

Question 1

Of the 13 study participants, 10 officers rarely and three officers periodically question their racial stereotypes and implicit bias. During police interactions with civilians, a police officer's response is based on the suspect's behavior and not the suspect's race.

Question 2

"The use of force is based on the actions of the suspect and that alone." All study participants stated they would never use excessive force or deadly force based on a suspect's race, religious beliefs, ethnicity, or minority group. Officers indicated they may employ excessive force as a means for protecting themselves. Using excessive force or deadly force goes against some officers' morals and Christian beliefs.

Question 3

The field training officers indicated that as the good stewards responsible for advancing the agency's culture, they have not and would not violate established department policies, standards, and procedures for using excessive force or deadly force. Reasonableness is the standard for using the continuum of force.

Question 4

The four field training officers that participated in the study stated they would intervene to prevent a senior officer, a line officer, or a peer from using unnecessary force, excessive force, or deadly force when necessary. With the responsibility for training new police recruits, FTOs are held to a higher standard individually, as team members, and collectively based on their morals and ethics.

Question 5

Of the 13 study participants, 12 had received "The Duty to Intervene" training (in January 2023). The Duty to Intervene training reviewed case law and the use of force policies.

Question 6

The traditional police cultural "blue wall of silence" is not a factor within the agency and does not influence the officers' decision-making processes. Four study participants were unfamiliar with the phrase and me to explain what the term meant.

Question 7

Study participants stated they would not violate their police agency's excessive force policy, regardless of the senior officer's title or position that directed the officer to do so. Officers have been trained to not obey an illegal or unethical order, and that they are responsible for their own choices.

Question 8

Officers specified that they would not lose respect for a fellow officer that intervened to prevent other officers from violating an agency policy or encouraging officers to do the right thing. "The right thing is always the right thing to do." Officers expect other officers to do the right thing, even when no one else is looking. "No one is above the law."

Question 9

Study participants expressed there is no retaliation within the department, and there is no fear of retaliation or backlash from fellow officers. Officers expressed they would not allow the possible fear of retaliation or backlash to affect their choice to speak up and prevent the use of excessive force or deadly force, or any other moral or ethics violation. Doing the right thing reflects honesty and integrity and supersedes any possible retaliation.

Question 10

Where asked if the officers felt the George Floyd incident would have been handled differently if George Floyd had been White (e.g., employing intervention to prevent excessive force or deadly force or providing medical assistance), officers ameliorated that the question was difficult to answer. Question 10 contained the highest number of divergent views, yet of the 13 study participants, 13 articulated they do not believe George Floyd would have been treated any differently and the outcome would not have been different if George Floyd were White (or non-African American). Officers believe George Floyd's death was not race-based and was not racially motivated but rather reflected poor training, a failure to train, inexperience mixed with a lack of proper supervision, poor police culture, a failure of effective leadership, and a lack of respect for the suspect. One officer stated [the four officers involved in the incident] "behaved the way they did due to Floyd's erratic behavior" and "if Floyd had complied" with the officers, "the situation could have been avoided." If George Floyd had not been African-American, the outcome would not have received the same level of media attention with the resultant aftermath (the number and intensity of the social protests).

Question 11

Regarding what the police officers could have done differently to prevent George Floyd's death, study participants suggested using different defensive tactics or less than lethal weapons (e.g., the Taser or pepper spray, placing Floyd in a recovery position with his head up after being restrained, ensuring Floyd's airway was not obstructed, and 'initiating steps to relieve Floyd's obvious respiratory distress'). De-escalation tactics would have been employed, as well as initiating medical assistance. An officer expressed Floyd was experiencing a mental health crisis. Another officer stated he "would have told the senior officer to remove his knee." Generally, the

officers' ethics and training would determine their actions. In this incident, the [officers involved] "took it personal. They never transitioned into seeing George Floyd as a human being. They could not separate the human being from the offense." One officer stated there was nothing he would have done differently since Floyd died due to ingesting illegal substances, though he would have "moved Floyd to a comfortable position and call EMS." Another officer felt those [four involved] officers did not cause Floyd's death.

Question 12

All study participants surmised George Floyd's death was a failure of leadership across myriad levels (e.g., organizationally, structurally, within leadership roles, the lack of applied progressive leadership practices by senior leaders, and leadership within teams and individually). Additionally, the lack of specific training regarding de-escalation techniques, and a toxic culture, which are elements of the organizational leader's leadership philosophy and leadership practices. Other contributing elements were that police organizational policies were insufficient to address the specific parameters of the incident and police supervisors lost control of the situation.

Question 13

The 13 respondents consider themselves to be leaders based on several variables, including leading by example and being held responsible to do the right thing; communication skills with superiors and subordinates; ensuring decisions are made in line with agency policy; being willing to stand up to others, if necessary, to support officer's beliefs; reevaluating agency tactics; and pursuing continual knowledge expansion.

Question 14

The police agency offers opportunities for the officers' leadership development primarily through targeted systematic training, and continual leadership development training courses. A

substantial part of the agency's budget is dedicated to officer leadership development, which begins when a new police recruit arrives at the department. Training is utilized as a development tool to prepare officers for the position they desire to take. Periodically, officers are temporarily assigned as shift supervisor or patrol sergeant to gauge the officer's leadership and performance during stressful times.

Question 15

The five assigned field training officers have attended a state-mandated field training officer course, several training and leadership training courses. The FTO training reinforced officers' skills in "how to deal with personnel issues" and molding officers into becoming well trained officers. Training for field training officers is essential for developing quality officers within any police agency. During FTO training, officer accountability is reinforced. The agency offers an FTO Academy that police officers and law enforcement agencies from various agencies in the area attend, such as the FTO Academy that graduated 13 students in May 2023.

Question 16

An officer expressed the need for progressive leadership within law enforcement agencies so they can "look in the mirror and embrace the communities they serve to influence change." An officer shared the fact of the incident should matter, stating the media and some organizations maximized the tragedy for political gain. Officers were thankful that the incident, George Floyd's death, was being researched.

Chapter 5 includes discussions of the findings and implications of each research question, the discussion of the findings in relation to past literature, the limitations within the context of the study's design, the recommendation for practical applications as well as recommendations for future research.

Discussion

The three research questions were developed through research utilizing three theories: critical race theory, social identity theory, and shared leadership theory. The three theories were the foundation for creating the parameters for the study, including the three research questions. A discussion on the three research questions, based on the study's findings, is provided.

RQ1: Does implicit bias influence police patrol officers' use of excessive force or deadly force when interacting with African American community members?

Research question one was based on dimensions of critical race theory, which is defined as race-consciousness that critically examines the degree to which race impacts organizational culture (Conyers & Fields, 2020), and focuses on injustice and difference based on race (Bell, 1980 as cited in Bell, 1992; Conyers & Fields, 2020; Leavy, 2017). Of the 13 study participants, all officers indicated they never have and never would choose to employ excessive force or deadly force against a suspect based solely on a suspect's race or ethnic group. A suspect's race or ethnic background does not and should not define the person as a criminal and should not be a determining factor in an officer using excessive force or deadly force, which is counterintuitive to critical race theory. The use of any type of force by police officers is based on the decisions and behavior of the involved suspect.

Implicit bias is defined as biases that operate primarily outside of conscious awareness and control (Spencer et al., 2016). Ten study participants stated they rarely question their racial stereotypes and implicit bias, whereas three participants periodically question their racial stereotypes and implicit bias. Officers expressed they are concerned about veering in the direction of negative stereotypes and implicit bias because they want to treat everyone fairly.

Several officers shared their Christian faith, and their morals and values contribute to an impact on how the officers interact with all suspects.

Twelve officers stated George Floyd would not have been treated differently during the incident and the outcome would not have been different if Floyd was Caucasian. Yet, all study participants communicated they would have utilized a less lethal form of physical restraint or would have moved Floyd to a different position. Officers would have offered Floyd some type of medical assistance or intervention, which may or may not have been successful in preventing Floyd's death due to Floyd having ingested illegal drugs prior to the incident. Floyd's death was not race-based but resulted from Floyd's lack of compliance with the instructions of the four officers involved in the incident.

Though Floyd's death, in the views of the officers, was not race-based, the community and society-at-large response would have been less intense. From the technical, tactical, and training perspectives of the police officers involved in the study, George Floyd's death was the result of improper and ineffective training, poor supervision, a toxic organizational culture, and a failure of leadership across the individual, team, and organizational levels. The participating officers' responses were not surprising, when considering that only fellow police officers have first-hand, real-world knowledge of, generally, what other officers have received training in and understand the behavior of other police officers.

RQ 2: Does the police socialization process prioritize "fitting in and following orders" and the blue wall of silence above police patrol officers exercising proactive judgment and decision-making skills?

Social identity theory, defined as when leaders emerge within a group become most like the group's prototype (Haider-Markel & Joslyn, 2017; Hogg, 2001; Hogg et al., 2012;

Northouse, 2019), postulated that leaders might emerge based on their in-group placement (e.g., self-categorization) and self-assimilate to maintain social and normative balance within the group (Hogg, 2001, 2018; Hohman et al., 2017). The degree to which a person fits with the identity of the group determines or influences leadership emergence. Study participants indicated the traditional police cultural "blue wall of silence" is not a factor within the agency and does not influence the officers' decisions.

Personal and professional ethics and integrity, the officer's age, and the number of years of law enforcement experience influence whether and to what degree the blue wall of silence affects officer's choices and behaviors. Overall, the agency has a "high ethical standard," yet some officers may fear being blacklisted for speaking out to expose unethical behavior as the "word may spread" to other local agencies and may affect their career. In the past, the blue wall of silence had a stronger impact within the agency but training and a change in hiring practices has changed the agency's culture. Four study participants had never heard the "blue wall of silence" phrase. The participating agency is the four officers' initial assignment as a police officer. Officers have been trained to not follow an unethical or illegal order, and officers are responsible for their decisions. An officer expressed their desire for the agency to provide a training scenario discussing a scenario where a field training officer gave an illegal or unethical command, which could familiarize officers with the cultural-social-emotional impact of going against the direction of a senior officer.

Elements of social identity theory had minimal impact within the police agency. The need to fit in and follow orders, organizational socialization, is not a factor in decision-making or following orders, even if the person giving the order is a field training officer. Officers would not lose respect for a fellow officer that spoke up to an officer from doing the wrong thing or

violating an organizational policy. Overall, the fear of retaliation or backlash would not inhibit an officer or a leader from speaking up to prevent an incident of police misconduct, the use of excessive force or deadly force, or any other infraction. Where there is the fear of retaliation, the fear would not prevent officers from intervening and doing the right thing.

The four field training officers that participated in the study indicated, as police trainers and upholders and extenders of the police culture and the organization, they have not and would not violate established agency policies, standards, and procedures for using excessive force or deadly force. Excessive force or deadly force is applied utilizing the reasonableness standard. Field training officers train, equip, and mold newly assigned officers "to be good stewards to the community." The field training officers also indicated they have intervened in the past and would intervene in the future to prevent a more senior officer, a fellow field training officer, or police officer for unnecessarily applying excessive force or deadly force. Field training officers hold themselves to a higher professional standard. The behavior of the field training officer involved in George Floyd's death, Derek Chauvin, did not honorably represent fellow field training officers or other police officers.

RQ 3: Does your police agency provide opportunities for and support police patrol officers' leadership development?

The 13 study participants stated the agency embraces the value of training and prioritizes leadership training courses and classes for continual leadership development and growth. Officer leadership development begins when the recruit arrives at the agency. Officers attend various training courses to help prepare them for new positions or assignments. Officers also attend training courses through are Law Enforcement Management Institute of Texas (LEMIT).

Periodically, a patrol officer will be assigned temporarily as a shift supervisor to perform the duties of a patrol sergeant, here the officer's performance and leadership will be observed.

The senior leader's leadership philosophy posits that continual, directed, and focused training are critical elements of leadership development. The agency has several Texas Commission on Law Enforcement (TCOLE) certified trainers and is a TCOLE contract trainer for myriad law enforcement agencies in the surrounding areas, including communications officers, and other police agencies, sheriff departments, and border patrol officers. Officers have developed training certification courses. For example, after an officer attended a critical incident training (CIT) course, the officer developed the CIT Team within the department, though the classes are not required by TCOLE. Officers in the department attended the Duty to Intervene training during January 2023, in addition to various ongoing training courses.

The agency has its own Field Training Officer (FTO) Academy and periodically hosts FTO training and certification classes. The FTO training provides a specific type of leadership training where participants are trained in how to lead and how to conduct themselves. FTOs have the most immediate influence on new officers, they are essential for producing high quality officers, and they are held to a higher level of accountability.

The police chief voluntarily repeats Chief of Police School every 2 years. By example and leadership philosophy, the police chief has committed dedicated effort, time, and financial resources into making the police agency what Kegan and Lahey (2016) dubbed a deliberately developmental organization where everyone in the organization is involved with and does people development; where everyone builds the agency's culture, where the organization functions on development principles, where weakness is a potential asset for growth and change, and where

affirmative principles, values, and ethical standards are woven into the decision-making processes off all employees.

The police chief has a written law enforcement code of ethics policy manual titled the "Chief's Golden Rule of Decision Making." The police chief's focus on continual training and ethical standards are influencing and impacting the officers' perceptions of and appreciation for individual and collective continuous growth and development. The officers stated they view themselves as leaders and they hold themselves to high standards which reflect the high leadership requirements that have been established by the senior police leader.

Discussion of Findings in Relation to Past Literature

Given the vast amount of research studying the history of policing in America (Dunham & Petersen, 2017; German, 2020b; Skolnick, 2007) and reportedly how police officers treat African Americans, and African Americans males in particular (Richardson, 2015; Swencionis & Goff, 2017), the study findings were unexpected and surprising. The findings from the study indicated, from the first-hand perspectives and views of the participating police officers, that George Floyd's death did not reflect any type of racial bias or implicit bias, and no unnecessary or deadly force was used.

The officers stated they thought George Floyd's death was the result of poor training methods and ineffective training implementation. Study participants indicated the events that resulted in Floyd's death reflected a toxic organizational culture, a lack of interpersonal and group accountability, and ineffective leadership within the Minneapolis Police Department. Overall, the police officers that participated in the study felt the four officers involved in Floyd's death did some things wrong from the perspective of technical policing procedure but the motive or intent behind the officer's behavior was not race-based. Officers expressed they would have

taken steps to intervene to deescalate the use of unnecessary force or excessive force. They would have removed the fellow police officer's knee from Floyd's necks, they would have changed Floyd's position to prevent positional asphyxiation, and they would have provided medical assistance sooner. An officer stated they would not have taken the incident so personally and would have treated Floyd as a fellow human being. Yet, the study participants believe the Minneapolis police officers' behavior was not race-based. However, the findings from two formal investigations yielded dissimilar results.

June 1, 2020, the Minnesota Department of Human Rights opened an investigation after George Floyd was murdered by a Minneapolis police officer on May 25, 2020. The intent was to investigate and determine if the City of Minneapolis and the Minneapolis Police Department violated the Minnesota Human Rights Act, Minnesota Statutes, Chapter 363A.12, for pattern or practice of race discrimination (MNDHR, 2022). The Minnesota Department of Human Rights investigated the policies, procedures, and practices of the Minneapolis Police Department's over the previous 10years to determine if they engaged in systemic discriminatory practices. The investigation results were released April 27, 2022.

The synopsis of the Investigation into the City of Minneapolis and the Minneapolis Police Department included findings of racial discrimination where Minneapolis Police Department officers engaged in a pattern of (a) racial disparities in how MPD officers use force and conduct traffic stops; (b) use racist, misogynistic, and disrespectful language; and (c) used covert social media to surveil Black leaders and Black organizations, which is unrelated to criminal activity. The Minnesota Department of Human Rights findings indicated the pattern of racial discrimination was caused by an organizational culture of (a) flawed training, (b) a lack of collective action by the City of Minneapolis and the Minneapolis Police Department leaders, and

(c) deficient accountability systems. The Minnesota Department of Human Rights proclaimed reforming the Minneapolis Police department's policies, procedures, and training will be meaningless without fundamental, organizational culture changes (MNDHR, 2022). On March 31, 2023, the Minnesota Department of Human Rights issued a press release announcing an enforceable agreement with the City of Minneapolis to make transformational changes that would strengthen public safety and address race-based policing (Minnesota Department of Human Rights, 2023).

Subsequently, on April 21, 2021, the U.S. Justice Department initiated an investigation of the City of Minneapolis and the Minneapolis Police Department. On June 16, 2023, the results of the Department of Justice federal investigation found Minneapolis police officers use "dangerous" excessive force and discriminatory conduct that disproportionately targets African Americans and Native Americans. Findings included that the Minneapolis Police Department patrols differently "based on the racial composition of the neighborhood," and disproportionately stops and uses force against African Americans and Native Americans. The Minneapolis Police Department, as provided in the federal investigation's report, is now prohibited from using "no-knock" warrants, prohibits neck restraints, and restricts certain crowd-control measures, among other initiatives. The Department of Justice also found the Minneapolis police officers use unlawful and excessive use of force throughout the city, including situations where race appeared to not be a factor. June 16, 2023, an agreement in principle between Minneapolis and the Justice Department was entered into to reach a court-authorized consent decree that formalized the federal findings and recommendations and appointed an independent monitor of the department (Legare & Quinn, 2023). The full Department of Justice report is accessible via the findings report pdf (Department of Justice, 2023).

There may appear to be discrepancies between the findings of the study within the local police agency, the results from previous research, and the official findings from the Minnesota Department of Human Rights and Department of Justice federal investigation of the death of George Floyd. Yet, there is no discrepancy. The police officers that participated in the qualitative descriptive study expressed their views, opinions, and perspectives based on their training, exposure, and backgrounds, and their current real-world, first-hand experiences within their local police agency. The local police officers expressed their views that were based on the filtered lens of their reality within the culture of their medium-sized police agency which is located in South Texas. In addition, the officers that participated in the local qualitative descriptive study did not have access to the 10 years of data upon which the Minnesota Department of Human Rights and the Department of Justice federal investigation were based.

The implications for the variance between the study results, previous research, and the two formal investigations is that no two police agencies are the same, and no two police agencies can be or should be compared to another police agency. No two police agencies will have the same senior leader, meaning, no two police agencies will have the same leader's leadership philosophy, which directly and indirectly affects the police organizational culture (Silver et al., 2017; Skolnick, 2002; Stroh, 2015; Werner, 2017; Westmarland& Rowe, 2018; Wieslander, 2019). That said, a broader explanation for the difference between earlier research, the results of the study from the participating police agency, and the two formal investigations of the City of Minneapolis and the Minneapolis Police Department warrant further discussion.

A secondary implication that may help explain the differences between previous research and the study, and may be the most important and differential factor in a police organization, or any other type of organization, is the senior police leader's commitment to organizational change

and change management, continual training to ensure officers stay abreast of current procedural, technical and nontechnical police requirements, and adapting and instituting police reform measures as needed or when required. In Ronald Weitzer's (2005) well-known and critical article, he asked, "Can the police be reformed?" The answer is an emphatic yes. The police agency, police practices, and police officer behavior can be reformed but police reformation procedures will not be easy. Practical organizational change initiatives begin at the top with the involvement and participation of the senior leader, though change initiative ideas may be submitted or communicated by anyone within the organization as stipulated by shared leadership theory (Amos & Klimoski, 2014; Bergman et al., 2012; Day et al., 2004; Locke & Schweiger, 1979; Northouse, 2019; O'Toole et al., 2002; Pearce et al., 2009; Steinheider & Wuestewald, 2008; Wuestewald & Steinheider, 2012). When a senior leader remains humble (De Pree, 2004) and open to the views, input, ideas, and suggestions of their cohorts, progressive change is possible.

Again, referring to Weitzer's (2005) study and the question of police reform, creating change within police agencies is possible. I propose another implication of the study. Police organizational change does not occur from the outside-in through federal government requirements or legally enforceable consent decrees. How effective would it be to mandate forced externally sourced organizational change efforts without the buy-in and support of the internal senior organizational leader? Organizational change may not occur from the outside-in but rather from the inside-out, starting with the leadership development of the senior leader within the police organization, including the senior leader's commitment to self-leadership (Rima, 2000), and the commitment to individual growth and development, including confronting potential failures (McIntosh & Rima, 2007).

The study may have resulted in the senior police leaders and cohorts examining their long-held views related to police policies and procedures. Embracing, prioritizing, and valuing organizational change initiative processes may be an important element of progressive leadership, which may impact police organizational reform (Deutschman, 2007). When the senior leader's relationships with cohorts represents a guardian mindset instead of a warrior mindset (McLean et al., 2020), ethics, integrity (Cloud, 2006), power struggles are minimized (Folger et al., 2013), and a high level of trust permeates the police organizational culture. Based on the police officers' responses to the questionnaire questions, the senior leader's written ethics standards permeate the police agency's organizational culture.

Limitations

A key factor identified through the study is the police agency's senior leader's leadership philosophy, which is an intentional focus on the agency becoming a deliberate developmental organization (Kegan & Lahey, 2016). The deliberate developmental organization targets continual learning, growth development through an extensive and intentional training program, which includes continual officer leadership and development. The senior officer's leadership philosophy may be the exception and may not be embraced by or practiced within police or other law enforcement agencies.

The study's limitations included some police officers' reluctance to participate in the descriptive study, despite continual reassurances of study participants' anonymity and confidentiality. The small-to-medium size of the police agency may be a limitation as the senior police leader's influence, power, impact, and leadership practices' efficacy may be reduced or minimized when compared to a larger sized police agency. The participating study's senior leader practices a progressive leadership philosophy that includes a rare focus on continual

training and training certifications, professional development, and personnel leadership development, a leadership philosophy which may not be enforced and practiced as strongly within other police agencies.

The size of the police agency may be an unavoidable limitation. The police agency senior leader accepted, embraced, and supported the study without reservation, and encouraged their cohorts to participate it the study, despite the sensitive nature of the study's subject matter, that being police officer race relations and the perception of implicit bias against African Americans, the use of unnecessary force and deadly force against African Americans, and addressing the issue of police leadership efficacy.

Eventually, 13 law enforcement personnel voluntarily participated in the study. In a larger sized organization, more study participants may have provided more diverse responses to the study's questionnaire, producing a wider array of themes and sub-themes from the questionnaire results. Additionally, because of the study's subject matter, some police officers may have been reticent to address or openly discuss their honest views related to the study's questionnaire questions. Also, Savage (2016) identified that the race of the interviewer and the survey questions about police use of force against an adult male citizen may impact the approval expressed by both African American and White respondents though additional research is warranted. It is unknown if my race, which is African American, may have impacted the respondents' responses.

Wooley and Smith (2022) revealed some of the unique challenges of police officers working in small rural police agencies, one of which is the lack of racial diversity within the police agency in part due to the lack of racial diversity within the local geographic region. The African American population in small towns in Texas tends to be small, hence the representation

of African American members of small-town police agencies also tend to be small, as was the case in this study. The transferability (Terrell, 2016) of the study may be limited to other police agencies that are similar in size to the participating police agency. Conversely, transferability of the study to much larger police agencies may be greatly reduced due to increased manning levels within the police agency, a larger community population that is served, and the probable increased level of racial diversity and police officers within those police agencies.

At the time of the study, no African Americans were employed by the participating police agency. It is unknown if having no African American police officers would have affected the study results. If there were at least one African American police officer within the police agency, the study findings may have proferred different results but this is unknown.

Within the medium-sized city where the participating police agency is located, the population demographic is predominately Caucasian and Hispanic, with African Americans and Asian American/Pacific Inlanders being in the minority. Based on the numbers, some officers within the police agency may have had limited interactions with members of the African American community. If the police agency were in a different region of the country with a much larger population and a larger percentage of African American citizens, more officers may have had increased and varied types of interactions across myriad ethnic and racial groups, which may have resulted in different study responses.

Police agencies have traditionally been known to operate culturally as a “closed secret society.” Study findings indicated four of the 13 respondents stated they had never heard of the phrase “the blue wall of silence.” Based on extensive previous research, the specific phrase “the blue wall of silence” may be unknown to those four officers but the overt socialization process and cultural norms of becoming a police officer may subconsciously socialize officers to expect

a certain level of "brotherhood/sisterhood protection" from their fellow police officers, whether or not the formal title of "the blue wall of silence" is utilized or taught (Lynch, 2018a).

It is unknown if senior police leaders from other agencies were reticent about participating in the study because the senior leader was resistant to none-law enforcement (external) examination of their police agency, possibly motivating police organizational change. Other police or law enforcement senior leaders may have been resistant to participate because of the study's topic, which addressed racial bias, police violence against African Americans, police excessive force and deadly force, and subordinate police officers expressing their views of their senior police leader's leader efficacy. The lack of a second participating police agency resulted in the lack of an additional study for objective comparison, thereby eliminating the study's variance (Rapley, 2013; Terrell, 2016).

The police officers involved in the study indicated that their choices, decision-making processes, morals, ethics, and actions as police officers were based on their Christian faith and beliefs (De Pree, 2004). It is unknown if a different agency where the police officers were less openly vocal about their Christian beliefs would produce different study results.

With full manning of the police agency being 34 peace officers, the smaller size of the police agency where the study was conducted may have impacted the officer's full ability or willingness to be completely honest when answering the questionnaire questions. Whether or not some study respondents answered the questionnaire questions in a manner that they may have subconsciously perceived as what was expected of them, or provided answers that may be considered "politically correct," cannot be known.

Recommendations for Practical Application

The participating study's senior leader practices a progressive leadership philosophy that includes a rare focus on continual growth and development through training classes and training certifications and personnel leadership development, a leadership philosophy which may not be enforced and practiced as strongly within other police agencies. During prestudy interviews with the senior agency leader, I learned that at the time of the leader's arrival in the organization, a concerted effort was implemented to change the organization's culture from one that was fractured to one that operated more cohesively as a unit, a process that took several years. The senior leader believed prioritizing continual training, learning, and development were critical elements for the police agency operating at optimal proficiency. The police agency involved in the study is a modern, real-world example of the police reform where intense and proactive focus on the process of change can create true organizational reform across myriad levels within the organization.

Congruent with the investigation findings from the Minnesota Department of Human Rights (MNDHR, 2022) and the Department of Justice investigation (DOJ, 2023) of George Floyd's death, implementing corrective and proactive changes within the Minneapolis Police Department mandates changes at the structural and system levels (Stroh, 2015). Implementing change at the systems level addresses issues such as process management, procedural reviews, organizational assessments, and training needs assessments (Chen, 2015; Kaufman & Guerra-López, 2013), cultural analysis (Driskill & Brenton, 2011), and addressing one's leadership philosophy and application (Marion & Uhl-Bien, 2007; McIntosh & Rima, 2007; Northouse, 2019) to name a few. Implementing change within a police agency is a daunting, challenging, difficult, and frustrating task that may take several years to complete. Senior police leaders may

benefit from being aware that the process of creating and implementing change can be frustrating and is not for the fainthearted.

Larger police agencies have a more extensive and expansive formal, hierarchal chain of command and lines of communication which may negatively impact the senior leader's full access to immediate or important information that may affect the senior leader's decision-making processes. Compared to larger police agencies, the senior leader within smaller police agencies may have a "tighter reign of control or influence" within the police agency due to the unofficial, informal, or indirect lines of communication with their cohorts. The organizational change implementation process, specifically as it relates to changing one's leadership philosophy or leadership style, may be easier to implement within a smaller police agency (Wooley & Smith, 2022).

As part of the preparation for the study, I approached 13 law enforcement senior leaders, of which only two senior leaders agreed to participate in the study. Due to a different mission type, the other law enforcement agency did not anticipate in the study. Eleven senior leaders chose to not participate in the study, some after jointly reviewing and discussing with me the 16 questions in the questionnaire. Several senior leaders shared they were uncomfortable discussing the issues addressed in the study, while others stated they were unsure of what the police officers under their leadership would say in response to the questionnaire. Organizational leaders, including police leaders, cannot and should not be afraid to discuss any issue(s) with their cohorts. Effective and honest communication between senior leaders and their peers and cohorts are important elements of individual and interpersonal professional accountability, which develops trust between the senior leader and the subordinates (Grenny et al., 2021) and assists agency personnel with developing their conflict management skills (Runde & Flanagan, 2013).

George Floyd's death and the circumstances surrounding Floyd's death could be utilized to create training scenarios and case studies for training purposes. The training scenarios or written case studies may also be a tool that may generate discussion(s) related to negative stereotypes and implicit bias toward minority groups.

Recommendations for Future Research

Recommendations for future research include the following:

1. Additional research on the impact or effectiveness of teaching shared leadership theory to senior police leaders (O'Toole et al., 2002; Pearce et al., 2009) is warranted. There is limited research on shared leadership theory being applied within police agencies. Also, determining whether teaching shared leadership theory is a practical, viable option that could be applied within police agencies (Bergman et al., 2012) to change the police culture is worthy of further study.
2. What would the impact be on organizational and leadership effectiveness if the senior police or law enforcement practitioner created a written ethics policy and enforced implementing the ethics policy within their agency? Also, would having a strong ethics program within the police agency affect the quality and implementation of the agency's training program? Additional study may be warranted.
3. In the police agency where the study was conducted, the police chief voluntarily attends "Police Chief School" every 2 years. What would the impact be on American policing if more police chiefs were required to repeat "Police Chief School" every 3 to 5 years? Would the police chief periodically attending refresher police chief school have a direct and positive impact on the policy agency's culture? Further discussion or additional research may be warranted.

4. What impact does a senior law enforcement's religious belief have on the leader's leadership acumen? More specifically, are Christian police officers more effective leaders than non-Christians? Do the senior leader's religious beliefs have a direct impact on the organization's culture and other police officers? The question may warrant additional research.
5. After George Floyd was killed, police officers and other law enforcement practitioners resigned from their position and eventually forfeited their peace officer credentials. Possibly, current law enforcement practitioners may reach out to or contact these former officers to check if these former officers would be interested in returning to the law enforcement profession, which may alleviate the current high police officer turnover rate and shortfall in police or law enforcement recruiting, particularly in rural police agencies (Liu & McCausland, 2019; Wooley & Smith, 2022). Some officers may be required to requalify as peace officers, but the issue may be worth studying and pursuing.
6. Could special temporary hiring concessions be made for those peace officers that resigned from law enforcement directly as a result from the at-large cultural backlash from George Floyd's death? If the officer passes a background check, could the officer be rehired as a conditional peace officer and given special consideration to earn their required permanent peace officer credentials within a six month period? This suggestion may require a temporary change in state law and law enforcement hiring requirements but may help alleviate the low rate of police recruit applicants, reduced police hiring, and lower police officer retention that is the experience of myriad police agencies and other law enforcement agencies across America. I believe there are highly qualified former peace officers that would return to law enforcement if given the opportunity to return to

law enforcement with a conditional temporary peace officer certification pending full certification within six months. Each state will need to establish specific time limit eligibility requirements for the return of temporary certified peace officers.

7. Could senior law enforcement practitioners receive formal training in an academic setting, college or university, where senior law enforcement officers may receive a master's level certification in leadership and management? The curriculum may include leadership theories, management philosophies, change management procedures, cultural analysis, and training senior leaders in how to develop developmental organizations. Further research is warranted to ascertain if the idea is viable, feasible, or practical.
8. More studies on the death of George Floyd, and others, may be a resource to advance police and other law enforcement agencies' transformation and reform initiatives (Goff, 2021; Kerrison et al., 2019; Lum, 2021; Swencionis & Goff, 2017). Those studies may also increase the body of work, provide scientific data in police science, and produce additional subjects for future research.
9. Morrow et al. (2018) proposed the criminal justice system may be one mechanism that controls culturally dissimilar minority groups through the minority threat hypothesis. Employing the minority threat hypothesis framework, in addition to the use of force being applied as a means for ensuring compliance within the law, the use of force also preserves social order or the status quo for the political or social elite. The theoretical framing of the minority threat hypothesis as it relates to police use of force warrants further research to increase transferability and dependability (Morrow et al., 2018) of earlier research.
10. Research conducted in conjunction with the International Association of Chiefs of Police

(IACP, 2023) and funded by Arnold Ventures, Engel et al. (2020a) expounded on the lack of scientific evaluations and literature review for de-escalation training, specifically noting the lack of de-escalation training evaluation research in the discipline of policing. Engel et al. (2020b) made a direct call to police practitioners, academics, and funders across policing to prioritize the evaluation and testing of de-escalation, use of force policies, and other police training. Additional research is needed for evaluating police training efficacy.

11. There is a need for law enforcement leaders to allow more police science practitioners to conduct studies within their organizations, particularly, descriptive studies that permit real-world police practitioners to express their views, ideas, and perspectives of the subject(s) or incident(s) being addressed. Part of the reasoning for this, explained Huey (2018), from the police practitioner's perspective, was the historical divide between police practitioners and police scientists or researchers. Police management philosophy perceives police "real world" experience as a critical component to decision-making and viewed scientific research as unnecessary, which limits evidence-based policing (Willis & Toronjo, 2019). The costs associated with conducting training evaluations and the disruption to police officer's normal duties were further justifications for the lack of systematic training evaluations (Huey, 2018). Further police research utilizing qualitative descriptive studies are warranted in learning real-world police officers' viewpoints.
12. Moon et al. (2018) uncovered that there were no nationally centralized training or assessment standards for police officer training, nor was there a cultural competency assessment tool. Extensive research to determine if and how police departments are measuring and accounting cultural competency training is lacking. Moon et al. (2018)

recommended utilizing the Intercultural Development Inventory (IDI) to train police officers. Research indicated a lack of periodic review, assessment, needs assessment, and evaluation (Cordner, 2020; Huey, 2018; Spencer et al., 2016; Swencionis & Goff, 2017) of race relations training. Assessing police officers' perceptions of the efficacy of race relations training content and soliciting recommendations for possible future racial awareness training content justifies additional research.

13. When a police leader teaches, reinforces, and supports shared leadership theory within their organization, will the result be a direct correlation to the police agency becoming a deliberate developmental organization (Kegan & Lahey, 2016) through the process of continuous learning (Senge, 2006), resulting in police cultural reform? The congruence between creating an intentional developmental organization and police cultural reform, based on the leadership philosophy of shared leadership theory and its effect on the process of continual cultural change and change management, warrants further study.
14. Is there a direct (or indirect) correlation between senior police officers and other law enforcement practitioners applying shared leadership theory principles and the reduction or prevention of officers' abuse of power? In other words, could the application of shared leadership theory reduce police officers' intentional or unintentional overreaching, misusing, or abusing the power associated with their positional authority? Additional study is warranted.
15. Broughton (2021) proposed that a key element of shared leadership is being other person-centered with Christ-like humility. Instead of self-promotion, the co-humility of shared power, collaboration, and interdependence is accomplished among shared leadership practitioners. Shared leadership theory applied within law enforcement agencies and

shared leadership theory, in general, is worthy of further study.

Summary

In summary, the qualitative descriptive study was to investigate the circumstances related to the death of George Floyd, an African American, who was killed during an interaction with four Minneapolis Police Department police officers on May 25, 2020, after one of the officers, the senior officer present and the field training officer, kept his knee on Floyd's neck for more than nine minutes. The overriding question posed as justification for the study was how three other police officers could stand by and allow, or not intervene to prevent, a fellow officer from participating in behavior that resulted in someone being killed when the suspect offered no resistance. The purpose of the study was to gather the first-hand, real-world perspectives of police officers. The study offered an in-depth examination of police culture from across a multi-tiered, systems-wide perspective as presented by the extensive literature review. The study was conducted within a medium-sized police agency in South Texas.

The study utilized three theories, critical race theory, social identity theory, and shared leadership theory, and was based on three research questions: RQ1 – Does implicit bias influence police patrol officers' use of excessive force or deadly force when interacting with African American community members?; RQ2 – Does the police socialization process prioritize "fitting in and following orders" and the blue wall of silence above police patrol officers exercising proactive judgment and decision-making skills?; and RQ3 – Does your police agency provide opportunities for and support police patrol officers' leadership development?

Based on the responses to the three research questions, from the perspectives of the police officers involved in the study, implicit bias does not influence police officers' use of excessive force or deadly force. Instead, a police officer will respond and take the necessary

corrective actions based on and in response to the suspect's actions or behavior, and race or ethnicity is not a contributing factor in police officers' response(s). All officers are expected to comply with training requirements and procedures, the police agency's standards, and the senior leader's written ethics policy. All officers are held accountable for their choices when those choices violate agency policy or procedures. The four police officers involved in the death of George Floyd exhibited poor training, violations of standard operating police procedures, manifested a toxic organizational culture, and exemplified ineffective leadership at the individual, team or group level, and among senior leadership.

The police socialization process does not prioritize "fitting in and following orders," nor does the blue wall of silence affect police officers' judgment or decision-making skills. Officers are trained too and are expected to make independent decisions for themselves based on their training and leadership development. Officers are trained too and are expected to always do the right thing because it is the right thing to do. The blue wall of silence is not an issue within the organization. Prior to participating it the study, four of the officers had never heard the phrase the "blue wall of silence."

The study participants stated their police senior leader prioritizes continuous technical training and leadership training and development as hallmarks of the agency. Continuous and extensive training is the proactive tool with which the senior leader ensures the officers remain well prepared for their duties and assignments as well as being prepared for leadership positions. The 13study participants expressed they consider themselves to be a leader within the agency due to their positional authority, and the officers receive extensive leadership training. The police agency has become a deliberate developmental organization (Kegan & Lahey, 2016) and a learning organization (Senge, 2006). The senior leader, the police chief, sets the standard by

voluntarily completing Police Chief School every 2 years, thereby exemplifying Peter Senge's quotation, "Organizations learn only through individuals who learn. Individual learning does not guarantee organizational learning. But without it no organizational learning occurs" (2006, p. 129).

As a final note, the police officers that participated in the study, after overcoming some initial hesitation, opened up to me and expressed their views and perspectives on George Floyd's death by the four former Minneapolis police officers that were involved in the incident. Several of the officers expressed their thanks, saying they were appreciative that someone wanted to hear and listen to what real-world police officers wanted to convey. The officers shared that, traditionally, most police research involves only the senior leader in a police agency but often the senior leader is removed from day-to-day police patrol operations. Real-world police patrol officers may benefit from having more opportunities to communicate their views by offering input, and critical and constructive feedback toward achieving corporate operational effectiveness.

In his book *Change or Die*, Alan Deutschman (2007) discussed change management principles in transitioning an organization's culture from traditional authoritarian, top-down leadership, and management practices where lower-level power-based employees have minimum voice and input in leadership and management functions, and where managers do not care about what employees think. Instead, Deutschman proposed employees may be "motivated by the desire to do a job that enhances his self-worth and earns the respect of other workers" and "where an employer values the employee's input," which are congruent with positive elements of social identity theory (Hogg, 2001; Hogg et al., 2012) and shared leadership theory (Northouse, 2019; Steinheider & Wuestewald, 2008; Wuestewald & Steinheider, 2012). For police or law

enforcement senior leaders that are interested in reforming their police agency's culture, implementing elements of shared leadership theory may be a viable option.

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Appendix A: Abilene Christian University Institutional Review Board Approval

Date: 1-4-2023

IRB #: IRB-2022-142
Title: Police Officers' Perspectives on the Death of George Floyd by Minneapolis Police Officers: A Descriptive Study
Creation Date: 12-16-2022
End Date:
Status: Approved
Principal Investigator: Janet Henderson
Review Board: ACU IRB
Sponsor:

Study History

Submission Type	Review Type	Decision
Initial	Exempt	Exempt - Limited IRB

Key Study Contacts

Appendix B: Participation Recruitment Flier

Photograph of police paraphernalia. Photograph retrieved from the public domain.

Announcement: Research Study to Assess Police/Patrol Officers' Perspectives on Police Leadership

As a police patrol officer, what are your perspectives on police leadership in general and within your police organization? Abilene Christian University offers an opportunity for you to participate in a research study on police leadership. The study is part of a doctoral program (Ed.D.) in organizational leadership.

The research seeks to generate insight from the eyes and ears of real-world police patrol officers that have first-hand knowledge of a phenomenon. The phenomenon being studied is the death of George Floyd on May 25, 2020, by four (former) Minneapolis police patrol officers.

The study focuses on the incident from a police leadership perspective. The study addresses police implicit bias in using excessive force or deadly force, police organizational culture including socialization and the blue wall of silence, and police patrol officers' perspectives of leadership within your police agency.

Study participants are field training officers (FTOs) and police/patrol officers. Police/patrol officers are currently assigned patrol officers and officers that periodically serve as patrol officers. The participation goal is 8-12 participants. The police chief has authorized police personnel to participate in the study. The timeframe to participate in the study is 15 working days or 3 weeks.

The study uses a questionnaire with 16 written**,** open-ended questions. The questionnaire should take 30-45 minutes to complete. Your participation ***will not*** be audio recorded or video recorded. The researcher ***will not*** record participant's names. Study participants will be recorded through a number/code pseudonym known only by the researcher.

Participation is voluntary. You may stop participating in the study at any time without penalty.

Participation is confidential. The researcher and each study participant will jointly make confidential arrangements for the participant to complete the questionnaire at the participant's convenience. ***Only*** the researcher will see the completed questionnaires and the raw data. The researcher will secure and protect the completed questionnaires.

Your complete honesty is requested. Study participants will not be judged or criticized for their perspectives.

For more information and/or to participate in the study, contact the researcher, Janet Henderson, directly via her cell phone, (xxx) xxx-xxxx.

Thank you for your consideration and participation.

Appendix C: Consent Form

You may be able to take part in a research study. This form provides important information about that study, including the risks and benefits to you as a potential participant.

Please read this form carefully and ask the researcher any questions that you may have about the study. You can ask about research activities and any risks or benefits you may experience. You may also wish to discuss your participation with other people, such as your family doctor or a family member.

Your participation in this research is entirely voluntary. You may refuse to participate or stop your participation at any time and for any reason without any penalty or loss of benefits to which you are otherwise entitled.

PURPOSE AND DESCRIPTION: The purpose of the study is to describe the circumstances, systems processes, organizational culture, and police leadership practices that resulted in George Floyd's death by four (former) Minneapolis police patrol officers on May 25, 2020. The study provides police patrol officers and FTOs an opportunity to provide first-hand perspectives of police leadership from police patrol officers that have real-world knowledge of policing.

If selected for participation, you will be asked to attend one (1) visit with the study staff over the course of one (1) day. The visit is expected to take approximately 30 minutes. During the course of the visit, you will be asked to participate in the following procedures: Complete a questionnaire that contains 16 open-ended questions.

RISKS & BENEFITS: There are risks to taking part in this research study. Below is a list of the foreseeable risks, including the seriousness of those risks and how likely they are to occur:
The subject matter discussed in the study may be sensitive for some police patrol officers and may create strong emotions or feelings in the participant, such as anger, bitterness, or resentment. Because of these strong emotions, some prospective participants may choose to not participate in the study or may decide to not complete the study. The risks are likely but are notserious. In spite of some officers' possible strong emotions, officers may still choose to participate in the study.

Another risk is the possibility of a loss of confidentiality. Due to the small size of the town, participants may be seen by others in the agency. The risk is less likely but not serious.
There are potential benefits to participating in this study. Such benefits may include police patrol officers and field training officers having an opportunity to express their perspectives, views, and perceptions of police leadership. The study provides police patrol officers an opportunity to self-assess their leadership and decision-making skills during challenging and difficult events.

There are benefits to science and society. Research that explores police patrol officers' perspectives on police leadership is limited. The first-hand views of real-world police patrol officers may be helpful in developing changes and reform initiatives within police agencies. Senior police leaders that read the completed study may possibly use the research for initiating change(s) in police leadership and police organizational culture.

The researchers cannot guarantee that you will experience any personal benefits from participating in this study.

PRIVACY & CONFIDENTIALITY: Any information you provide will be confidential to the extent allowable by law. Some identifiable data may have to be shared with individuals outside of the study team, such as members of the ACU Institutional Review Board. Otherwise, your confidentiality will be protected by not collecting the name or any identifiable information on any participant. Participants will be tracked by using an alphanumeric/number code that is created by the researcher. Demographic data will be collected only for descriptive statistics.

CONTACTS: If you have questions about the research study, the lead researcher is Janet Henderson, doctoral student at Abilene Christian University (ACU) and may be contacted at cell phone # (xxx) xxx-xxxxor email xxxxxxxxx@gmail.com. If you are unable to reach the lead researcher, or wish to speak to someone other than the lead researcher, you may contact Katrina Kelly, Student Advisor, at (xxx) xxx-xxxx or xxxxxx@acu.edu.

If you have concerns about this study, believe you may have been injured because of this study, or have general questions about your rights as a research participant, you may contact *Qi Hang, ACU's Executive Director of Research, at* xxxxx@acu.edu.

Additional Information

The expected number of participants to be enrolled in the study is 8-12.

Consent Signature Section

Please sign this form if you voluntarily agree to participate in this study. Sign only after you have read all of the information provided and your questions have been answered to your satisfaction. You should receive a copy of this signed consent form. You do not waive any legal rights by signing this form.

_____	_____	_____
Printed Name of Participant	Signature of Participant	Date
_____	_____	_____
Printed Name of Person Obtaining Consent	Signature of Person Obtaining Consent	Date

Appendix D: Questionnaire

Table 2. The Death of George Floyd Descriptive Study Questionnaire

Part 1. Demographic Data

Demographic data are collected to ensure that subjects participating in the questionnaire meet the minimum requirements.

Position type: ☐ Field Training Officer ☐ Police Patrol Officer

Race/ethnicity: ☐ Black (non-Hispanic) ☐ White ☐ Hispanic ☐ Asian/Other

Gender: ☐ Male ☐ Female ☐ Highest level of education ☐ Number of years of law enforcement service

Part 2. Questionnaire Questions

1. How often or do you periodically question your racial stereotypes and implicit bias?

2. Have you used or would you use excessive force or deadly force against someone based on the person's race or ethnic group?

3. As the Field Training Officer (FTO) that is responsible for upholding and abiding by police department standards, would you intentionally violate established policies, procedures, and guidelines for using excessive force or deadly force against anyone?

4. Would you speak up and intervene to prevent a fellow patrol officer from using unnecessary force, excessive force, or deadly force against someone, even if the person using the unnecessary force, excessive force or deadly force is senior to you in rank or position, such as an FTO or a senior officer?

5. Have you received formal training in techniques on *how to intervene* during an incident of unnecessary force, excessive force, or deadly force, such as bystander intervention training?

6. How does the law enforcement “blue wall of silence” influence your decision-making processes?

7. What would you do in a situation that involves using excessive force where your FTO or supervisor directed you to do something that you knew violated organizational written policy or procedure?

8. If a patrol officer (Officer A) spoke up, took a stand, intervened to prevent other officers from violating a policy, and encouraged others to do the right thing, would you lose respect for and trust in the officer (Officer A)?

9. Does the fear of retaliation or backlash from other patrol officers or leaders result in you not speaking up when you know you should intervene to prevent or to report a serious policy infraction(s) (e.g., police misconduct, the use of excessive force or deadly force, or other violation(s)?

10. Do you feel the George Floyd incident would have been handled differently if George Floyd had been White (e.g., patrol officer(s) employing intervention to prevent other officers’ excessive force or deadly force, or providing medical assistance)?

11. If you had been involved in the incident, as a police patrol officer, what would you have done differently to prevent George Floyd’s death?

12. Do you think George Floyd’s death at the hands of the four Minneapolis police patrol officers was a failure of leadership? Why or why not? If yes, at which level was the leadership failure; individual, teams, organizational, a combination of more than one or all parameters? (Please explain)

13. Do you consider yourself to be a leader? Why or why not?

14. Does your police organization offer opportunities for your leadership development?

15. Have you received any leadership training as a police patrol officer or FTO? How would leadership training would benefit you as a police patrol officer or FTO?

16. Additional comments (optional):

Please ensure your responses are legible and easily understood. Place the completed survey in the large envelope provided, seal the envelope, and give the sealed envelope to the author.

Thank you for participating in the survey. Again, your participation is anonymous, and your responses will remain confidential.

Appendix E: Participants' Transcribed Questionnaire Results

1. **How often or do you periodically question your racial stereotypes and implicit bias?**

"I rarely question my racial stereotypes and implicit bias because I try and treat everyone equal. A guy wearing a suit can kill someone just like a person wearing baggy pants and a hoody."

"Usually on a daily basis depending on what types of calls we get and how best to handle them."

"I find that it has become an issue more now than it was when I began my law enforcement career in 1993. I had the issue of Rodney King when I started my police academy and it seemed to center on racial profiling as it was carried out by law enforcement and introduced the inception of racial profiling legislature and training for newer officers. Now, with the George Floyd incident, it seems that basing a stop or almost any encounter on racial stereotypes can be assumed by a lot in the public. I do not believe that the implicit bias is a great issue as I only deal with the school-based law enforcement aspect now and it does not present itself in that environment very often."

"I check-in with myself semi-frequently so I can ensure I am treating everyone fairly."

"For myself, I do not consider racial stereotypes or implicit bias. I treat everyone the same regardless of race, creed, color, or religion."

"I do not feel like I have internal dialogue when it comes to these two topics. Generally speaking, I make decisions based off the information presented to me at that specific point in time."

"Rarely, due to living in a small town. You get to know the community & know who is involved in the good & bad."

"Not at all."

"I question myself periodically about my stereotypes and implicit bias because I do worry that I will start veering in that direction without recognizing it. By periodically, I can't say a specific time frame, but I would venture to say at least every few months."

"Not often. I am not particularly introspective."

"This is a tough question to provide a response. I believe that there are in general stereotypes among race, religion, culture and about every aspect of life. One can fit into many different categories" if one is wanting to describe stereotypes. I believe that you can recognize stereotypes of people, from any category, but that does not tell you who the person is. I understand that I see stereotypes, and at times there is a different response to people that is based on those stereotypes. These actions are often due to previous knowledge and experience. For example, if a subject is hanging around with three other people and in the past I have found each of the other three with a weapon, I am stereotyping that he may have a gun, and I am going to have a more safety conscious response. Race in and of itself has nothing to do with this stereotype. I do not question my racial stereotypes or implicit bias because I know that any stereotypes that I may see are based on the totality of the circumstances, and not based on race or bias."

"Very, very seldom. After 32 years, I know character far outreaches race. I simply don't care what race anyone is."

"Almost never."

2. Have you used or would you use excessive force or deadly force against someone based on the person's race or ethnic group?

"Never."

"No."

"No."

"No."

"I would not nor have I ever used excessive force or deadly force against someone based on their race or ethnicity in my career. I came from a poor family and was part of a minority group as well so I often saw and felt law enforcement could be biased against someone just due to their skin color or where they were raised."

"Absolutely not, primarily because if goes against my morals as a human being and a Christian."

"I have not used excessive force or deadly force based on a person's race or ethnic group. When it comes to this career and the daily calls for service we respond to, we act on information given by the reporting person or by what we observe in field (making traffic stops for violations or consensual/investigative stops based on reasonable suspicion). Each of these routine or daily encounters are fluid and can change in a matter of seconds, forcing us to make decisions on what we believe was the correct thing to do at that point in time."

"No, I would not because one's race or ethnic background should not define them as a criminal. Criminals come in all races."

"I have not and would not use excessive force or deadly force against anyone based on the person's race or ethnic group. I have not had to use excessive force or deadly force against anyone thus far in my law enforcement career though."

"Never. The use of force, especially deadly force, is clearly outlined in Chapter 9 of the Penal Code. Neither race, ethnicity, gender, religion, or sexual preference should ever be considered in the use of force."

"Absolutely not. The use of force is based on the actions of the suspect and that alone."

"I have never used any type of force on anyone based on race. Use of force is not my decision. It is the actor's decision and choices that cause me to have to use force to protect myself, them, or

someone else."

"Absolutely not."

3. As the Field Training Officer (FTO) that is responsible for upholding and abiding by police department standards, would you intentionally violate established policies, procedures, and guidelines for using excessive force or deadly force against anyone?

"No."

"No."

"No."

"I have been an FTO in this department and in other agencies and would not violate any of the departmental policies, procedures, and guidelines for using force or deadly force when it came to having to deal with anyone, no matter that person's skin color or ethnicity. I believe and have taught those under my watch that we should treat those we encounter in the way we would want our parents or relatives treated if ever encountered by law enforcement."

"I would not intentionally violate policies/procedures. They are specifically put in place to help us do our job. Our Chief has a "golden rule" that we follow, which allows us to make our own decisions as long as we can defend them to our peers, the community, and ourselves. There are set guidelines, but we have the ability to ultimately make our own choices as well."

"No. As an FTO or Instructor, it is my job to train and equip officers with the highest level of education and mold them to be good stewards to the community. Furthermore, in a role as an Instructor and FTO, I hold myself to an even higher standard to be a good role model to our younger officers."

"No. I am a very firm believer in body-worn cameras and their ability to keep both patrol officers and the citizens we interact with safe. With that being said, if an accusation of excessive force is

presented, then the complaint is taken and it is reviewed by several individuals above the officer that is being complained on. If there is an issue with the amount of force used, then it is documented and handled according to our policy guidelines. Policies are a guideline when it comes to certain areas and many of them are subject to the reasonableness standard."

4. Would you speak up and intervene to prevent a fellow patrol officer from using unnecessary force, excessive force, or deadly force against someone, even if the person using the unnecessary force, excessive force or deadly force is senior to you in rank or position, such as an FTO or a senior officer?

"I would step in to stop a senior officer. No person deserves to be mistreated. I refuse to jeopardize my career for anyone."

"It is a duty of the officers to intervene and we receive training in this particular area. It may be difficult to confront a senior officer but the end result will be better for the intervening officer both politically and for their career."

"I would step in and intervene to stop a fellow officer that I believed was about to or was using that type of force that was unnecessary even if he was senior or my supervisor. I have intervened in calls while employed here and in other departments where I believed an officer was becoming too heated or was taking the situation too personal."

"Yes, of course. Our department supports each other, and sometimes that means stepping in when tensions or adrenaline run high."

"Absolutely. I have done so in the past on a senior officer who used excessive force. That officer is no longer employed as a law enforcement officer."

"I would. My moral compass and ethics dictate that I do so."

"Yes, because in the law enforcement field we say we are our brother's keeper, meaning we need to look out for each other & make sure we do what's right."

"Yes."

"Most definitely I would intervene. We are encouraged to speak up if we don't feel like something is being handled correctly. When staff begins in-field training, I take it upon myself to tell them, "If you have questions about anything you see or hear, or you are not comfortable with the way a situation was handled, please come talk to me."

"Yes. I have intervened in the past and would do so again."

"I have been in the position a couple of times in my career where a situation was not to the point of excessive force, but was escalating and I have stepped into the situation. These incidents happened while I was a Sergeant, and the officers were those under my command. I can say that I would have no issues stepping in on a situation on somebody more senior than me. I think that falls on the culture of the department to instill the ideas that you should always do what is right no matter what. I can see in many places where a line officer would be hesitant to step in when it was a senior officer, but that is not the mentality and what we preach in my department. I have zero doubt that any officer under my command would step up and intervene if I was getting out of hand, but that is a bond that we have. The officer that steps up could be not only helping the subject but also saving that officer's career. In law enforcement there are those calls that get under your skin, and sometimes you have to tag out or get tagged out by another."

"Not only would I, I have. Incidentally, it was not race based."

"Yes. I would prevent the unlawful use of any force regardless of rank or my position."

5. Have you received formal training in techniques on *how to intervene* during an incident of unnecessary force, excessive force, or deadly force, such as bystander intervention

training?

“I have received formal training in a class called “Duty to Intervene.”

“Yes, we get a class on the “Duty to Intervene.” It is a good class and helps the officers pre-plan for a situation where they may have to intervene with a senior or equal officer.”

“The only training which I can actually call upon has been training provided by the department and surrounding agencies on how to deal with these types of situations. I would take it upon myself to act if I felt the moment called for it in order to prevent someone being injured or killed by unnecessary use of force.”

“Yes.”

“Yes.”

“Yes.”

“Yes.”

“I have not been to a course, nor have I heard of any such course. To be honest, most of the training we do has a lot to do with ethics, but it would be a good idea moving forward to create such a course.”

“Yes, I have. I have been to a training called Duty to Intervene.”

“Yes, we have had training on how to intervene and when it is necessary to do so.”

“I have not personally attended Duty to Intervene courses. They have been offered through our agency.”

“As the Training Coordinator for the department, I brought in two classes this month [January 2023] that covers intervention and the duty to intervene. Most of the department attended those training classes. Sadly, this is not the case in most other departments.”

"Yes. The Duty to Intervene class is an approved TCOLE [Texas Commission on Law Enforcement] class that details this exactly."

6. How does the law enforcement "blue wall of silence" influence your decision-making processes?

"Blue wall of silence does not mean shit to me. What's right is right. What's wrong is wrong."

"If I said there was not a culture of helping fellow officers then I would be lying, but the severity is not what it used to be. There has been a push in training and hiring practices in order to change the culture and it is working."

"I have stepped forward in some occasions and have been labeled as "too nice" when I began my career, as I had sympathy for those we dealt with. And, I also may have hurt my chance to "move up the ladder" for being too truthful when it came to certain circumstances."

"I haven't heard that term before, but if it implies LEOs don't talk to officers who intervene, then that wouldn't influence me at all. I don't have to care what others think of me. I have to make sure I can live with my own decisions and personal ethics."

"I have never heard of the blue wall of silence, I suspect mostly because such a thing is highly unethical. We strive for a high ethical standard within my agency, where it is also encouraged to speak up if you see an officer policing in an unethical manner."

> I have never heard of the 'blue wall of silence' so I cannot speak on this topic. I'm assuming this is something with 'because we are on the same team we have to have each other's backs.' I thoroughly enjoy my job and do not want anything that will make it harder in the long run. If I can help weed out bad officers to protect my job and make our view in the eye of the public better, then I would.

“It does not influence me at all. If I see someone doing wrong I will intervene. If not, it just makes me as wrong as the other [person].”

“Not at all.”

“I have never heard the phrase “Blue Wall of Silence” but in reference to me personally, withholding information that I know to be illegal or unethical, I would never agree to do so. I have proven that over and over again. I wouldn’t say I am a “snitch” but I know that others know that I will not tolerate such behavior and I am more than willing to tell others when necessary.”“Admittedly, it does give one pause. There is the fear of being blacklisted for speaking out. Even if the agency involved doesn’t “put the word out,” other local agencies will know and speaking out MAY cost you your career.”

“When I started law enforcement 17 years ago there was a culture of the blue wall of silence, to a certain point. Over the last decade I really have not experienced anything like that. We all realize that one black eye for law enforcement anywhere is a black eye for law enforcement everywhere. I think I can speak for almost all the officers I know in saying that nobody hates a bad cop, like a good cop.”

“It does not. My integrity guides me.”

“I think my personal experience with this is not what I would call the “wall.” My expectation and experiences are context-based and without all of the context, I will withhold most judgments.”

7. What would you do in a situation that involves using excessive force where your FTO or supervisor directed you to do something that you knew violated organizational written policy or procedure?

“If it is not a lawful order then I would disobey and handle the consequences with my attorney.”

“If I was told to violate policy it would have to be in order to save or preserve life. I do not have a duty to follow an unlawful order.”

“I would not use unnecessary force in any situation, especially if it violated my organization’s written policy or procedures.”

“I would weigh all aspects of the situation and make my own choices.”

“I would respectfully disobey the order and explain why the order would be illegal or unethical. At the end of the day, I’m not a robot and very capable of making my own sound and ethical decisions.”

“We are responsible for our own actions. Fortunately, I have not been placed in one of these situations so it is hard to speak without being placed in that position. Everyone will tell you up front that they would not do so but there is always the pressure from your FTO or supervisor that may overpower your gut instinct.”

“I would not do what is told if it violated policy even if directed by a supervisor. That puts my job on the line.”

“I wouldn’t complete the task directed if I knew it violated policy. I know without a shadow of doubt that I would be supported in my decision not to violate policy by my superiors.”

“Personally, I would refuse. The same can’t be said for a younger, more impressionable officer.”

“The action would not be taken unless it was a lawful order. If an order is given that violates policy, then generally it is still a valid order. If we are referencing using excessive force, that is a criminal violation, therefore an unlawful order and I would intervene as necessary and report the action.”

“I would consider that an unlawful order and refuse.”

"The organizations should have a policy that involves this scenario, but personally the situation would be handled the same way as any other potentially violent action, with the de-escalation tactics."

8. If a patrol officer (Officer A) spoke up, took a stand, intervened to prevent other officers from violating a policy, and encouraged others to do the right thing, would you lose respect for and trust in the officer (Officer A)?

"No because I expect officers to do the right thing when no one is looking. Nobody is above the law."

"I would not. In fact, I would applaud that officer and use him/her as an example to other officers."

"I would not lose anything for the officer if he did the right thing and I would expect any officer to do that in any situation. I believe I would have greater trust and respect for that officer for having the courage to do what is right."

"No, I would gain respect for them."

"I would have a much greater respect for the officer because it takes a great deal of intestinal fortitude to do so. And I would do everything in my power, including becoming a whistleblower, to ensure that officer is not retaliated against."

"No. Trust and respect would be higher and I would look up to that person as a leader."

"I would not because he is looking out for his peers & their livelihood."

"No."

"No."

"Not at all. It takes a "big" person to be able to stand up to others. Officer A would have definitely earned my trust and respect."

"I would not. Quite the contrary, I would gain respect and trust for that officer."

"Absolutely not, respect would be gained."

"Not at all. My most favored ability for law enforcement is the ability to freeze most scenes and gather information."

9. Does the fear of retaliation or backlash from other patrol officers or leaders result in you not speaking up when you know you should intervene to prevent or to report a serious policy infraction(s) (e.g., police misconduct, the use of excessive force or deadly force, or other violation(s)?

"No, because I refuse to tarnish my name."

"There is always the fear of retaliation, but that would not stop me or anyone I train to step up to do the right thing. This department encourages officers to be individual thinkers and will place blame where it belongs, on the wrong doer."

"I am a Sergeant in a department that has a lot of young police officers. I do not fear the backlash or retaliation for doing the right thing as I believe this only shows great honesty and integrity."

"No. As previously stated, my morals and ethics outweigh me caring what others think. Also, there is no retaliation in my opinion at my department."

"No. It takes a lot to scare me. I know I would have a great deal of community support if I was ever retaliated against."

"I am the kind of person that genuinely has no filter, regardless of being in a room full of peers, subordinates, or supervisors. Just recently I pushed against management about a possible policy violation with working excessive hours. The issue is having to work a full 12-hour shift on nights (6p-6a) and then having to attend training at 8 am for eight hours."

"Being in a small department it does not because we all are a close family."

"No."

"No."

"No."

"Not at all. I don't fear retaliation or backlash from others. Maybe it is my age or my personality, but I truly feel like as long as I know that what I am doing is right and ethical, I will be fine in my decision. If people don't trust or respect me for doing what is right, they aren't the people I want to be associated with anyways."

"Nothing prevents me from speaking up."

"I have not experienced this personally, but I would like to believe it would not."

10. Do you feel the George Floyd incident would have been handled differently if George Floyd had been White (e.g., patrol officer(s) employing intervention to prevent other officers' excessive force or deadly force, or providing medical assistance)?

"I do not believe so. The officers involved clearly lacked training."

"I really don't think race had a lot to do with it. I took the officers' lack of action due to a failure to train and may have been somewhat career apathy and a lack of respect for the suspect."

"I feel there were a lot of factors that lead to that incident, and it has to be taken apart issue by issue, but I honestly do not feel that the incident would have been different or had a different outcome if the subject had been White."

"Personally, no."

"This is a hard question to answer, because I do not know what was going through the officer's head. I do not believe that the George Floyd event was racially motivated. I believe this occurred due to a lack of training and inexperience mixed with [a] lack of proper supervision."

"I do not feel like the incident would have turned out any differently. I feel the officers involved were doing what they felt necessary and were trained to do at that specific moment in time. We have had several incidents where similar force and/or "holds" have been used to gain compliance from the individuals. As soon as compliance is gained, then your use of force continuum de-escalates. If there is any complaint of pain from the individual, then Emergency Medical Services are immediately contacted and requested to respond."

"I don't think it would have changed the outcome. I would want to think the officers were acting that way due to erratic behavior."

"No. If Floyd had complied with officers the situation could have been avoided. Other officers failed him."

"Truly, I don't know if it would have been handled differently if he was White. I feel I can positively say that I don't think our department would have handled it that way at all, despite Black or White. I think it most likely would have been handled the same."

"No. There are many things going on in the George Floyd case. Officers conducted themselves poorly, but in reality, it was bad optics. There may have been "contact fatigue" with Floyd, which can happen with ANY repeat offender."

"There were clearly issues with the handling of this incident which is a problem with training, skills, and culture, but I honestly do not believe that this situation would have been any different if he had been a different race. It just would not have received the media attention had he been a different race."

"No."

"I do not believe the outcome would have been different but the aftereffects would have been."

11. If you had been involved in the incident, as a police patrol officer, what would you have done differently to prevent George Floyd's death?

"I would have handled the situation differently by utilizing different defensive tactics or less than lethal weapons (i.e., Taser, pepper spray).

"Once he was restrained properly, he would have [been] placed in a "recovery" position, seated, with [sic] head up. Once medical issues were identified, I would get medical on scene to check him out as soon as possible. If he continued to fight, we would have placed him in the WRAP, a type of swaddling restraint device that keeps the suspect in a seated position."

"I would have made sure he was handcuffed properly, then would have started getting officers off of him, and then would have moved him into a seated or side position which would have made it easier for him to breathe. It is sometimes easier to move an arrested subject into a more comfortable position and then have them calm down easier."

"George Floyd died due to his ingestion of illegal substances, so there isn't anything I could have done to directly prevent that. I would have, however, moved him to a comfortable position and called for EMS."

"I would have realized that George Floyd was having a mental health crisis, or possibly even excited delirium. I realize he was not an immediate danger to anyone else when officers made contact with him. I would have attempted to deescalate the situation and would have had a plan and EMS on standby."

"I would have acted in line with my ethics and training. The whole idea is to gain compliance until that person is no longer a threat to you or the general public. Once that is accomplished, then force starts to de-escalate."

“I would have told the officer to move his knee placement & if he did not agree I would pull him off & sit George Floyd upright. The officers with Gorge Floyd took it personal. They never transitioned into seeing George Floyd as a human being. They could not separate the human being from the offense.”

“I would have placed Floyd in a secure location where his airway was not obstructed and where a medical evaluation could have been done.”

“I would have tried to help gain control of the suspect in a different manner and potentially even physically pushed the primary officer off of the suspect once control was gained.”

“I would have spoken with George as soon as his respiratory distress was evident (which it was) and placed him in a position that was more comfortable for him. Floyd had ingested both methamphetamine, which increases heart rate and [a] fatal amount of fentanyl, which suppresses lung function. The only thing that may have saved him was medical intervention by EMS, which had been called to the scene.”

“As previously stated, I did not agree with the handling, however, I do not feel that officers caused his death. Current training would not have allowed him to be in this position for so long, would have allowed medical intervention, and steps could have been taken to secure him in the vehicle.”

“Reminded the officer of proper recovery techniques, until the problem was resolved.”

“People in handcuffs should be removed from their stomachs quickly. I would have provided CPR.”

12. Do you think George Floyd’s death at the hands of the four Minneapolis police patrol officers was a failure of leadership? Why or why not? If yes, at which level was the

leadership failure; individual, teams, organizational, a combination of more than one or all parameters? (Please explain)

"Considering the size of the police department, I could not blame leadership for a few bad apples' mistakes. Perhaps they need more specialized training of defensive tactics and use of force."

"This is a difficult question to answer because I do not have enough information or experience with the department. The departments I have worked with do not allow this type of restraint to begin with and promote officers taking care of other officers. What I mean by that is if another officer sees that I am getting too emotional, they would step in to take over and give me time to collect myself to be able to handle the situation professionally. This has happened to me before and I have done this for other officers before. It is a way of looking out for them instead of covering up when something goes wrong; we can catch it before it gets bad. I would say that the failure (based on my limited knowledge of the department) was at the first-line supervisory level, the senior officer or sergeant on scene."

"It seems to me that it was due in part to the failure of leadership of the senior officers on the scene and the failure to train the new officers on how to deal with these types of situations. It also could be a failure to train in part by the department that has a responsibility to educate their officers on their duty to intervene. I believe we all have a duty to teach those below us on how to properly perform our jobs as well as the combination of how to deal with unruly prisoners and their duty to act."

"I don't think it was directly caused by those officers, but I think they could have done things differently (such as seeking medical attention) to prevent or possibly counteract death as a result of the chemicals in his system."

“Yes. From the Chief down, I believe people were put in bad situations by not having good supervision and [a] lack of progressive leadership.”

“I do not believe his death was caused explicitly by the actions of the officers. It is without any doubt that the combination of substances in George’s body only exacerbated the poor decisions made by those officers at that time. I do believe there was a failure of leadership on an individual level. I believe any of the other three Officers could have taken a leadership role and removed Derek Chauvin and removed him from the situation. He could have been placed in another role such as crowd management or removed from the situation entirely.”

“Yes and no. Yes, because I think they knew it was wrong but were scared to step up and no because George Floyd did ingest drugs in a large amount that officers did not know about at first.”

“I think it was a team failure and a lack of training.”

“I do think his death is a failure of leadership within the individual, but more so amongst the team, and somewhat on the organizational leadership. The individual should have been able to use self-restraint and recognized what he was doing. The team should have been able to stand up and stop him and find alternative solutions, and the organizational leadership should have set a standard that would never have tolerated that.”

“This is hard to say without being privy to the work environment. This WAS a failure of Derek Chauvin (individual), as a senior officer and a field training officer. [H]e should have realized what his junior officers were attempting to bring to his attention.”

“This incident is a combination of failures. The biggest failure, as you can see from [the] video, is that you had four officers that had no idea what to do next. This is a training issue and sadly officers in many departments do not get the appropriate level of training that they need. I see this

as a leadership issue because they are not ensuring that the officers are being trained and know how to handle themselves."

"Yes. There is definitely a toxic culture there. Organizational but the organization is lead by the top."

"Yes. Baseline supervisors should have taken control of the situation and known better than to keep a hand-cuffed subject in positional asphyxiation positions. The policies have failed apparently multiple times and were never reviewed for changes to prevent future failures, so the policy maker is where the leadership ladder failure begins."

13. Do you consider yourself to be a leader? Why or why not?

"Yes because I try to lead by example. I support my officers in anything they need whether it's on the job or personal issues."

"I do consider myself a leader as a sergeant in this department. I am also the FTO Coordinator. It is my job to monitor the FTOs and make sure the right message is being sent to the new hires. Essentially, the FTOs shape the future of the department and that is an immense responsibility."

"I do consider myself a leader as I do have the time and experience in law enforcement, but I do try to lead by example as well as teaching those coming up that we all have the responsibility to do the right thing no matter sometimes who it may affect."

"Yes. I lead by example. I always try to make the best decisions I can, and push others to do the same."

"Yes. I'm constantly striving for change and reevaluating our tactics as [a] whole for law enforcement and trying to influence change within law enforcement at the local level."

"I do consider myself a leader based on my ability to communicate both with my subordinates and people above me. It's important to have a good line of communication between the two so

issues on either side do not fall upon deaf ears. Being able to make tough decisions on the fly that are in line with department policy and the law are also required of a front-line supervisor."

"To an extent due to me trying to show people what's right but being new to the department, many have more years [experience] than I do."

"Yes. I try to set myself as an example to new officers. I attend continuous training to further expand my knowledge and seek out alternative ways of handling difficult situations."

"I do consider myself to be a leader. I am willing to stand up for things I believe in and stand up to people that I feel like need it, even if I am standing alone."

"I do. I have a willingness to make a decision and stand by that decision, even if it is unpopular."

"Yes. Although I am a leader by title, I started in law enforcement with the focus on making a difference. My focus later turned to always trying to move the department and our officers forward."

"Yes. I have been a supervisor for 20 years."

"I do believe that there are certain aspects that other officers look to me to make decisions, but I do not consider myself a leader."

14. Does your police organization offer opportunities for your leadership development?

"Yes, they do as they are constantly sending us to leadership training."

"Our department does offer a lot of training. Officers need only to show a dedication to the field they want to take. I have been sent to a command staff level training in Huntsville [Texas]. This is expensive training for a week, but this department sent me when this type of training is usually designed for captains and above."

"I have been sent to the State of Texas Instructor Course in Law Enforcement in order to teach our officers classes related to emergency driving and legal aspects and updates. I have also been

to a supervisory school in order to learn aspects of being a first-line supervisor as well as being the SRO Sergeant in our department."

"Yes. We go to a lot of training, and my department actually offers a tuition repayment program (which is what allows me to attend college)."

"Yes. We are provided with leadership development courses, and leadership training through LEMIT [**Law Enforcement** Management Institute of Texas]."

"Our department is known for providing a substantial amount of training to patrol officers. Although our department is small and our demographic count is relatively low, we provide training to neighboring departments and have had officers attend from all over the State of Texas. Opportunities will sometimes arise for patrol officers to become a temporary shift supervisor and will be responsible for a majority of the duties the patrol sergeant would normally encounter. This provides an opportunity to gauge a person's ability to lead and perform in those stressful situations."

"They do. [Name of organization] provides a vast amount of training, as well as sending you to train and prepare for that role."

"Leadership classes as well as training opportunities."

"Yes, I believe we offer lots of opportunities to develop into leaders. We offer training and send people off to all kinds of training to make them an expert on various things with the hopes that they then can pass on their knowledge to others. We also value and promote leadership opportunities within the department, even at the front-line level. An example of that would be the CIT Team that [an officer] has implemented."

"Yes. Our department has embraced the value of training. Our administration words hard to ensure that training is made available to any that wish it."

"Yes. I started off in the department as a police explorer at the age of 14. As soon as I graduated high school I was hired as a dispatcher, then promoted to supervisor. The department then allowed me to attend the police academy and I have worked up through the ranks to a Captain and the training coordinator. I try to instill great pride in being a police officer and I am constantly encouraging our officers to grow in everything from the peace officer license level to going to college."

"Yes. We encourage everyone to live up to their best potential. Everyone is a leader, just at different levels."

"Absolutely. Our agency is very training focused. We attended classes that are instrumental in building and developing officers in general. These classes are not required by TCOLE but our department is very training-heavy and makes them available."

15. Have you received any leadership training as a police patrol officer or FTO? How would leadership training benefit you as a police patrol officer or FTO?

"Yes, I have received leadership training. The training opened my eyes to dealing with personnel issues and molding officers into well-rounded, trained officers."

"The FTO class is a leadership class in itself. As stated earlier, the FTO has the most influence on new officers and complete training is essential if we want to have good quality officers. Our department and chief are strong in accountability. If you screw up, you will be dealt with appropriately but conversely, if you do a good job, they are quick to recognize that."

"I guess it would be a lot like my answer for number 14 in regard to leadership training that the department provides for its officers. I believe any additional training would be greatly beneficial to myself as a patrol officer or supervisor."

"Yes. I have been to several leadership training courses, specifically two different FTO schools. It benefits not just me, but the entire department."

"Yes. The FTO training course focuses heavily on leadership and teaching skills in the adult training model to help conform our instruction to each individual trainee."

"I have attended several training classes involving leadership, including the state-mandated Field Training Officer Course and the New Supervisor Course when I was promoted to the rank of Sergeant. These classes are important and benefit you in a number of ways including how to manage individuals below you. The most important thing I took away from the New Supervisor Course was how to have an effective conversation with your staff. We also have a rather unique "test" when it comes to promoting to a Patrol Sergeant. If selected to be promoted, you have a set amount of time to write an essay. The essay requires you to read the book "Crucial Conversations: Tools for Talking When Stakes are High." We then ask to think of a crucial conversation you had, be it real or fiction, and add notes from the book on how that conversation could have ended on a more positive note."

"This is a detailed class on how to conduct yourself as a leader and how to lead by example. This class assists in understanding an officer's point of view and how to find solutions as a supervisor."

"I have received leadership training at LEMIT specifically but have also had the opportunity to attend conferences and other trainings on the topic."

"I have taken a mandated new supervisor course."

"I have attended many leadership classes over the years, and I think we do a relatively good job having continuing training for leaders."

"Yes. It has served me well."

“I have received training that builds toward being a leader. Our department does offer an FTO Academy.”

16. Additional comments (optional):

“I hope my responses will be beneficial in your study. It is important for people to know that law enforcement officers do have compassion and we feel for those who we serve even if they do not see it every day.”

“I believe law enforcement as a whole need to take a hard look in the mirror and embrace the communities they serve to influence change. We need progressive leaders in the field and legislative mandates that are developed with research and not put together haphazardly or one sided.”

“Thank you for allowing me the opportunity to complete this questionnaire!”

“I am glad that you are researching this topic. I can’t wait to read your final results.”

“This is a difficult case to speak to with accuracy. There was a concerted effort by media and some organizations to maximize this tragedy for political gain or influence. Facts should matter, but many facts were not discussed or considered.”

“I hope the responses were helpful. I would say that I would continue pursuing officers in other departments to get a more accurate assessment. Our department is significantly more progressive than other departments around us. I am afraid that by only having results from one department your results may be skewed.”

“The statements made by [me] are made using my personal experiences and life developments, [and] should not generally reflect the intentions, thoughts, or feelings of agencies at large.”